1 Introduction

Freedom of testation is recognised as one of the founding principles of the South African law of testate succession. According to this principle, testators are free to dispose of their assets in a will in any manner they deem fit.1 Freedom of testation is not, however, completely unfettered — South African law allows for the restriction of this freedom on the basis of relevant social and economic considerations.2 Some of these restrictions are of a statutory nature, while others are founded upon common law principles.3 In South African law as in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, an important restriction based upon social considerations dictates, that effect will not be given to testamentary provisions if compliance with such provisions will be contra bonos mores or against public policy.4

A disconcerting feature of the South African legal position with regard to the limits imposed upon freedom of testation by the boni mores is the comparative juridical inactivity which has characterised this area of the law in recent years — neither our courts nor the legislature has devoted much attention to freedom of testation in general and more particularly to the limiting effect of the boni mores on this freedom. Indicative of this lack of judicial and legislative rejuvenation is the fact that authoritative decisions by the appellate division (now the supreme court of appeal) on this issue dates back to the 1950s.5 It stands to reason that the role attributed in such decisions to the boni mores for the purpose of limiting freedom of testation may no longer hold true in a (more)

1 I would like to thank the University of the Western Cape for facilitating the research for part of this article through their exchange programme with the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium.
5 Corbett, Habib & Hoffman, The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980) 118; De Waal & Scheuerman Law of Succession 92. For purposes of this discussion the terms “boni mores” and “public policy” will be used as synonyms. See Trust Bank v Afrika Bank v President Versieringsmacchappie 1988 1 SA 546 (W) 552G in support of this proposition and Rylands v Robb 1997 1 BCLR 77 (C) 82A for a contrary view.
6 Armon v Estate Hart 1950 1 SA 559 (A) on testamentary faith and race clauses.
modern legal environment. The paucity of legal development in the above regard becomes even more acute when constitutional development in South Africa since 1994 is considered. This development has raised a pertinent question with regard to the impact of constitutional principles upon the entire body of South African private law. It is, for example, accepted that some of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution has a definite bearing on the relationship between private individuals, be it by way of either direct or indirect horizontal application of such rights. It is furthermore accepted that the effect of constitutional principles (as embodied in the rights contained in the Bill of Rights) will, with regard to the limitation of freedom of testation, primarily occur through the application of the boni mores criterion.

There is, however, as yet little indication as to the precise manner in which such a constitutionally-founded boni mores criterion will operate in order to limit freedom of testation in the South African law. In view of these considerations, it is suggested that a proper evaluation of the limits imposed upon freedom of testation through the application of a constitutionally-founded boni mores criterion is indeed appropriate.

In order to facilitate such an evaluation, this article investigates, by way of comparative research, the role of the boni mores for the purpose of limiting freedom of testation in selected common law and civil law (continental) legal systems. The insight gained from such an investigation will undoubtedly provide valuable direction when this issue is considered in a South African context.

As far as common law legal systems are concerned, the limits imposed by public policy upon freedom of testation in English and Australian law will be considered first. Then Dutch and German law will be similarly investigated as two examples of civil law or continental legal systems. In each of the latter two cases, the limits imposed upon freedom of testation by good morals (goede zeden in Dutch law and guten Sitten in German law) will be considered. The investigation of the issue in each of the above-mentioned legal systems will focus primarily on the approach (in terms of public policy or good morals) to prescriptive testamentary provisions whereby it is attempted to control the conduct of beneficiaries or to regulate the exploitation of assets in a manner which infringes the

---

1 In the famous words of Hablo "Jewish Fruits and Race Classes in Wills — A Note on Arison v Estin v Hare 1950 1 SA 539 (A)" 1990 "The New South African Law Journal 231 240." Times change and conceptions of public policy change with them.

2 Act 108 of 1996.


6 The only substantial consideration of the issue to date is by De Waal in Rautenbach & De Waal Bill of Rights Compendium 3G1. De Waal’s discussion is, however, confined to the limiting effect of the equality clause of the Bill of Rights upon freedom of testation.

7 I shall undertake this task in a forthcoming article.
fundamental rights of (instituted and/or potential) beneficiaries. To this end particular emphasis will be placed on testamentary provisions based on race, nationality and religion.

2 Freedom of testation and its limitation in Common Law legal systems

2.1 English law

2.1.1 Freedom of testation in English law

Testate succession during the Anglo-Saxon period in England was comparatively undeveloped and imperfect. The Norman conquest (1066) did not expedite development in this area of the law as the ecclesiastical courts and the King's Court soon gained strict control over deceased estates. As the influence of these courts waned, English testators enjoyed greater freedom (within certain broad limits) to dispose of their assets by way of will. This freedom was later enhanced by various statutory measures such as the Statute of Wills of 1540, the Statute of Tenures of 1660, the Dower Act of 1833, the Married Women's Property Act of 1882 and the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act of 1891. At the height of political and economic laissez-faire during the nineteenth century, the freedom of testamentary disposition was virtually unfettered in English law. This freedom was, however, again substantially restricted in favour of a deceased's dependants by the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act of 1938 and the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act of 1975.

Finch et al summarise the position in English law with regard to freedom of testation as follows:

"The concept of testamentary freedom... is of central importance to legislation on wills in the context of English law... each testator is free to dispose of his or her property on the basis of individual choice. In its purest form it implies the absolute right of the individual over property, in death as well as in life. In reality the law places some restrictions on that right. However, in essence, under English law the testator has considerable freedom to decide who shall receive bequests, and also what form those bequests shall take."

English law supports freedom of testation by various other means, most importantly through the acknowledgement of private ownership. Miller explains the relationship between private ownership and private succession (which in turn is premised upon freedom of testation) in English law as follows:

"The law of succession presupposes the existence of private property, that is property owned and possessed by individuals. Given that the rules of succession are necessary in a society which recognises private property... the power of testation is a part of the power of gift.

15 Potter English Legal History 252–255; Pollock & Maitland History of English Law 332–333; Miller The Machinery of Succession 3.
16 Holdsworth A History of English Law (1938) 22.
17 Other relevant restrictions on freedom of testation in English law relate to mutual wills, esoppel, contractual succession and perpetuities.
19 The Machinery of Succession 2–3.
The limits imposed upon freedom of testation by public policy in English law

2.1.2 General observations

As indicated above, the United Kingdom is unfamiliar with a constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights upon which the limitation of freedom of testation with regard to prescriptive testamentary provisions (which ostensibly infringe the fundamental rights of (instituted and/or potential) beneficiaries) can be founded. Some of the rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights have, however, acquired full legal force and effect in the United Kingdom on the basis of the Human Rights Act. Various English commentators maintain that the Convention rights thus embodied in the Human Rights Act enjoy at least indirect horizontal application in the United Kingdom and that it can, therefore, also influence the relationship between private individuals. Should horizontal effect indeed be attributed to Convention rights, it is quite possible that such rights will in future shape the English legal position with regard to the limitation of freedom of testation on the basis of public policy, particularly by defining public policy for the purpose of the limitation of free testamentary disposition. At present, however, contentious testamentary provisions, particularly those based on race, nationality and religion, are dealt with in English law, as far as

20 Confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights in Mareck v Belgium 13 June 1979 Series A Volume 31.
21 Relevant rights include the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (a 9 of the Convention); the right to freedom of expression (a 10 of the Convention); the right to freedom of association (a 11 of the Convention) and the right to marry (a 12 of the Convention). The Convention also contains a prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status (a 14 of the Convention).
public policy is concerned, predominantly in accordance with the courts' view of what is acceptable and what is not. The role of public policy in the latter regard is aptly described (with reference to Australian law but obviously equally applicable to English law) by Atherton and Vines:23

"Public policy . . . suggests some overriding qualification of legal rules in the public interest: that at some point the individual's freedom of action is checked in the interest of some higher good; Public policy . . . is . . . an explanation of a group of rules and principles which overrides the freedom of testamentary disposition and the freedom of inheritance." 24

English courts have in this regard labeled the following testamentary provisions (principally in the form of testamentary conditions) as offending against public policy:

