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Exporting contradictions: the expansion of South African agrarian capital within Africa

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Abstract

Agrarian change in South Africa over the past two decades has seen consolidation of the hegemony of large-scale commercial farming and corporate agribusiness within agro-food systems. Constrained domestic demand and growth opportunities elsewhere have driven both farming and agribusiness capitals to move into other African countries, attempting to reproduce agro-food systems similarly centred on the dominance of large capital. This is evident in five areas: first, the financialization of agriculture and 'farmland funds'; second, multinational and South African input supply industries; third, large-scale land deals to expand industrial farming systems; fourth, the export of South African companies' food processing, manufacture, logistics and distribution operations; and fifth, the expanding reach of South African supermarkets and fast food chains. Regional expansion involves South African agrarian capital encountering substantial obstacles to entry, and challenges mounted by competitors in destination markets. Success as a regional hegemon in Africa's agro-food system is thus far from assured, and even where it does appear to succeed, generates contradictions, and rising social tensions of the kinds experienced in South Africa itself.

1. Introduction

Spurred by rapid deregulation and liberalization, the overall trajectory of agrarian change in South Africa over the past two decades has seen consolidation of the hegemony of large-scale commercial farming and corporate agribusiness within agricultural value chains. Ownership and control have become highly concentrated; high-tech and high-input production systems are focused on lucrative new crops and markets; and employment continues to decline. In a context of constrained domestic demand due to high levels of unemployment and poverty and stagnating growth, and emerging opportunities for geographic diversification, both farming and agribusiness capitals are now expanding into African countries. Their strategies are premised on promoting and reproducing agro-food systems centred on the dominance of large capital. However, the support of host states, of the kind that facilitated the large-scale form of capitalist production and the growth of agribusiness companies in South Africa, is not assured, and success is thus far from certain.

Large-scale commercial farmers and agribusiness corporations have been expanding their operations into the wider region in recent years, but so have many other South African companies (Boche & Anseeuw, 2013; Hall, 2012). Such expansion is driven by calculations of potential profitability, but is also shaped by specific conditions. These arise from a combination of the inherited structure of the economy at the end of apartheid, neoliberal economic policies adopted by the post-apartheid government after 1994, and the slowing down of the global capitalist economy since the financial crisis of 2008/2009 (Fine, 2008). But the strategies and *modi operandi* of South African companies were developed in a particular political economy context, and bear its imprint; when exported to other African countries, they tend to generate tensions reminiscent of those experienced in the domestic context.

In this article we map out some of the structural foundations underpinning the regional expansion of South African capital, identifying key features of the domestic agro-food economy which condition the behaviour of regionalizing companies. This is evident in five arenas: first, the financialization of agriculture and the emergence of South African-based 'farmland funds'; second, the growing influence of multinational and South African input supply industries; third, the prevalence of large-scale land deals premised on investment in agro-industrial farming systems; fourth, the expansion of South African companies' food processing, manufacture, logistics, and distribution operations; and fifth, the rapidly growing reach of South African supermarkets and fast food chains. In each arena, we identify key actors, noting their diverse expansion strategies and the contradictions they produce, including the ways in which these are circumscribed both by the character of local agro-food systems and by competition from other corporate investors in destination markets.

South Africa's regional expansion exemplifies a wider pattern of growing agricultural sector investment in regional and cross-regional agro-food systems by capitalist firms located in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries, and raises questions as to the similarities and differences among them (Scoones, Smalley, Hall, & Tsikata, 2014). Our focus in this article, however, is not with the BRICS organization per se, but rather with South Africa as one among several BRICS countries with growing influence in Africa's changing agro-food system. South Africa is, of course, an outlier among the group, having by far the smallest economy of those within the grouping. Its inclusion among the BRICS was widely perceived as being due to its economically and politically dominant position in Africa – rather than being an emerging global power. Yet even within Africa, South Africa's political and economic dominance is contested and increasingly in doubt (Radebe, 2016). Nonetheless South African companies are, together with others from within Africa and beyond, reshaping agro-food systems across parts of the continent in distinctive ways, albeit in a highly uneven and contradictory manner.

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2. The political economy of post-apartheid South Africa

Capitalist development in South Africa took off towards the end of the nineteenth century, following the 'minerals revolution' – the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886, involving significant levels of foreign investment. Mining played a key role in driving urbanization and industrialization in the early twentieth century, and dominated export earnings for many decades, together with some agricultural products. Both mining and the (largely white) capitalist agriculture that it gave rise to depended on a low-wage regime. State policies in both the period of segregation following the consolidation a national polity ('union') in 1910 and in the apartheid era, from 1948 to 1994, focused in large part on ensuring a ready supply of cheap labour to these sectors (Marais, 2011).
The first democratic government of 1994 faced the challenge of transforming the economy to make it more equitable as well as being able to sustain growth. Freedom was achieved at the very moment that the global economy began to move towards ever higher levels of interaction and integration amongst national economies, led by the advanced capitalist countries and the USA in particular. Trade liberalization in South Africa after 1994 led to sharp increases in both export and imports, but globalization also brought many challenges, including those of intense competitive pressures from rapidly growing economies such as China.

