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  • This thing called communitarianism: A critical review of Matolino's Personhood in African Philosophy 

    Oyowe, O.A. (Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2015)
    The subject of personal identity has received substantial treatment in contemporary African philosophy. Importantly, the dominant approach to personal identity is communitarian. Bernard Matolino's new book Personhood in ...
  • The extreme claim, psychological continuity and the person life view 

    Beck, Simon (Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2015)
    Marya Schechtman has raised a series of worries for the Psychological Continuity Theory of personal identity (PCT) stemming from what Derek Parfit called the 'Extreme Claim'. This is roughly the claim that theories like ...
  • Transplant thought-experiments: Two costly mistakes in discounting them 

    Beck, Simon (Taylor & Francis, 2014)
    ‘Transplant’ thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some ...
  • Am I my brother’s keeper? on personal identity and responsibility 

    Beck, Simon (Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2013)
    The psychological continuity theory of personal identity has recently been accused of not meeting what is claimed to be a fundamental requirement on theories of identity - to explain personal moral responsibility. Although ...
  • Understanding ourselves better 

    Beck, Simon (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013)
    INTRODUCTION: Marya Schechtman and Grant Gillett acknowledge that my case in ‘The misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View’ (2013) has some merits, but neither is moved to change their position and accept that the ...
  • The misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View 

    Beck, Simon (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013)
    Marya Schechtman has argued that contemporary attempts to save Locke’s account of personal identity suffer the same faults that are to be found in Locke, among which is an inability to capture the role our unconscious ...