The admissibility of evidence obtained through human rights violations in Mauritius
Mujuzi, Jamil Ddamulira
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The Constitution of Mauritius, unlike those of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya, does not guide courts on the issue of the admissibility of evidence obtained through human rights. Jurisprudence from Mauritius shows courts have grappled with the issue of establishing the criteria that have to be followed in determining whether or not to admit evidence obtained through human rights violations. Courts have limited their jurisprudence to a few rights: the right to freedom from torture; the right to remain silent; the right against self-incrimination; and the right to counsel. The jurisprudence is inconsistent on the issue of whether or not evidence obtained through human rights violations should be automatically excluded. In some cases courts have held that such evidence is automatically inadmissible whereas in others courts have held that such evidence may be admissible. It is recommended that the best approach would be to only exclude such evidence if its admission would render the trial unfair or would be detrimental to the administration of justice.