(a) A condition which encourages a beneficiary to commit a crime or to participate in any other act forbidden by law.25
(b) A condition which requires of a beneficiary to exert influence with regard to a political matter, for example, the acquisition of a peerage.26
(c) A condition which effects the separation between parent and child.27
(d) A condition which interferes with the religious education of a child.28
(e) A condition which prevents a beneficiary from defending the realm or from occupying a public office.29
(f) A condition in general restraint of marriage.30
(g) A condition which prevents a beneficiary from practicing a certain trade.31

2 1 2 2 Restriction of freedom of testation with regard to prescriptive testamentary provisions

The manner in which public policy is employed in English law to address the issue of the validity or otherwise of prescriptive testamentary provisions, particularly those based on race, nationality and religion, is somewhat controversial. Such provisions are, on the one hand, often regarded as not offending against public policy and hence completely valid. This approach is, on the other hand, regularly questioned, particularly on the basis that such provisions should indeed be considered as contrary to public policy. The following discussion of the English legal position in this regard proceeds on the basis of a dual

24 Mitchell v Reynolds (1711) 1 P Wms 181; Egeron v Earl of Brownlow (1853) 4 HL Cas 1; Shrewsbury v Hope Scott (1859) 6 Jur NS 452.
25 Earl v Kingston v Pierspon (1681) 1 Vinn 5; Egeron v Earl of Brownlow (1853) 4 HL Cas 1.
26 Re Sandbrook, Noel v Sandbrook [1912] 2 Ch 471; Re Roulter, Capital and Counties Bank v Roulter [1922] 1 Ch 75; Re Carborne, Hodge and Nabarro v Smith [1943] 2 All ER 7; Re Piper, Dodd v Piper [1946] 2 All ER 503.
27 Re Tregg, Public Trustees v Bryant [1936] 2 All ER 876; Re Blake, Lynch v Lombard [1955] IR 89.
28 Re Board, Reversorium and General Securities v Hall, Re Board v Hall [1908] 1 Ch 383; Re Edgar, Cohen v Edgar (1939) 4 All ER 635.
29 Long v Dennis (1767) 1 Burr 2052; Morley v Reynolds, Morley v Linkom (1843) 2 Hare 570.
30 Cooke v Turner (1846) 15 M&K 727; Egeron v Earl of Brownlow (1853) 4 HL Cas 1.
distinction. Firstly, prescriptive testamentary provisions aimed at controlling the conduct of beneficiaries will firstly be discussed with reference to testamentary forfeiture clauses. Prescriptive testamentary provisions aimed at regulating the exploitation of assets will thereafter be discussed with reference to charitable testamentary bequests.

2122 Testamentary forfeiture clauses

In English law, testamentary forfeiture clauses often take the form of so-called conditions subsequent in terms of which a bequest is terminated upon the occurrence of an uncertain future event.31 Prescriptive forfeiture clauses founded on race, nationality or religion which direct beneficiaries’ religious convictions or choice of spouse are well-known in English law. These provisions are generally regarded as not in conflict with public policy.32 This position is supported by the fact that the provisions of the Race Relations Act of 1976, which is aimed at combating discrimination on racial grounds, does not apply with regard to testamentary bequests and private trusts.33

The view in favour of the validity of the testamentary provisions under discussion has, however, been questioned in the past. In Clayton v Ramsden, for example, a testator stipulated that his daughter would forfeit her testamentary benefit, should she marry “a person who is not of Jewish parentage and of the Jewish faith.”34 Lord Russell correctly describes the effect of this provision as follows.35

“[T]his is a case in which the testator has sought . . . to direct the lives of his children from the grave . . . [and] . . . to control his daughter Edna’s choice of husband.”

Lord Romer decides, without specific reference to public policy, that such a bequest is completely acceptable.36 A word of warning is, however, offered by Lord Atkin:37

“For my own part I view with disfavour the power of testators to control from their graves the choice in marriage of their beneficiaries, and should not be dismayed if the power were to disappear.”

The court’s general reluctance to grant relief on the basis of policy-considerations is somewhat tempered by the majority’s decision that the terms “of Jewish parentage” and “of the Jewish faith” are conceptually too uncertain to ensure proper effect and that the condition in casu therefore fails as a result of vagueness.

The leading English decision on the present issue is by the House of Lords in Blathwayt v Lord Cawley, where a testator provided for forfeiture of trust benefits if, amongst other things, any of the

32 Perrin v Lyon (1887) 9 East 170; Jenner v Turner (1880) 16 ChD 188; Hodgson v Halford (1879) 2 ChD 995; Re May, Egger v May [1932] 1 Ch 99.
34 [1960] 1 All ER 16.
35 17. See a similar observation by Lord Romer at 20–21.
36 21.
37 17.
beneficiaries should "be or become a Roman Catholic". Lord Wilberforce admits to the desirability of a reconsideration of the validity traditionally attributed in English law to provisions of this kind:

"[I] do not doubt that conceptions of public policy should move with the times and that widely accepted treaties and statutes [in case reference was made to the Race Relations Act as well as the European Convention on Human Rights] may point to the direction in which such conceptions, as applied by the courts, ought to move. It may well be that conditions such as these are, or at least are becoming, inconsistent with standards now widely accepted."

Lord Wilberforce is, however, of the opinion that the present provision should not be regarded as invalid on the basis of policy considerations. He advances two reasons for his view. Concluding that the provision is contrary to public policy, would firstly detract from the prominence of freedom of testation in English law.

"To do so would bring about a substantial reduction of another freedom, firmly rooted in our law, namely that of testamentary disposition."

Secondly, testamentary benefiting is secondly per definition premised on personal choice and preference, which is not necessarily to be equated with discrimination.

"Discrimination is not the same thing as choice: it operates over a larger and less personal area, and neither by express provision nor by implication has private selection yet become a matter of public policy."

Lord Wilberforce is supported in this approach by the rest of the court. Lord Cross comments, for example:

"[T]he true is that it is widely thought nowadays that it is wrong for a government to treat some of its citizens less favourably than others because of differences in their religious beliefs; but it does not follow from that that it is against public policy for an adherent of one religion to distinguish in disposing of his property between adherents of his faith and those of another."

Lord Edmund-Davies concurs with this view:

"[N]ot unimportant matter of public policy is involved in limiting a testator's power to dispose of his own property in his own way without clear justification for so curtailing his freedom is first established, and I echo the doubt expressed by Lord Cross ... that it is self-evidently against public policy for an adherent of one religion to distinguish between people of one faith or another when he is making his testamentary dispositions."

The court decides, therefore, that the conditional forfeiture clause in casu does not conflict with public policy. The court also holds that the forfeiture clause cannot be regarded as conceptually too vague or uncertain to ensure proper effect. The testator's wishes are thus maintained.

Several aspects with regard to the Blathwayt decision deserve comment. Firstly, Lord Wilberforce's statement that private selection

---

38 [1975] 3 All ER 625.
39 636.
40 636.
41 636.
42 639.
43 649.
by a testator, supported by his freedom of testamentary disposition, is not a matter to be dealt with in terms of public policy can not be accepted without qualification. Freedom of testation as well as its limitation is, as stated earlier, founded upon relevant social and economic considerations. These considerations, either independently or in mutual co-operation, determine the content and operation of public policy. Therefore, private selection, if it exceeds the boundaries imposed by particularly policy-defining social considerations, can indeed offend against public policy in appropriate circumstances. It is submitted that this will principally occur when a testator uses freedom of testation to exert undue influence in the private lives of beneficiaries to such an extent that the fundamental rights of the beneficiaries concerned are (discriminatorily) infringed.

Secondly, Lord Simon arrives at his decision in a somewhat positivistic manner. 44

"Courts are concerned with public policy only insofar as it has been manifested by parliamentary sanction or embodied in rules of law having binding judicial force."

It is submitted that particularly the provisions of the Human Rights Act, insofar as they enjoy horizontal application, amply embody public policy in binding legal (and legislative) rules. In the present context, the provisions of this Act therefore facilitate not only Lord Simon's approach to public policy but also satisfy the requirement of a "clear justification for so curtailting his [a testator's] freedom" asserted upon by Lord Edmund-Davies above.