Crucially, the manufacturing sector has not succeeded in becoming more dynamic, job-generating, and competitive in the post-apartheid era. The economy has shifted away from agriculture and levels and patterns of consumption have changed, but 'poverty is declining slowly, inequality is extremely high, and production and trade patterns have not shifted from the relative predominance of raw materials, exports and the importation of high value added manufactures' (Bhorat, Hirsch, Kanbur, & Ncube, 2014, p. 13). The economic prospects of the majority of citizens have been only slightly improved, notwithstanding the growth of a new black middle class and an extensive system of social grants that provides some relief for the poor.

Key features of the South African economy since the end of apartheid include the rapid expansion of services and government spending, and the continued relative decline of mining, manufacturing, and agriculture. Unemployment currently stands at around 27% when only active job seekers are counted, and at around 37% when those too discouraged to seek work are included. Many of those in employment, particularly in casual or temporary work, earn very low wages. More than half of the population is poor, and levels of inequality remain amongst the highest in the world, with a Gini coefficient that generally lies between 0.65 and 0.70 (Bhorat et al., 2014, p. 6). Poverty and inequality underlie severe social and political tensions, increasingly evident in relation to land, agriculture, and the agro-food system more broadly.

3. Continuity and change in South Africa's agro-food systems

Capitalist agriculture in South Africa and its dynamics must be understood within the larger structure and functioning of the country's political economy as a whole, as it has evolved over time, and its contradictions. South Africa's mining industry in the nineteenth

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and twentieth centuries was based on an authoritarian labour system designed to supply low-waged African migrant workers, as indicated above. These workers depended on food production by rural homesteads to supplement (i.e. subsidize) their wages, and were increasingly confined to densely populated 'native reserves', formed on the basis of large-scale dispossession of African land (Wolpe, 1972). A capitalist agriculture based on white-owned and generally large-scale farms emerged in response to rapidly growing markets in urban centres, and was strongly supported by the state, as well as by mining capital, for which cheap food formed a crucial 'wage good'. An alliance of 'gold and maize' was thus formed, centred on the Highveld in the interior, where most grain crops were produced. The development of capitalist agriculture in South Africa did not promote industrialization, as elsewhere, rather the reverse was true. The transition from pre-capitalist farming involved 'accumulation from above' on the basis of a 'Prussian-like' resolution of the agrarian question, as white land-owners, a key political constituency for Afrikaner nationalists, began to derive income from production rather than rent from African tenant farmers (Bernstein, 1996, p. 30).

These features involved high levels of state subsidy and support, in the form of cheap credit, guaranteed markets, and administered prices through marketing boards, tariffs, and other forms of protection, income support, infrastructure provision, and research and extension (Vink & Rooyen, 2009). They were accompanied by continuing repression of black workers, lack of support for black farmers, and forced removals aimed at achieving a racially segregated countryside. The rise to power of the National Party in 1948 and the adoption of apartheid as national policy saw intensified repression and adoption of measures such as the 'pass laws', aimed at heightened control of movement and settlement by the black majority.

By the 1970s many decades of intensive support had yielded a (white) capitalist agricultural sector characterized by increasing capitalization and mechanization, soaring output, but also farming systems premised on low wages and, increasingly, high levels of debt. By the 1980s the economic and political crisis of the apartheid regime saw increasing political pressure exerted by mining and industrial capital to reduce state support to agriculture and allow freer rein to 'market forces' (Bernstein, 1996, p. 31). The deregulation and liberalization of agriculture were initiated then, but came to fruition only after the transition to democracy in 1994.

Agricultural reforms since the transition have been largely detached from land reform, and have maintained their neoliberal character (Cousins, 2013). The concentration of ownership has proceeded apace, and by 2002 over half of all farm income was earned by 5% of enterprises (Vink & Rooyen, 2009, p. 32). Farm employment has fallen steadily, and is increasingly casualized and seasonal in nature. The number of large-scale commercial units is currently estimated at under 35,000. In contrast, a minority of black rural families earn cash from regular sale of agricultural produce – perhaps as few as 8% of black rural households with access to land, or between 200,000 and 400,000

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production units (Aliber, Maluleke, Manenzhe, Paradza, & Cousins, 2013). Many of these supply informal local markets.