Thirdly, Lord Simon correctly acknowledges that the evaluation of public policy in any given instance can only proceed with due consideration of the particular facts and circumstances of the individual case. 45

"The actual personal circumstances can differ so greatly in these matters from case to case that it is difficult to apply a general rule of public policy which is not either practically unreal in many cases or open to some logical objection."

Unfortunately, the court provides little indication of the factors to be considered in such a casuistic evaluation. One valuable observation is, however, made in this regard by Lord Wilberforce. He suggests that the personal inclination and responsibility of the individual beneficiary (in casu towards the acquisition of a material benefit) should be weighed carefully against the ostensible infringement of a fundamental right of such beneficiary (in casu religious freedom). 46

"[A] choice between considerations of material wealth and spiritual welfare has to be made by many . . . and it would be cynical to assume that these cannot be conscientiously and rightly made."

The public policy standpoint enunciated almost three decades ago in Blathwayt v Lord Cawley with regard to prescriptive testamentary forfeiture clauses based on race, nationality and religion, still represents

44 637.
45 637.
46 637. See similar remarks by Lord Cross at 644 and Lord Fraser at 650.
the prevailing legal position in English law. It will be interesting to see whether (and if so, to what extent) the indirect horizontal application of relevant provisions of the Human Rights Act will bring about a metamorphosis in the approach to this contentious issue.

2 1 2 2 2 Charitable testamentary bequests

English law allows testators to confine benefits in terms of charitable bequests (often in the form of charitable trusts) to groupings of their choice. 47 This approach is supported by English law's traditional classification of charitable trusts as formulated in Commissioner for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pensel. 48 Lord MacNagthen decides in casu that charitable trusts can be identified under four distinct headings, namely trusts for the relief of poverty, trusts for educational purposes, religious trusts and trusts which cannot be identified under any one of the aforementioned three headings, but which still operate for the benefit of the community. 49 English law allows testators to regulate the exploitation of assets by means of charitable trusts on the grounds of, inter alia, race, nationality and religion, as long as this quadruple classification can accommodate such trusts. 50

The above legal position is strengthened by the fact that the Race Relations Act of 1976 (aimed at combating discrimination on racial grounds) as well as the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 (aimed at combating discrimination on the ground of gender) allow for certain concessions in favour of charities.

Section 34 of the Race Relations Act provides, for example, that discrimination will not be unlawful if such discrimination is necessary in order to give effect to the provisions of any instrument directing the operation of a charity and in terms of which benefits are awarded to persons of a particular racial group. This section is, however, not applicable with regard to provisions which limit benefits on the basis of race or colour. Oakley therefore contends that this statutory provision allows a charitable trust to provide validly for the education of, for example, Pakistani's or Spaniards only, but that a similar charitable trust which expressly excludes Pakistani's or Spaniards from its benefits, will conflict with this statutory provision. 51 Section 34 of the Act furthermore provides that, in the case of a provision which defines a group or class of beneficiaries with reference to colour, such reference must be regarded as void and has to be ignored by the trustees of the charity concerned. A trust to educate white children in Coventry will therefore simply become a trust to educate children in Coventry. 52

48 [1891] AC 531.
49 583.
Section 43 of the Sex Discrimination Act provides that conduct will not be unlawful if such conduct occurs pursuant to the provisions of any instrument directing the operation of a charity and in terms of which benefits are bestowed upon the members of one gender only. This section allows for the existence of so-called “single sex charities” such as the YMCA, the YWCA, the Boy Scouts and the Girl Guides. Section 7(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act does, however, provide for certain restrictions with regard to educational charities in the above regard. This section stipulates that the trustees of any such charity can apply to the appropriate minister for the removal or amendment (subject to relevant administrative procedures) of any restriction which pertains to their organisation so as to enable them to award benefits to members of both genders.

It is therefore evident that, despite the general lenient approach to charities in terms of the above-mentioned legislation, certain legislative restrictions are indeed imposed upon charities as far as bestowing benefits on the basis of race, colour and gender is concerned. These restrictive measures are complemented by various non-statutory mechanisms of English law to further escape the contentious results of charitable bequests founded on, inter alia, race, nationality and religion.

One such mechanism concerns the requirement that charities have to display an element of public benefit. In Inland Revenue Commissioners v Baddeley, Viscount Simonds formulates an important distinction with regard to this requirement when he has to decide upon the validity of a charitable trust:

"[T]here is a distinction between a form of relief extended to the whole community, yet by its very nature advantageous to the few and a form of relief accorded to a selected few out of a larger number equally willing and able to take advantage of it."

In the former case, a charitable trust can validly be constituted, while no such trust exists in the latter case, simply because the required element of public benefit is absent. This distinction prompts Viscount Simonds to hold that a trust inter vivos created for, amongst other things, “the promotion of the religious and physical well-being of persons resident in the County Boroughs of West Ham and Leyton in the County of Essex who are members or likely to become members of the Methodist Church” does not, due to the absence of the required element of public benefit, constitute a valid charitable trust. A similar result is achieved in Davies v Perpetual Trustee Company with regard to a testamentary trust for “the Presbyterians, the descendants of those settled in the Colony hailing from or born in the North of Ireland for purposes of establishing a college for the education and tuition of their youth”. Lord Morton describes the intended beneficiaries in casu as “a fluctuating body of private individuals” and holds that the trust

55 592-593.
56 [1939] AC 439.
provisions display no element of public benefit. The trust is therefore not to be regarded as a valid charitable trust.\footnote{436. See also Caffaro (Trustees of the Abdul Gaffoor Trust) v Commissioner of Income Tax, Colombo [1961] AC 584. In Fergy v Somerville [1924] AC 496 a testamentary bequest “for the benefit of New South Wales ... soldiers” returning from the First World War was, however, regarded as a valid charitable trust.}

Another mechanism relates to the application of the _cy prés_ doctrine. This doctrine allows a court to identify and implement an alternative trust purpose if the original purpose identified by the founder of a charitable trust cannot be achieved because it has been rendered impossible, impractical or unlawful, provided that the purpose identified by the court corresponds closely with that originally identified by the founder. English courts have in the past employed the _cy prés_ doctrine to avoid the contentious consequences of charitable bequests founded on race, nationality and religion.

One such case is _In re Lysaght, Hill v The Royal College of Surgeons_.\footnote{[1966] Ch 191.} The testatrix _in casu_ bequeathed the residue of her estate to trustees for the purpose of the creation of an endowment fund of £5 000 in favour of The Royal College of Surgeons, to be administered by the college itself. The fund had to be utilised for the payment of bursaries to students, but in this regard the testatrix prescribed that any recipient of a bursary “must be a British born subject and not of the Jewish or Roman Catholic faith”. The college declared itself unwilling to administer the fund in respect of which (in their view) discriminatory measures applied. The college therefore approached the court to determine whether the trust created by the testatrix can indeed be labelled a charitable trust and, if so, whether the trustees should pay the £5 000 to the college or, alternatively, utilize it _cy prés_.

Buckley J holds that the will of the testatrix evinces a clear charitable intention and purpose. This purpose is manifested in the bequest of the endowment fund to the college. He is of the opinion, however, that the restriction imposed by the testatrix with regard to religion cannot be regarded as contrary to public policy:\footnote{204-205.}

> “I accept that racial and religious discrimination is nowadays widely regarded as deplorable in many respects . . . but I think that it is going much too far to say that the endowment of a charity, the beneficiaries of which are to be drawn from a particular faith or are to exclude adherents of a particular faith, is contrary to public policy.”

Buckley J, however, still has to address the unwillingness of the college to administer the endowment fund under the restrictions prescribed by the testatrix. In this regard he comes to the conclusion that the restrictions imposed do not constitute an essential portion of the testatrix’s general charitable purpose.\footnote{203.} He is furthermore of the opinion that these restrictions render the trust purpose impractical and that relief can therefore be granted in terms of the _cy prés_ doctrine.\footnote{209.}
"The existence on the provision for religious discrimination would defeat the paramount intention of the testatrix in the present case; indeed it would destroy the trust, for it would result in the college disclaiming the trustship, which would occasion the failure of the trust.