Post-1994 land reform policies aim to address the legacies of this bitter history of dispossession and discrimination through three mechanisms. A *land restitution* programme seeks to restore the land to black communities and individuals who were dispossessed in the period subsequent to the adoption of the Natives Land Act of 1913, which formally divided the entire country into race zones. The programme has experienced many problems, and has contributed little to reshaping ownership patterns in the countryside (Walker, Bohlin, Hall, & Kepe, 2010). *Land redistribution* aims to create a more equal distribution of land, but has slowed and instead of supporting black small-holders, in recent years has been diverted into tenuous forms of leasehold for a small grouping of aspirant black commercial farmers (Hall & Kepe, 2017). *Tenure reforms* were initiated to secure the legally vulnerable land rights of farmworkers and dwellers living on private farms as well as the 'customary' rights of people resident in the former reserves, now known as communal areas, but these show little evidence of success. The land tenure rights of the majority of black rural dwellers remain insecure (Cousins & Hall, 2013).

Ambitious land reform policies were adopted post-1994, but the ruling party has appeared to lack the political will required to tackle the complexities of the land question, displaying an enduring commitment to large-scale and commercial farming, despite rhetorical support for smallholder agriculture (Hall, Anseeuw, & Paradza, 2015). Over the past 22 years, funds for land reform have rarely constituted more than 0.5% of the national budget. The track record to date in delivering land and secure land rights to black South Africans is exceedingly poor, with only 8% of commercial farmland transferred (against a target of 30% by 2014), and many land reform projects performing badly in terms of production and the enhancement of rural livelihoods. Land reform is widely recognized as having failed to alter racially skewed inequalities in land holdings, and is thus a powerful symbol of the lack of substantive transformation in democratic South Africa (Cousins & Walker, 2015). The land is currently at the centre of fierce political contestation between and within political parties, and calls are being made to change the post-apartheid constitution to allow for expropriation of land without compensation. However, revelations of state capture by a politically well-connected family and their hangers-on are prompting anger at elite capture more widely (Bhorat et al., 2017).

Deregulation, especially the closure of marketing boards and privatization of sectoral cooperatives, has facilitated vertical integration in the agro-food system, leading to 'Big Food' – the growing dominance of just a handful of powerful corporations – in inputs, processing and retail, and to a lesser degree in primary production. This was accompanied by increased financialization, the key moment in which was the creation of a futures market (SAFEX) in key staple commodities. While financialization is global, in South Africa it was clearly a response to falling rates of profit, underpinned by liberalization, and South African capital responding to a wider set of opportunities and

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pressures in the global capitalist economy. The dismantling of the systems and institutions providing state support to agriculture has been accompanied by the growing power of agribusiness corporations, both upstream and downstream of farming. Concentration has increased still further since 1994, exacerbated by the entry of multinational seed, fertilizer and agrochemical companies (Bernstein, 2013, pp. 29–30).

Contrary to the predictions of the World Bank, whose proposals for Rural Restructuring informed the deregulation plan of the 1990s, these policy reforms neither lowered barriers to entry for small farmers, nor lowered the price of food. Food price inflation over the past 15 years has far exceeded general inflation, not only due to widespread collusion in key sectors – notably fertilizer, seed, poultry, milling, bread, and retail – but due to the concentrated structure of the food system itself, and its industrial farming models premised on input- and capital-intensive production. The negative social outcomes of this economic structure have therefore become apparent and widely recognized.

State responses do not confront agrarian capital in its various forms, but accommodate and even support it – despite the creation of a Competition Commission that investigates anti-competitive behaviour within a limited mandate. The ruling African National Congress has consistently supported large-scale commercial farming, confronting only those market 'distortions' brought about through cartel behaviour, rather than the fundamentals of the structure of the economy. However, given a growing crisis of social reproduction of 'fragmented classes of labour', only partially defused by social grants payments, capital-friendly policies such as these are increasingly coming under fire. In short, the contradictions of South Africa's capitalist agro-food system are increasingly evident (Greenberg, 2017).

4. The Increasing regional footprint of South African agrarian capital

South African agrarian capital, in the form of both large-scale commercial farming operations and agribusiness firms that are active up- and down-stream of farming itself, is expanding across Africa (Boche & Anseeuw, 2013; Hall, 2011; Hall, 2012). Here we examine why and how this is taking place, and with what success. Table 1 lists companies located in different nodes of agricultural value chains, which are active in different African countries, many of which we discuss further below.

Reforms to lower barriers to intra-regional trade have been key to the expansion of South African companies, giving them a competitive edge over some of their multinational competitors. The South African Development Community (SADC) Free Trade Area of 2008 set out a phased reduction in tariffs on intra-regional trade, facilitating more investment and cross-border sales of agricultural produce and foodstuffs. Expanded market access was provided from 2015 by the extension to a tri-partite free trade area, across the regional blocks of SADC, the East African Community and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA).

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4.1. Financialization and farmland funds

Along with deregulation of South African agriculture has come financialization, a feature currently being exported elsewhere in the region. Reflecting global trends (Fairbairn, 2015) financialization has involved the emergence of South African-based agricultural investment funds (Boche & Anseeuw, 2013). Animating this is a growing cast of actors through whom transnational private capital is being brought into Africa's agriculture, ranging from pension funds, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, banking institutions and agribusinesses and private equity funds. Among their financial instruments are 'farmland funds' offering share portfolios – essentially creating a new asset class. An influential European report on the 'Vultures of Land Grabbing' characterized such funds as 'not only [having] a speculative business model, but also represent[ing] a conveyor belt for shareholder capitalism from the financial to the real economy' (Merian Research and CRBM, 2010, p. 3).

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Table 1. South African agro-food corporation expansion into Africa and beyond.

Country	Node of value chain	Corporation
Africa		
Angola	Fertiliser	Omnia
	Logistics	Barloworld
	Wholesale and retail	Shoprite, Spar
Botswana	Primary production	Country Bird
	Agri services	Unitrans
	Logistics	Barloworld, Bidvest, Imperial, RCL Foods
	Food manufacturing	AVI, Pioneer Foods
	Wholesale and retail	Massmart, Pick n Pay, Shoprite, Spar, Woolworths
Cameroon	Food manufacturing	Tiger Brands
Cape Verde	Logistics	Barloworld
DRC	Logistics	Barloworld
	Wholesale and retail	Shoprite
Ethiopia	Food manufacturing	Tiger Brands
Ghana	Agri services	AFGRI
	Logistics	Bidvest, Imperial
	Wholesale and retail	Massmart, Shoprite, Woolworths
Kenya	Food manufacturing	Tiger Brands
	Logistics	Bidvest, Imperial
	Wholesale and retail	Woolworths
Lesotho	Agri services	Unitrans
	Logistics	Barloworld, Bidvest, Imperial
	Fertiliser	Omnia
	Food manufacturing	Premier Foods
	Wholesale and retail	Massmart, Pick n Pay, Shoprite, Spar, Woolworths
Madagascar	Agri services	Unitrans
	Wholesale and retail	Shoprite
Malawi	Agri services	Unitrans
	Fertiliser	Foskor
	Logistics	Barloworld, Bidvest, Imperial
	Wholesale and retail	Massmart, Shoprite
	Manufacturing	Illovo
	Primary production	Illovo
Mauritius	Fertiliser	Omnia
	Logistics	Bidvest
	Wholesale and retail	Shoprite, Woolworths
Mozambique	Grain/feed milling	Astral
	Primary production	Country Bird, Illovo, Tongaat Hulett
	Agri services	Unitrans
	Fertiliser	Omnia
	Food manufacturing	Illovo, Premier Foods, Tongaat Hulett
	Logistics	Barloworld, Bidvest
	Wholesale and retail	Massmart, Shoprite, Spar, Woolworths
Namibia	Retail input	Zeder
	Primary production	Country Bird
	Agri services	Unitrans
	Food manufacturing	AVI, Pioneer Foods
	Logistics	Barloworld, Bidvest, Imperial
	Wholesale and retail	Massmart, Pick n Pay, Shoprite, Spar, Woolworths
Nigeria	Food manufacturing	Tiger Brands
	Logistics	Imperial
	Wholesale and retail	Massmart, Shoprite
Sao Tome and Principe	Logistics	Barloworld
Seychelles	Logistics	Bidvest
Swaziland	Primary production	Astral, Illovo, Tongaat Hulett, TSB
	Agri services	Unitrans,
	Fertiliser	Foskor, Omnia
	Grain/feed milling	Premier Foods
	Food manufacturing	Illovo, Premier Foods, TSB
	Logistics	Barloworld, Bidvest, Imperial
	Wholesale and retail	Massmart, Pick n Pay, Shoprite, Spar, Woolworths

(*Continued*)

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Table 1. Continued.

Country	Node of value chain	Corporation
Tanzania	Agri services	Unitrans
	Logistics	Bidvest, Imperial
	Manufacturing	Illovo
	Primary production	Illovo
	Wholesale and retail	Massmart, Woolworths
Uganda	Grain/feed milling	Quantum
	Logistics	Bidvest
	Wholesale and retail	Massmart, Shoprite, Woolworths
Zambia	Primary production	Country Bird, Illovo, Zeder
	Grain/feed milling	Astral, Country Bird, Quantum, Zeder
	Agri services	Afgri, Unitrans
	Fertiliser	Foskor, Omnia
	Food manufacturing	AVI, Illovo, RCL Foods
	Logistics	Barloworld, Bidvest, Imperial
	Wholesale and retail	Massmart, Pick n Pay, Shoprite, Woolworths
Zimbabwe	Primary production	Country Bird, Tongaat Hulett
	Agri services	Afgri
	Fertiliser	Foskor, Omnia
	Food manufacturing	Tiger Brands, Tongaat Hulett
	Logistics	Barloworld, Bidvest, Imperial
	Wholesale and retail	Pick n Pay, Spar
Outside Africa		
Middle East and Australasia	Agri services	Afgri
	Fertiliser	Omnia
	Logistics	Barloworld, Bidvest
Americas	Fertiliser	Omnia
	Food manufacturing	Tiger Brands
	Logistics	Barloworld, Bidvest
Europe and UK	Food manufacturing	Pioneer Foods
	Logistics	Barloworld, Bidvest, Imperial
	Wholesale and retail	Spar

Source: Greenberg (personal communication).