Accordingly . . . the court can and should enable the college to carry the trust into effect without the element of religious discrimination."

Buckley J decides therefore that the words "and not of the Jewish or Roman Catholic faith" should not be read as part of the trust provisions. 62

It is evident that, despite English law's lenient approach to prescriptive charitable testamentary bequests based on race, nationality and religion, English courts readily employ the above mechanisms in order to avoid the contentious consequences of such bequests. However, public policy plays little part in this regard.

2.2 Australian Law

2.2.1 Freedom of testation in Australian law

The English colonised Australia during the 1780's. Existing British legislation and common law applied in the new colonies, and the British parliament also enjoyed legislative power with regard to such colonies. 63 Australia gradually obtained independence from Britain, but Australian law remains closely related to that of Britain. In the words of Brennan J in Mabo v State of Queensland (No 2): 64

"Australian law is not only the historical successor of, but is an organic development from, the law of England."

This is true also with regard to the Australian law of succession, as stated by Atherton and Vines. 65

"Since inheritance is an area of the law which is regulated by the [Australian] States rather than the Commonwealth, it is clear that English law continued to be able to influence the jurisdictions well into the twentieth century. Most of this influence appeared in the form of common legislation and a view that the English cases were the most persuasive precedents for Australian courts to follow."

Freedom of testation was readily received as one of the fundamentals of the English law of testate succession in Australian law. Hardingham et al declares in this regard: 66

"The law of the various Australian States and Territories . . . like the law of England, confer on a mature citizen the liberty to make an effective declaration as to what is to be done after his death in relation to the inheritable property which he owns immediately before his death."

Private succession and freedom of testation are supported in Australian law, as in English law, 67 by the acknowledgement of private

62 A similar result was achieved in Re Woodhouse, Lloyd's Bank v London College of Music (1981) 1 All ER 202 with regard to a testamentary bequest to the College of Music towards the payment of an annual bursary to "a promising boy . . . of British Nationality and Birth". See also In re Dominion Students' Hall Trust, Dominion Students' Hall Trust v Attorney General (1947) Ch 183.
64 (1993) 175 CLR 1 18.
65 Australian Succession Law 47.
66 Wills and Intestacy in Australia and New Zealand (1983) 1.
67 See 2.1.1.
ownership. Atherton and Vines provide an Australian perspective in this regard.68

"Succession law is about the transmission of property on death. . . . It is possible to view the ability to pass on property at the time of one’s death as a right which is inherent in the nature of the ownership of property."

Australian law does not, in the absence of a bill of rights in the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act of 1900, recognise a constitutional guarantee of private ownership and private succession, (and hence of freedom of testation).

2 2 2 The limits imposed upon freedom of testation by public policy in Australian law

2 2 2 1 General observations

As indicated above, Australia is unfamiliar with a comprehensive constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights upon which the limitation of freedom of testation with regard to prescriptive testamentary provisions (which ostensibly infringe the fundamental rights of (instituted and/or potential) beneficiaries) can be founded. The one or two fundamental rights guaranteed in the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, as well as relevant provisions of Commonwealth legislation aimed at combating discrimination, operate either strictly vertically or are otherwise not available to litigants in private disputes on the contents of wills.69 Australian law therefore deals with contentious testamentary provisions, particularly those based on race, nationality and religion, in accordance with public policy as formulated and applied by the courts.

Australian courts have in this regard labeled the following testamentary provisions (principally in the form of testamentary conditions) as offending against public policy:

(a) A condition which encourages a beneficiary to commit a crime or to participate in any other act forbidden by law.70
(b) A condition which excludes the jurisdiction of a court or which precludes a beneficiary from litigation with regard to the particular will.71
(c) A condition which affects the separation between parent and child.72
(d) A condition which prevents a parent from performing his/her parental duties.73
(e) A condition in general restraint of marriage.74

68 Australian Succession Law 17–18.
70 Wallace v Wallace (1898) 24 VLR 839; Re Ellis, Perpetual Trustee v Ellis (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 470.
71 Permanent Trustee v Dougall (1931) 34 SR (NSW) 85; Re Chester (1978) 19 SASR 247.
72 Re Thomason (1966) SASR 278.
73 Re Ellis, Perpetual Trustee v Ellis (1929) 29 SR (NSW) 70.
74 Carredos v Carredos (1913) VLR 1; Re Hartman [1960] Tas SR 16; Re Thomason [1966] SASR 278.
2 2 2 2 Restriction of freedom of testation with regard to prescriptive testamentary provisions

The manner in which public policy is employed in Australian law to address the issue of the validity of prescriptive testamentary provisions, particularly those based on race, nationality and religion, is as controversial as in English law. Such provisions are, on the one hand, often regarded as not offending against public policy and hence completely valid. This approach is, on the other hand, regularly questioned, particularly on the basis that such provisions should indeed be considered as contrary to public policy. The discussion hereafter of the Australian legal position in this regard proceeds on a similar basis as the discussion of the English legal position. Firstly, prescriptive testamentary provisions aimed at controlling the conduct of beneficiaries will be discussed with reference to testamentary forfeiture clauses. Prescriptive testamentary provisions aimed at regulating the exploitation of assets will thereafter be discussed with reference to charitable testamentary bequests.

2 2 2 2 1 Testamentary forfeiture clauses

In Australian law, as in English law, testamentary forfeiture clauses often take the form of so-called “conditions subsequent” in terms of which a bequest is terminated on the occurrence of an uncertain future event. 73 Prescriptive forfeiture clauses founded upon race, nationality or religion are well-known in Australian law. These provisions are generally dealt with on the basis of vagueness or uncertainty, rather than with reference to policy considerations. Such provisions have, however, in a few cases been cursorily regarded as not in conflict with public policy. 76

In Trustees of Church Property of the Diocese of Newcastle v Ebbeck, the court investigates this issue in greater detail. 77 The testator in casu bequeathed the residue of his estate to his wife and directed that, upon her death, it should go to their three sons in equal shares. The bequest to each son was made subject to the condition “that he and his wife shall, at the date of death of my wife or at my death should my wife predecease me profess the Protestant faith”. The testator provided for forfeiture of benefits should this condition not be fulfilled. The validity of the bequest is contested, inter alia, on the ground that it offends against public policy. This view finds favour with the majority of the court. Dixon CJ bases his decision in this regard on the negative consequences brought about by the forfeiture clause, particularly with reference to the dilemma resulting from the choice between preservation of marriage on the one hand and adherence to a chosen faith on the other. He uses a marriage between one of the testator’s Protestant sons and a Roman Catholic wife as an example. 78

73 Atherton & Vines Australian Succession Law 395–396.
78 403–404.
“In a marriage between a Protestant husband and a Roman Catholic wife [the conditional bequest in case] makes the continued adherence of the wife to her faith the cause of his forfeiting his very substantial share in his father’s estate with the alternative of his disencumbering himself of his wife before he mother dies. Whether desirously or not such a disposition creates an opposition between the wife’s religious beliefs and a serious temporal interest of the husband. . . . If she cannot or will not desert her faith it provides an inducement to him of a pecuniary or proprietary nature the operation of which cannot be put in opposition to the policy of the law, its policy to preserve and maintain marriage. . . . Assuming that the donee himself retains his Protestant faith, he and his wife remain conscious that her adherence throughout his mother’s life to her own faith stands between him and his inheritance. The husband on his part might be a man of firm mind and of a lofty and generous sentiment, but it would be difficult for many a man in such a situation to prevent his mind on occasions from adverting rather to the advantages of divorce than the blessings of marriage, that is to say if ever unhappy differences arose or clouds appeared which unless dispelled might develop such a prospect. In an uneasy marriage a more fruitful apple of discord could hardly be placed upon the domestic board.”