Several such funds with regional and even pan-continental ambitions were established in South Africa from 2008 onwards, among them being Emergent Asset Management Ltd, a UK/SA management firm emerging from defence and high-tech industries in the US and now specializing in farmland investments in Africa. In the midst of global recession, its African Agricultural Investment Fund, established in 2008, aims to grow to €3 billion and promised its large institutional investors 30 percent annual returns. Partnering with Grainvest, one of the top 5 companies on South Africa's SAFEX, it formed operating company Emvest Agricultural Corporation, providing a vehicle for South African, UK and other investors to diversify their investments into African agriculture in Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (McNellis, 2009, p. 13). Susan Payne, formerly of Goldman Sachs, initiated Emergent and formed the South African connection, punting African farmland as the most promising new investment frontier for institutional investors and wealthy individuals, arguing that 'because of its series of microclimates, its highlands, its agricultural diversity and good logistics, South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa can deliver an enormous amount of food' (Payne, cited in McNellis, 2009, p. 13).

More 'homegrown' among the South African farmland funds is United Fruit Farmers and Agri Asset Management, part of investment and insurance company Old Mutual's

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African Agricultural Fund. This vehicle aims to take 'advantage of Africa's enormous untapped agricultural potential' through twin funds – one for internal acquisitions through Futuregrowth Agri-Fund (SA) and the other being the African Agricultural Fund, enabling South African investors to channel investments both internally in the domestic market and externally in the region (UFF, 2015). Alongside these are several other funds, with a range of internal and regional foci including, among others, Phatisa's African Agricultural Fund which by 2016 held equity in the region of half a billion US dollars (Anseeuw et al., 2012).

Alongside these new financial actors are the more traditional forms of finance, both public and private. Among these are South African banks Standard Bank[1] and ABSA, themselves transnationalized (Hall, 2011). From the agribusiness sector is Afgri, a privatized state-established farming cooperative, formerly Oos-Transvaal Beperk (OTK), which has, by absorbing other former state cooperatives, reinvented itself as a leading agribusiness in inputs, including through a continent-wide license to sell John Deere tractors, and is the main source of finance and logistics for several farmland investments, including the South African farming venture in Congo (Hall et al., 2015). It has, in turn, been absorbed by the Canadian company Fairfax which bought a controlling share in Afgri, despite protestations by the African Farmers' Association of South Africa which objected that this once-parastatal was being sold off to a multinational rather than into black South African hands.

Changes to financial regulation would incentivize investment from and via South Africa by creating 'simpler rules' to reduce the time and costs of doing business in Africa. By allowing holding companies exempt from the South African Reserve Bank's exchange controls to be created by companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, as regional investment vehicles which would not be regarded as resident for exchange-control purposes. 'Similar measures [would] apply to foreign companies wanting to invest in African countries using South Africa as their regional headquarters … as part of the Gateway to Africa reforms … , including BRIC countries' (Gordhan, 2013, p. 12–13).

Less significant by far is the direct role of state finance through development finance institutions (DFIs), primarily the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) with its massive infrastructure projects in road, rail, energy, and mining, and the Development Bank of Southern Africa, which has significantly increased its financing of regional projects in transport, energy, mining, ICT, health, financial services and manufacturing, primarily to Zambia, and Mozambique (Govender, 2013, pp. 10, 16). Meanwhile, the Agricultural Business Chamber has spearheaded studies on agricultural market opportunities in Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Kenya, providing advice to South African agribusinesses in support of their expansion plans (ABC, 2012). Clearly, faced with economic slowdown at home, capital is on the move out of South Africa but also globalized capital is on the move across Africa, in part via South Africa. This suggests

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that a complex interplay of South African conditions, global trends and conditions in host states are combining to see agriculture become increasingly financialized, as new institutional actors cash in on African farmland as a new investment frontier.

4.2. Inputs: seed, fertilizer and pesticides

From an apartheid past where major agribusiness companies were state-owned, major seed, fertilizer and pesticide companies and cooperatives have been privatized, and several have reinvented themselves as regional players. The influence of multinational and South African input supply industries in Africa's agro-food system has grown alongside their consolidation in seed, pesticide and fertilizer markets. One way in which this is happening is via multinational corporations buying up or into South African corporations and these in turn expanding in the region. Examples include Pannar Seeds (now largely owned by Du Pont), together with Monsanto and Pioneer Seeds, all but monopolizing the local market for maize, sorghum and wheat seed.

One of South Africa's seed giants, Pannar, was acquired by Du Pont's Pioneer Hi-Bred in 2013, effectively consolidating the domestic seed market in the hands of just two companies: Pioneer and Monsanto. This was initially prohibited by South Africa's Competition Commission on the grounds that it would give Pioneer an anti-competitive advantage, a ruling that was confirmed by the Competition Tribunal but later overturned by the Competition Appeal Court (ACB, 2015, p. 25). The merged company and Monsanto together now hold 90% of the South African seed market for maize, wheat, and sorghum (Bernstein, 2013, 30). The merger, according to Pannar CEO Deon van Rooyen, would give the South African company access to the US company's technology and research, and in turn offer it access to South African maize germplasm and a base from which Pioneer could 'reach farmers it is not currently serving, such as those in some of the small-scale farming regions locally and elsewhere in Africa' (cited in Coleman, 2012). Among these would be Pannar's existing clients in other countries, where it holds significant market share in Zimbabwe (18%), Zambia (15%), and Tanzania (15%) (ACB, 2015, p. 25).

As well as seed, in other sectors too, South African and multinational companies are leading the way in transforming the pesticide market, which is now dominated by global companies – Monsanto, Pioneer, Syngenta, and a few others, their entry into African agriculture facilitated in part by the G8's New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. Further mega-mergers have been proposed, including ChemChina and Syngenta, DuPoint and Dow, and Monsanto and Bayer (Who Owns Whom, 2017a), with the latter being particularly contentious in South Africa where state approval for the merger is still pending. Despite there being some regulatory brakes, then, the pesticide market, like seed, is increasingly concentrated and multinationalized. Though Syngenta and Monsanto have direct market links into African countries – not necessarily using South Africa as a launching pad – there are many grain-trading joint ventures in the region that pair up South African companies with these multinationals. For instance, multinationals Cargill and Dreyfus are dominant grain traders in South

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Africa, handling 70% of maize trade, and from there also expanding also elsewhere in the region (Greenberg, 2017).

South Africa's main chemical fertilizer companies, Sasol and Omnia, now operate as multinationals, and were found guilty – and fined – by South Africa's Competition Commission in 2009 for cartel behaviour, together with the Norwegian-based Yara International. These companies, along with a small number of other multinationals, are the primary beneficiaries of subsidies under the rubric of the 'Green Revolution in Africa', funded by USAID and other donor agencies, including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (ACB, 2014). The G8's New Alliance on Food Security and Nutrition and the US's Grow Africa initiative both involve policy concessions from priority countries to open their markets to such companies, as part of their 'country cooperation frameworks' which are required to unlock donor funds. South Africa's Omnia, now in 10 countries in Africa, has expanded in recent years but is dwarfed in this market already dominated by several global (and a few African) firms, mostly notably Yara, whose profits rose threefold on the back of global price increases between 2009 and 2012 (ACB, 2014, p. 31). So even as South African input industries expand, they are, at times, in competition with larger actors from the global North, but at other times have agglomerated via mergers and acquisitions. By and large, we see the South African seed, pesticide, and fertilizer companies being consolidated as well as being acquired by multi-nationals, as they expand regionally.

4.3. Land deals

South African farmers and companies have been identified as among the 'land grabbers' in Africa, with land deals being premised on the expansion of South African industrial farming systems to new sites on the continent – but this story is complex and has changed over time (Hall, 2011; Hall et al., 2015). South African (white) farmers and farming companies have been on the move, securing substantial land deals across several countries – Mozambique, Zambia, and Congo being prime among them – while complaining of low profitability, high costs, and political threats to farmers at home. Africa has been at the centre of the 'global land grabbing' phenomenon from about 2008 onwards, arising from the food price crisis of 2007/2008, the financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent global recession, and fuel price spikes around the same time. While the reasons for the preponderance of large-scale corporate land deals in Africa are debated (Scoones et al., 2014), what is clear is that South African companies are significant among the range of actors involved. Deals are being struck typically between South African companies and foreign governments, sometimes with local business partners. They are not exclusively for food production or even for agriculture, as South African companies are now engaged in forestry deals in Mozambique and Ghana, in farming projects in Congo, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria, and in tourism (wildlife safaris and ecotourism) in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda (Matrix, 2015). These sit alongside general banking, financial services, telephony, construction, and information technology investments by South African firms.

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Facilitating many of these deals is the commercial farmer association, Agri South Africa (AgriSA), which in 2013 created 'AgriAllAfrica (AaA) as an external agricultural investment facilitation platform to enable South African farmers to invest more easily in farmland and agriculture elsewhere on the continent:

South African farmers have started to spread their wings considerably wider than the traditional South [ern] (sic) African Development Community (SADC) ... The international focus on agriculture's potential in Africa has further intensified over the past year, with an increase in investments in various high-potential agricultural countries. (AgriSA Africa Policy Committee, 2014, p. 35)

From the gung-ho plans to secure land concessions in 22 African countries in the 2011–2012 period, AgriSA has, after disappointing results of its farmer groups 'AgriSAMoz' in Mozambique and 'Congo Agriculture' in Congo, withdrawn to more modest aims of consolidating its members' operations through acquiring 'priority status' as agricultural investors in these countries, and engaging in talks with host governments to provide further protection and support. Neoliberal visions and post-colonial ambitions have foundered in practice, and the 'land grab bubble' has burst. Meanwhile, AgriSA has been pursuing new opportunities for land concessions in Ethiopia and Nigeria, while continuing to monitor conditions in countries where initial talks have been held, including Botswana, Swaziland, Tanzania, Angola, DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Egypt, Chad, Ghana, Gabon, and Sierra Leone (AgriSA Africa Policy Committee, 2014, p. 39). Meanwhile, at home, it is lobbying the Ministry of Trade and Industry for support in securing further sites in the face of South Africa's discontinuation of bilateral investment treaties.