Dixon CJ therefore, pursuant to the social considerations referred to in the above dictum, regards the condition embodied in the forfeiture clause as contrary to public policy and hence invalid. He is supported, with a slight shift in emphasis, by Windeyer J: 79

“The vice of the situation that this condition creates does not, I think, arise from the possibility of capricity on the part of the husband overmastering affection and considerate loyalty. It arises from the conflict of emotions, loyalties and duties that it creates for the wife. She must decide before a given date whether to adhere to her faith and thus cause her husband to lose his patrimony, or in the interests of the husband and their children to renounce her faith. It is not, I think, fanciful to regard such a situation as containing the seeds of unhappy differences and not the less so if the spouses be good and conscientious people.”

It is evident that the majority of the court finds the attempt by the testator to control, by means of the power of the purse, the religious convictions and marital harmony of the beneficiaries and others concerned, as well as the resultant dilemma of choice with regard to the acquisition of a testamentary benefit, the preservation of marriage and the adherence to a chosen faith, as the determining factors in judging the present condition untenable in view of public policy. The minority of the court is, however, not persuaded by this point of view. Kitto J, much like Lord Wilberforce in Blathwayt v Lord Cowley, 80 is of the opinion that the last-mentioned dilemma does not in itself justify the conclusion reached by the majority—the personal inclination and responsibility of the individual beneficiary must be factored into the equation, with particular reference to the facts and circumstances of each individual case. 81

“[I]t is not difficult to believe that in some cases the offer of a legacy to one spouse on condition that the other will renounce an existing religious adherence may lead to discord between them. But whether it will, and to what extent it will, must depend on the particular circumstances of every case. . . . I find myself unable to accept, as a general proposition, that in most cases or even in a considerable number of cases, the pecuniary advantage thus bestowed upon dissolution of the marriage would appeal to the husband so strongly that, notwithstanding all considerations of opposite tendency, he would be likely to feel a real temptation to seek an end to his marriage, and to yield to it for the sake of the luce.”

79 417.
80 See 2 1 2 2 1.
81 409–411.
Kitto J does therefore not regard the present condition as contrary to public policy. The *Ebbeck*-decision provides a good example of what Mackie describes as the "real tension between testamentary conditions and the principle of freedom of testation" in Australian law — tension which has as yet not been satisfactorily defused by the Australian courts.82

2 2 2 2 Charitable testamentary bequests

The Australian common law position with regard to prescriptive charitable testamentary bequests corresponds to a large extent with that of English law. Australian law allows testators to confine benefits in terms of charitable bequests (often in the form of charitable trusts) to groupings of their choice. This approach is supported by the acceptance in Australian law of English law’s traditional classification of charitable trusts as formulated in *Commissioner for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel*83: Australian law allows testators to regulate the exploitation of assets by means of charitable trusts on the grounds of, *inter alia*, race, nationality and religion, as long as this quadruple classification can accommodate such trusts.84 In this light a charitable trust "for a training farm for orphan lads being Australians,"85 a bequest of trust income "for such purposes relating to the work of St John the Baptist Church of England,"86 a trust "for the benefit of [Armenian] orphans whose fathers fought with the Russian Army against Germany and Japan in the World War,"87 a bequest of trust income "to the Adelaide Hebrew Congregation"88 and a trust "to provide accommodation for transient aborigines"89 have all been regarded as valid by Australian courts.

Australian law, emulating the English legal position, acknowledges certain mechanisms to escape the contentious results of charitable bequests founded *inter alia*, race, nationality and religion. In accordance with the English decision in *Inland Revenue Commissioners v Baddeley*,90 Australian law requires charities to display an element of public benefit. In the absence of this requirement, an (attempted) charitable bequest cannot be labelled as such. In *Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne v Lawlor* a trust "to establish a Roman Catholic daily newspaper" was not regarded as a valid charitable trust.91 The court opines that the promotion of the Roman Catholic faith was not the sole purpose of the newspaper, but that other non-religious purposes were also intended. These non-religious purposes did not satisfy the requirement of public

---

83 See 2 1 2 2 2.
84 Maugher & Gummow *Jacob's Law of Trusts in Australia* (1997) 185.
85 Attorney-General for New South Wales v *Perpetual Trustee Company* (1946) 63 CLR 209.
86 *Union Trustee Company v Church of England Property Trust* (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 298.
87 *Armenian General Benevolent Union v Union Trustee Company of Australia* (1952) 87 CLR 597.
89 *Aboriginal Hostels v Durrow City Council* (1985) LGRA 414.
90 See 2 1 2 2 2.
91 (1934) 51 CLR 1. See also *Re Davies* (1932) 48 TLR 539.
benefit and rendered the entire bequest ineffective as a charitable trust.\footnote{Meagher & Gunnison \textit{Law of Trusts in Australia} 192–193 and 206–207.} It is furthermore accepted, in principle, that the \textit{cy près} doctrine can, in accordance with the English decision in \textit{In re Lysaght, Hill v The Royal College of Surgeons},\footnote{See 2.1.2.2.} be employed in Australian law to give effect to the provisions of a charitable trust, while at the same time negating the contentious consequences of such provisions founded on, for example, race, nationality and religion. Australian courts have, however, as yet not had the opportunity to employ the \textit{cy près} doctrine in this regard.

It is evident that Australian law, while adopting a lenient approach towards prescriptive charitable testamentary bequests, recognises certain mechanisms to avoid the contentious consequences of such bequests based on race, nationality and religion. Public policy plays, as in English law, little part in this regard.

3 Freedom of testation and its limitation in Civil law (Continental) legal systems

3.1 Dutch law

3.1.1 Freedom of testation in Dutch law

The Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Dutch Kingdom) was established in 1813. The Dutch adapted the provisions of the French civil code, the \textit{Code Napoléon}, (already in force in the Netherlands at that time) as the codification of their civil law and produced the \textit{Burgerlijk Wetboek}, which came into force in 1838. The \textit{Burgerlijk Wetboek} remained in force as the Dutch civil code for more than a century until a new code was commissioned in 1947. This commission resulted in the compilation of the \textit{Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek}. Dutch law of succession, which comprises a mixture of successionary rules from the \textit{Code Napoléon} and principles from Roman and Germanic law of succession, was originally contained under the main heading of “Ownership” in Titles 11–17 of Book 3 of the \textit{Burgerlijk Wetboek}. It has now been moved as an independent subject to Titles 1–5 of Book 4 of the \textit{Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek}. Book 4 will, however, only be implemented in full by 2001.\footnote{Gerwer, Sorgdrager, Stutterheim & Hidma \textit{Het Systeem van het Nederlandse Privaatrecht} (1995) 47–54, 375–376; Kasdorp, Kleya, Wodekind & Zwannes \textit{Erfrechts Compendium} (1998) 2; Perrick \textit{Erfrecht} (1996) 2.}

Freedom of testation (\textit{testeerrijheid}) constitutes one of the founding principles of the Dutch law of succession. Kasdorp \textit{et al} declares in this regard:\footnote{Erfrechts Compendium 43.}

\begin{quote}
In een testament kunnen worden opgenomen alle niet met de openbare orde en goede zeden strijdende bepalingen, bestemd om na deode te werken en rakende privaatrechtelijke belangen waarover de testator de vrije beschikking heeft.\footnote{A will can contain any interest in terms of private law which is not contrary to public policy or the public order and which is destined to devolve upon death in terms of the testator’s power of free disposition.” (My translation.)} \end{quote}
Dutch law lends support to freedom of testation through the recognition of private ownership and private succession. Perrick states this proposition as follows: 97

"Zolang men een eigenaar de vrije beschikking over zijn goederen tijdens zijn leven zal laten, zolang zal men hem ook de bevoegdheid moeten toekennen, om bij uiterste wilbeschikking over zijn goederen te beschikken. En in zoverre het recht deze bevoegdheid tot het maken van uiterste wilbeschikkenen erkent, in zover zal het erfrecht een onverbloed zijn van die individuele eigendom." 98

Dutch law does not recognise a constitutional guarantee of private ownership and private succession. Article 14 of the Dutch Grondwet (Constitution) grants protection against expropriation, destruction and disuse of property, but this provision is not regarded as a comprehensive guarantee of private ownership in Dutch law.99 The Netherlands is a co-signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, but the guarantee of private ownership embodied in Article 1 of the First Protocol to this Convention is similarly not regarded as a guarantee to the same effect in Dutch law.