AgriSA's 'Africa Policy Committee' reports that 'The international focus on agriculture's potential in Africa has further intensified over the past year, with an increase in investments in various high-potential agricultural countries' (AgriSA Africa Policy Committee, 2014, p. 35). In 2013, it created an investment platform named 'AgriAllAfrica' (AaA) to facilitate South African farmers' deals in farmland and agriculture elsewhere on the continent, and brought state representatives from other African states on visits to South Africa to broker deals. Meanwhile, commercial farmers are forging stronger relations with regional farmer bodies, notably the Southern African Commercial Agricultural Union (SACAU) and the new continent-wide alliance of regional farmer organizations, the Pan African Farmers' Organization (PAFO). Having already headed SACAU, AgriSA's chief land deal negotiator, Theo de Jager, now heads both organizations, having been elected as president of PAFO in 2014, and has used his influence in the region and across the continent to promote commercial agriculture and increased uptake of technology, and regional integration through intra-African investment and trade (PAFO, 2014). On his election as president of PAFO last year, he set out priorities for African agriculture, including 'a change of mindset from fighting poverty through agriculture, to wealth creation', and a need for Africa to take ownership of opportunities on the continent primarily through intra-Africa trade (PAFO, 2014). This

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reflects a distinctive neoliberal development ideology being advanced by South African farmers.

One of the main 'success stories' of South African agribusiness on the continent is that of sugar, notably the SA sugar giants, Illovo, and Tongaat Hulett, each with operations in six countries in the region and, to a lesser but growing degree, also TSB, now active in three countries. The success of these sugar companies builds in large part on the export of a model developed and honed over decades in South Africa, of nucleus estates supplemented by (indeed, often largely dependent on) contracted outgrowers (Dubb, 2016). The adaptation of this model of contract farming, in different ways from Tanzania to Malawi to Zambia to Mozambique, shows how these large companies have on the one hand reproduced production systems and labour regimes, and the social relations that underpin them, while also varying their modalities. At the same time that they have expanded their regional footprint, their ownership structures have also changed, with the most significant regional player, Illovo, now being 100% owned by Associated British Foods. While retaining its South African base of operations, like many others, it is no longer a South African company. That sugar is at the 'frontier' of expanding industrial farming in the region resonates strongly with its important historical role as a frontier crop in the global expansion of capitalism (Moore, 2015).

While land deals may constitute processes of 'accumulation by dispossession' (Harvey, 2003), other factors are also changing landholdings. As Jayne, Chamberlin, and Headey (2014) have shown, endogenous concentration in landholdings is underway in several African countries, driven by local and national elites, and this dynamic, including market transactions and local elite land grabs, possibly overshadows transnational corporate 'land grabs' as a driver of concentration. This suggests that domestic capital within African countries is moving up and downstream through food value chains. These are highly dynamic contexts into which South African capital, and capital routed via South Africa, is expanding.

4.4. Food processing, manufacture, logistics, and distribution

South African companies are also exporting their food processing, manufacture, logistics, and distribution operations, as domestic demand stagnates. Building on the expansion of sugar are the four South African food giants – Tiger Brands, Pioneer Foods, Premier Foods, and RCL Foods[2] (formerly Rainbow Chicken Limited) – which together dominate processing and manufacture in South Africa. These companies are at the epicentre of South Africa's tightly controlled food value chains. In the 'bread cartel' scandal of 2009–2016, the Competition Commission found three of these – Tiger Brands, Pioneer and Premier – to have colluded to fix prices by using their collective market power which spans milling and baking subsidiaries (Cock, 2009).

Over the past decade, these companies have regionalized, prompted by dulled growth prospects, regulatory constraints and competition at home and by improved prospects in regional markets. For instance, faced with domestic competition from cheap Brazilian,

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EU, and USA chicken imports – the latter being the result of a bilateral trade deal between South Africa and the USA in 2016 under the aegis of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) – RCL Foods was joined by the poultry association in lobbying government to conclude government-to-government deals with other countries in the region to facilitate the export of South African chicken into neighbouring markets (Pitso, 2016). As well as rising market competition at home, another push factor driving poultry players into regional markets is the impending introduction of more stringent regulations on the maximum level of 'brining'[3] from 30% to 15% – regulations not applicable in neighbouring countries (Pitso, 2016).