3 1 2 The limits imposed upon freedom of testation by good morals (goede zeden) in Dutch law

3 1 2 1 General observations

Chapter 1 of the Dutch Grondwet guarantees a number of fundamental rights (grondrechten). Chapter 1 contains, inter alia, an equality clause (article 1) which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race, gender or any other consideration. Other relevant rights guaranteed in this Chapter include the right to freedom of religion and belief (article 6), the right to freedom of association (article 8) and the right to privacy (article 10). It is accepted that these rights enjoy at least indirect horizontal application in appropriate circumstances. They are therefore instrumental in the determination of Dutch juridical concepts such as good faith and good morals.100 There has, however, been little judicial reference to these rights as far as the limits imposed upon freedom of testation by good morals in Dutch law are concerned. It is nevertheless argued by many Dutch writers that fundamental rights can in principle affect the general approach to prescriptive testamentary provisions, particularly by guiding a court in its

98 "If an owner is allowed to freely dispose of his property during his lifetime, he must also be allowed to dispose of it by will. As long as the law recognizes such testamentary disposition, the law of succession will remain a consequence of individual ownership." (My translation)
interpretation and application of the good morals criterion. The necessity of such a role for fundamental rights is explained as follows by Coene:

"Het komt mij voor dat ook tussen testator en legataris geen werkelijke verhouding van gelijkheid bestaat en dat het recht dat een eigenaar van goederen heeft om vrij over die goederen te beschikken hem een zekere machtspositie i.a.v. de (kandidaat) tegensteende zou kunnen geven die hij kan aanwenden om invloed uit te oefenen op diens intieme levenssfeer." 

In view of these considerations, the discussion hereafter of the relevant Dutch legal position will commence with a theoretical perspective on the influence of fundamental rights on prescriptive testamentary provisions, whereupon the limiting role of good morals with regard to freedom of testation in Dutch law will be examined.

3 1 2 2 Restriction of freedom of testation with regard to prescriptive testamentary provisions

3 1 2 2 1 A theoretical perspective: the influence of fundamental rights on prescriptive testamentary provisions

Various approaches typify Dutch law as far as this issue is concerned. The first question to be considered is whether a prescriptive testamentary provision can indeed infringe the fundamental rights of a beneficiary. One approach attributes no such effect to prescriptive provisions as a beneficiary is always free to repudiate a bequest and in so doing maintains the fundamental right concerned. The bequest in terms of, for example, a forfeiture clause which obliges a beneficiary not to wed a Roman Catholic, can therefore simply be repudiated, ensuring that the beneficiary’s freedom of choice of spouse remains unscathed. A second approach (which is ostensibly favoured by most Dutch writers on the topic) dictates that a prescriptive testamentary provision of the kind under discussion presents the beneficiary with a dilemma: she must weigh the fundamental right concerned against material gain. In the above example the beneficiary will necessarily be obliged to decide whether his choice of spouse (even a Roman Catholic) is going to be limited by material gain. The second approach prescribes that the mere presence of this dilemma renders the beneficiary’s decision or choice involuntary and the fundamental right concerned is consequently infringed.

Acceptance in terms of the latter approach, that the fundamental rights of a beneficiary might indeed be infringed by prescriptive testamentary provisions, raises a second matter, namely an evaluation of the subjective and objective approaches advanced in Dutch law in order to resolve this

101 In Rimanequ (ed) Die Toepasbaarheid van de Grondrechten in Private Verhoudingen (1982) 315. Coene writes with regard to Belgian law which, as far as the issue under discussion is concerned, corresponds greatly with Dutch law.

102 "It appears that an unequal relationship exists between testator and legatee and that the testator’s right to dispose of his assets freely can provide him with a position of authority with regard to the beneficiary, which position he could exploit in order to interfere in the intimate private life of the beneficiary." (My translation)

103 Kampshuijsen “Godsdienst en Vermogensrechten” 1955 Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariële en Registratie 337.

104 Kampshuijsen 1955 WPNR 358.
THE LIMITS IMPOSED UPON FREEDOM OF TESTATION

problematic issue. The subjective approach dictates that the relevant testamentary provision will be invalidated only if the testator intended to exert influence through material enticement in the private life of the beneficiary concerned. The objective approach dictates that the provision will be invalidated only if it indeed caused undue interference in the private life of the beneficiary, irrespective of the intention of the testator to this effect. If such interference is present on the facts of the particular case, judged objectively, the prescriptive provision infringes the fundamental right concerned and will be invalidated.

Kamphuizen suggests that neither of these two approaches resolve the issue satisfactorily, as a rigorous application of each can, in a given instance, produce a result which does not accord with the legal convictions of the community. Kamphuizen opines that a compromise between the two approaches can be found in the careful judicial consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case. The intention of the testator and the interest of the beneficiary concerned should be weighed properly—the prescriptive provision should, in the absence of any ascertainable concern on the part of the testator with regard to the restriction imposed in his will, be invalidated in favour of the fundamental right(s) of the beneficiary. Coene adds that a will is essentially an instrument for the distribution of assets upon death, not an instrument to effect influence in the private lives of beneficiaries. She qualifies this view, however, with reference to the fact that testamentary benefiting occurs, per definition, on the basis of preference—in some cases a proper evaluation of all relevant facts and circumstances will inevitably result in the testator’s freedom of testamentary disposition prevailing despite the presence of what a beneficiary perceives to be (discriminatory) unequal treatment. Kamphuizen admits to the difficult nature of the issue under discussion in a final word of warning:

“De probleme, de ik aan de orde heb gesteld, zijn uitermate netelig, vooral, omdat ook de opvattingen omtrent moraal en godsdienst een rol spelen. Verschil van mening kan dan ook niet uitblijven en men kan zelf vaak aarzelen omtrent het juiste standpunt. En de rechter krijgt naast zijn meervoudige ambt van praetor de nog subtieler functie van censor morum te vervullen.”

3 1 2 2 2 The limiting role of good morals (goede zeden) with regard to freedom of testation

The limitation of freedom of testation occurs in Dutch law on the basis of, inter alia, the nature of the particular bequest. This means that a

107 In Rimanque (ed) Grondrechten in Private Verhoudingen 326. This view accords with that of Lord Wilberforce in Blaikie v. Lord Cavendish discussed in 3 1 2 2 1 supra.
108 1955 WPNR 359.
109 “The difficulties I have alluded to, are extremely problematic, particularly since conceptions with regard to morality and religion play a part. Difference of opinion can, therefore, not be precluded and one might hesitate as to the correct point of view. The judge furthermore acquires the difficult role of moral censor in addition to his task as justiciary.” (My translation)
testamentary bequest will be invalidated if its implementation cannot be justified in terms of the good morals or the public order (a set of rules maintaining the social order for the benefit of the state). The general approach to this issue is founded upon Article 3: 40 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek which provides:

"Een rechtshandeling die door inhoed van strekking in strijd met de goede zeden of de openbare orde, is nietig." 111

This general provision provides the basis for various other provisions of the Burgerlijk Wetboek which operate to restrict freedom of testation. Article 4: 935 provides, for example:

"In alle uiterste wibeschikkingen worden de voorwaarden, die onverstaanbaar of onmogelijk zijn, eu met de weten en de goede zeden strijden, voor niet geschreven gehouden." 112

Article 4: 938 provides in similar vein:

"De vermelding van eene, het zij ware, het zij valsche bewegreden, die echter met de weten of de goede zeden strijd, maakt de erfstelling of het legaat nietig." 113

The following testamentary provisions have in the past, in the light of the above statutory provisions, been regarded by Dutch courts as conflicting with the good morals:

(a) A provision in general restraint of marriage. 114
(b) A provision which negates the operation of the legitieme partie (award of maintenance) in favour of dependants. 115
(c) A provision which prohibits the alienation of bequeathed assets. 116
(d) A provision which establishes a prohibited fideicommissum (making over de hand). 117

Van der Burgh indicates that the good morals are readily employed to limit freedom of testation in Dutch law with regard to prescriptive

111 Perricot Ehrfechte 144.
112 "A juristic act which is, as a result of either its contents or its purport, contrary to the good morals or offensive to the public order, is void." (My translation). Article 4.3.1.4.1 of the Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek stipulates in this regard: "Een uiterste wibeschikking, waarvan de inhoud in strijd met de goede zeden of de openbare orde, is nietig." ["A testamentary disposition is void if its contents are contrary to the good morals or offend public order." (My translation)].
113 "In all testamentary dispositions conditions, which are incomprehensible or impossible or which are contrary to law or the good morals, will be regarded as though they were not written." (My translation). Article 4.3.1.6.1 of the Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek stipulates in this regard: "Een voorwaarde of een last die onmogelijk te vervullen is, of die in strijd met de goede zeden, de openbare orde of een dwalinge wetnepaling, wordt voor niet geschreven gehouden." ["A condition or obligation which is impossible to fulfill or which is contrary to the good morals, the public order or a compulsory statutory provision, is regarded as though it was not written." (My translation)].
114 The mention of either a true or false motive which is contrary to the law or the good morals, renders the inheritance or legacy void." (My translation). Article 4.3.1.4.2 of the Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek stipulates in this regard: "Een vermelding, een uiterste wibeschikking nietig, wanneer voor den een in uiterste wil vermelde bewegreden die in strijd met de goede zeden of de openbare orde, bedoelde is geweest." ["A testamentary disposition will be void if it is determined by a motive which is contrary to the good morals or public order." (My translation)].
115 Perricot Ehrfechte 144.
117 Perricot Ehrfechte 145.
testamentary conditions, particularly those which oblige a beneficiary to wed or not to wed, to adhere to a particular faith or not to convert to a particular faith or to adopt a particular nationality.118 He emphasises, however, that no hard and fast rules apply in this regard—each individual case has to be considered in the light of its own particular facts and circumstances:119

"Men kan nooit van een van deze voorwaarden in abstracto zeggen, dat zij zedelijk of onzedelijk zijn. Alles hangt hier af van omstandigheden... Men moet steeds nagaan of het concrete geval de strekking van de voorwaarde de uitoefeningen van ongeoorloofde dwang is of de bedoeling van de testator vormt één van de in de beoordeling te berekenen factoren."120

The best example from Dutch case law with regard to such a prescriptive testamentary provision (in the form of a conditional forfeiture clause) is to be found in the decision by the Hoge Raad in the Elisabeth Tisper case.121 The testatrix in casu appointed her stepdaughter, Elisabeth Tisper, as her only heir, but provided for forfeiture of benefits, should Tisper fail to baptise any of her future children in the Dutch Reformed Church before such children’s second birthday. It appeared that Tisper herself was a Roman Catholic. She had six children, none of whom were baptised in the Dutch Reformed Church. The question as to the validity of the forfeiture clause is consequently raised before the Hoge Raad.

The court regards the forfeiture clause as offending against the good morals, and orders it to be disregarded in terms of article 4, 935 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek. In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasises the unacceptability of material considerations playing a determining part in an important personal decision such as the baptism of children:122

"[Dat het Hof eene dergelijke belemmering in de persoonlijke vrijheid van de erfgenaam in strijdacht met de goede zeden... dat toch voor de ouders de doop hunner kinderen eene zaak is, die zij vrijelijk overeenkomstig hunse godsdienstige overtuiging hebben ze te beslissen, zonder dat overwegingen van geldelijke aard daarbij invloed mogen oefenen.]"123

Meijers opines in a note to this decision:124

"Deze beslissing en ook haar principiële motivering vallen zeer toe te juichen. Het is een begrijpelijk verlangen van erfgenaars om door middel van hun vermogen nog na hun dood invloed op de daad van hun naaibestaanden uit te oefenen, maar even begrijpelijk is het dat het recht zich tegen deze heerschappij verzet."125

118 Het Nederlandsch Burgerlijk Wetboek 77–78.
119 77–78.
120 "We cannot judge these conditions in the abstract as being moral or immoral. Everything depends upon the circumstances... We must ascertain in each concrete case whether the condition implies undue influence: the intention of the testator is but one of the factors to be taken into account in this regard." (My translation)
121 HR 21 June 1929, NJ 1325.
122 1327–1328.
123 "The court regards such impediment of the personal freedom of the heir as contrary to the good morals... the baptism of children is an issue to be decided by parents based upon their own religious views and monetary considerations should play no part in this regard." (My translation)
124 1328.
125 "This decision and its motivation should, in principle, be applauded. It is an understandable desire of testators to control the conduct of beneficiaries from the grave by way of their patrimony, but it is equally understandable that the law should resist any such attempt at imperiousness." (My translation). Meijers seems to view this decision in terms of the subjective approach described...
Sneepe, however, warns against the generality of Meijers’s view and emphasises that the present issue can only be resolved by a proper evaluation of the facts of each case — such an evaluation might reveal a laudable purpose on the part of the testator which, in turn, might serve to maintain his testamentary disposition.129

"Ik meen te mogen bewijzen of wel zo in het algemeen gesteld kan worden, dat d.g. voorwaarden zijn toe te schrijven aan beheerschap van de erfgenamen. Zouden deze niet eveneens een gevolg zijn van de stem van het geweten van de erflater, die hem zegt zijn vermogen niet te vermenen aan andersdenkenden? Dit zal geval voor geval beslist moeten worden. In geen geval lijkt het mij juist, om a priori steeds poging tot beperking van de gewetsvrijheid van de bevoordeelde te veronderstellen."127

3.2 German Law

3.2.1 Freedom of testation in German law

Germany was constituted in its modern form when the North German Federation unified with the South German States to establish the Deutsches Reich (the second German Empire) in 1871. Political unification prompted legal consolidation, particularly with regard to German civil law. This was achieved in 1900 with the coming into force of the German civil code, the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.128 German law of succession, which is derived from Roman and Germanic succession law, is codified in Book 5 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.

Private ownership as well as private succession enjoy constitutional protection in terms of the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law). Article 14(1) of the Grundgesetz provides:

"Das Eigentum und das Erbrecht werden gewährleisst. Inhalt und Schranken werden durch die Gesetze bestimmt."129

This provision guarantees private succession as an institution — the so-called Erbrechtsgarantie, and in so doing protects the interests of the deceased as well as his/her beneficiaries. This provision also guarantees the entire objective complex of norms which regulate the transfer of rights and interests upon death.130 It is evident, therefore, that private succession enjoys comprehensive protection in German law. Despite the

above — in his opinion it was the intention of the testatrix to exert influence in the private life of the beneficiary, hence the invalidation of the condition. Coose, on the other hand, views this decision as representative of the objective approach — the condition, judged objectively, resulted in undue influence being exerted in the private life of the beneficiary, hence its invalidation. See Coose in Rimunke (ed) Grundrecht in Private Verhoudingen 325.131

127 "Groofoorde en Ongroofoorde Beperkingen der Gewetsvrijheid" 1949 WPJS 340-244.
128 "I doubt whether it can be stated as a general proposition that these conditions are to be ascribed to the imperiousness of testators. Could they not be the result of the conscience of a testator implying him not to leave his patrimony to those of different opinions? This will have to be determined casuistically. It does not appear correct to a priori presume an attempt to limit the beneficiary's freedom of conscience." (My translation)
130 "Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and limitation shall be determined by the laws." (My translation)
fact that article 14(1) does not expressly refer to freedom of testation, the guarantee of private ownership and private succession is readily interpreted in German law as a commensurate guarantee of freedom of testation (Testierfreiheit). In the words of Leipold:

“Daß die Vermögensrechte an Gegenständen aller Art beim Tode eines Menschen von privater Hand in private Hand übergehen, ist die Konsequenz der privatrechtlichen Eigentumsordnung. Auch die Testierfreiheit ist letztlich nur ein Teilespekt der Verfügbarkeit und damit der Privatheit des Eigentums. Der Zusammenhang wird in der verfassungsgesetzlichen Garantie des Art. 14 Abs. 1 Satz 1 GG verdeutlicht, die sich auf das Eigentum und das Erbrecht erstreckt.”

3.2.2 The limits imposed upon freedom of testation by good morals (guten Sitten) in German law

3.2.2.1 General observations

Chapter 1 of the German Grundgesetz contains a number of guaranteed fundamental rights (Grundrechte). An equality clause (article 3) prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender, parental extraction, race, language, place of birth or extraction, religion as well as religious and political opinion. Other relevant rights guaranteed include the rights to freedom of religion, belief and confession (article 4), the right to freedom of marriage and protection of the family (article 6), the right to freedom of association (article 9) and the right to privacy (articles 10 and 13). It is generally acknowledged that the rights contained in Chapter 1 enjoy indirect horizontal operation (mittelbare Drittwirkung) and that it can therefore shape private law, particularly when it is applied in a private dispute between parties. The European Convention on Human Rights plays, due to certain legislative and procedural considerations, a limited role as far as the general operation of fundamental rights in German law is concerned.

The constitutional guarantee of freedom of testation in article 14 of the Grundgesetz, coupled with the fact that the Grundrechte operate only indirectly horizontally, imply that fundamental rights do not constitute a direct limitation on freedom of testation in German law. These rights do, however, guide the courts in its interpretation and application of the good morals criterion. In this light the German legal position with regard to the limits imposed by good morals on freedom of testation, particularly with reference to prescriptive testamentary provisions, will be examined next.

---

132 Ebrecht 24. See also Ebenroth Ebrecht 25; Born Ebrecht 12.
133 "The transfer of proprietary rights from one person to another upon death is the consequence of the property system in terms of private law. Freedom of testation plays an important part with regard to this power of disposition and functions as an essential element of private ownership. The relationship between freedom of testation and private ownership is established by the guarantee of private ownership in a 14(1) of the Basic Law." (My translation)
134 Halbmeier & Hummel in Ebbe & Finkin (eds) Introduction to German Law 67.
135 Foster German Legal System and Laws 76.
3.2.2.2 Restriction of freedom of testation with regard to prescriptive testamentary provisions

3.2.2.1 The limiting role of good morals (guten Sitten) with regard to freedom of testation

The limitation of freedom of testation occurs in German law, as in Dutch law, on the basis of, *inter alia*, the nature of the particular bequest. This means that a testamentary bequest will be invalidated if its implementation cannot be justified in terms of the good morals. This approach is founded on, *inter alia*, paragraph 138(1) of the *Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch* which provides:

"Ein Rechtsgeschäft, das gegen die guten Sitten verstößt, ist nützlich." 137

A testamentary provision is regarded in German law as contrary to the good morals (*Sittenwidrig*) if it offends the "Anstandsgefühl aller billig und gerecht Denkenden" (the "legal convictions (pertaining to what is proper and decent) of all reasonable and right minded people"). The test applied in this regard is objective in nature—it is determined whether the relevant provision, judged objectively in terms of the "Anschauung des anständigen Durchschnittsmenschen" (the "consideration of the decent average person"), offends the good morals. 138 This test is applied with particular reference to the facts and circumstances of each case, since, as Lange and Kuchinke point out, testamentary benefiting is, by definition, premised upon preference and hence unequal treatment—in some cases beneficiaries will simply have to accept what they perceive as unequal or even discriminatory treatment at the hands of a testator. 139

Brox evaluates the role of good morals in limiting freedom of testation on the basis of a dual distinction. He contends that testamentary provisions which effect the out and out disinherit of (potential) beneficiaries must be distinguished from provisions in terms of which a testator attempts to exert influence in the private lives of beneficiaries. As far as the former is concerned, Brox opines that disinheritance which occur with reference to the fundamental rights of disinherit (potential) beneficiaries, should not be regarded as contrary to the good morals, particularly because, as stated above, no testator is under the obligation to treat his/her beneficiaries on an equal footing. Testators therefore retain the absolute right to institute certain beneficiaries and to disinherit other (potential) beneficiaries. 140 Brox contends, however, that prescriptive testamentary provisions can indeed be regarded as contrary to the good morals, particularly if such provisions infringe the fundamental rights of the beneficiaries concerned. A bequest which provides for forfeiture of benefits, should the beneficiary marry a person of a...
particular race, nationality or religion, can consequently be regarded as an 
undue restriction of such beneficiary’s right to freedom of marriage 
(Entschließungsfreiheit) and hence invalid. The determining consideration 
in this and other related cases is the dilemma with which the beneficiary is 
presented: he must weigh the fundamental right concerned against material 
gain. The imposition of such a dilemma can, in appropriate 
circumstances, render the relevant provision contrary to the good morals:141

"Der Erblasser darf nicht materielle Vorteile für solche Entschlüsse versprechen, die nach 
allgemeiner Annahme frei von Zwang und Beeinflussung Dritter zu treffen sind und bei 
denen man sich nicht von materiellen Erwägungen leiten lassen soll." 142

4 Conclusion

The survey in this article of two common law and two civil law legal 
systems revealed that freedom of testation is regarded as the founding 
principle of the law of testate succession in all four systems. This freedom 
is supported by the recognition of private ownership and private 
succession in all four legal systems. The legal systems surveyed all allow 
for the restriction of freedom of testation, inter alia on the basis of policy-
considerations. Fundamental rights (often constitutionally guaranteed) 
readily direct the application of public policy or good morals to this 
effect, particularly with regard to the limitation of free testamentary 
disposition through prescriptive testamentary provisions based on, inter 
alia, race, nationality and religion.

The limits imposed on freedom of testation in the latter regard are 
determined by the judicial weight attributed to various relevant 
considerations. In the case of testamentary provisions aimed at 
controlling the conduct of beneficiaries, the principal considerations 
appear to be, on the one hand, the testator’s freedom of testation, per 
definition exercised on the basis of preference, weighed against, on the 
other hand, material gain directing important personal decisions and 
choices of beneficiaries. In the case of testamentary provisions aimed at 
regulating the exploitation of assets, the determining considerations 
appear to be, as before, the testator’s freedom of testation. This is 
weighed against the possible detrimental effect of the restriction imposed 
by the testator with regard to the use of assets on the position of 
institted and excluded beneficiaries as well as the position of the 
functionaries responsible for the administration of the assets concerned. 
These issues can be resolved only by a proper evaluation of the particular 
facts and circumstances of each case.

It is submitted that the manner in which comparable foreign legal 
systems strive to achieve a properly weighted balance in the above regard, 
provides valuable direction when a similar exercise is conducted by South 
African courts.

141 Zbrowski 172.
142 A testator may not award material benefit to a decision which should, according to the general view, 
be reached free from the compulsion and influence of others and with regard to which financial 
considerations should play no part." (My translation)
OPSOMMING

Die Suid-Afrikaanse regspositie ten opsigte van sowel testseerwyeheid as die beperking van diyfryheid aan die hand van die bona fides het in onlangs tye onder wetgewende en regsprekende traagheid gebuk gegaan. Die behoefte aan vernuwing op die gebied word in die hand gewerk deur 'n algemene erkenning van die invloed van grondwetlik-gewaarborgde regte op die gebied van die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatre. In hierdie lig ondersoek die huidige artikel, aan die hand van regverwysende navorsing, enkele tersaaklike aangeleenthede ten opsigte van die beperking van testseerwyeheid ingevolge beloedoorwegings in “common law” en “civil law” (kontinentale) regteliks. Die ondersoek is in die besonder gereg op die bepaling tot voorskriflike testamentêre bepalings aan die hand waarvan gepoog word om die gedrag van begunstigdes of die benutting van bates op sodanige wyse te beheer, dat die fundamentele regte van ingestelde en/of potensiële begunstigdes in gedrang kom. Die wyse waarop die Engelse en Australiese reg (as twee voorbeelde van “common law”-regteliks) asook die Nederlandse en Duitse reg (as twee voorbeelde van “civil law”-regteliks) hierdie aangeleenthed aanpook, vorm die besondere fokus van hierdie artikel.