As a result, the South African poultry industry is rapidly regionalizing. RCL acquired a 49% in Zam Chick in 2013 for $14.5 million, the year it also acquired FoodCorp, South Africa's third biggest food producer, for $113 million and changed its name from Rainbow Chicken Limited to RCL Foods Limited (IOL, 2013). In 2015, together with Zambeef, the majority owner of Zam Chick (Zambia Chicken), it made a $4 million investment in Zam Hatch, thereby extending its involvement in Zambia's poultry value chain from a feedmill to laying farms, a hatchery and rearing farms (RCL Foods, 2016b) – thereby achieving a rapid degree of vertical integration. RCL discourses reflect this turn to an outward-facing business strategy:

RCL Foods has implemented a business model to grow the company and ultimately supply high quality, nutritious and affordable food to the entire African continent ... we have begun to actively expand our reach beyond South African borders by continually seeking out and negotiating with prospective new business partners across Africa. Through our joint venture partnerships with leading food supply companies in the African market, we will branch out into new and exciting avenues which will benefit the Group as well as our African associates. (RCL Foods, 2016a)

The experience of the dairy industry offers some cautionary tales. Clover, one of South Africa's largest dairy producers in the domestic market, withdrew in 2013 from a supply agreement with Danone, the Italian company with a global footprint, and now faces competition from it elsewhere on the continent where Danone has 19 factories and a workforce of 10,000 (Peacock, 2016). Clover's attempts to break into the Nigerian and Angolan dairy markets faltered, as 'logistical and supplychain challenges thwarted attempts to build its brands' in those countries (Peacock, 2016). Its competitor, Danone, with deeper pockets for more substantial investment, has in contrast bought controlling stakes in major dairy companies in both Nigeria and Kenya, tapping into their existing and extensive distribution systems, which include 25,000 'pushcart bicycle sellers on the streets' – something which the South African company Clover, by 'going it alone', could not do (Peacock, 2016). All this suggests some binding constraints faced by South African companies attempting to expand in isolation into the agro-food systems of other countries on the continent.

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Tiger Brands, the biggest food manufacturer in South Africa, is operational in 22 countries in Africa, with a focus on maize value chains. Facing declining profits at home, Tiger Brands has in the past decade embarked on aggressive acquisitions in other African countries, acquiring Nigerian biscuit manufacturer Deli Foods in 2013, as well as a 51% stake in the Ethiopian food and beverage East African Group, and 49% of the food and beverage operations of UAC of Nigeria Plc (Africa Business Journal, 2014). But the direct acquisition of manufacturing businesses has not fared well, and Tiger Brands has withdrawn from this mode of operation, shifting instead to investing in distribution networks for its South African processed foods. For example, in 2016 it sold its biggest investment in Nigeria after an R1 billion loss, which also led to the axing of its CEO (Goko, 2016). Meanwhile, its arch-rival at home, Pioneer Foods, has also been expanding its Africa operations, having acquired a majority stake in Food Concepts PLC, its Nigerian rival in the fast food and bakery sector, and focusing on further expansion of operations in Angola, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Ghana. Pioneer has extended its footprint through vertical integration combined with regional expansion, into grains, animal feed, poultry, and beverages – until recently through a licensing agreement with PepsiCo (Pioneer Foods, 2014).

A feature of regional expansion by South African companies is that they *co-expand*. There are several examples of the regionalization of existing business partnerships. For instance, Unitrans provides transport and logistics services for Illovo sugar estates and to its outgrowers in South Africa, and now also at its operations in Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania (Smalley, Sulle, & Malale, 2014). Unitrans now operates in 10 countries in Southern Africa, providing logistics, leasing of on-farm machinery, storage, transport, and supply-chain management services, often in partnership with South African-based companies, including Tiger Brands and RCL Foods (Unitrans, 2017).[4] This shows how South African companies moving into the region tend to pull their value chains with them, often in the context of long-established commercial relationships forged inside South Africa, and sometimes in the absence of equivalent service industries in host countries. Unitrans is a wholly owned subsidiary of KAP, Industrial, established in 2003 as 'a diversified industrial business focused on growth in African markets' and which acquired Unitrans sometime after 2004.[5] In this way, Unitrans, first established in 1962, became part of a larger conglomerate of companies focused on complementary service provision to manage regional logistics and supply chains. All this shows how business networks shape regional expansion, and how South African companies with histories of partnership rely on one another, effectively pulling their value chains with them as they venture into new territory.

4.5. Supermarkets and fast food

At the retail end of the value chain, South African supermarkets and fast food chains are rapidly expanding their reach, aiming to cash in on both the growing 'middle class' market in African cities and the growing low-end market for cheap manufactured foods. Four giant South African supermarket chains – Shoprite, Pick n Pay, Spar and

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Woolworths – have all developed a regional imprint over the past two decades. Shoprite, ‘arguably the most successful supermarket chain in sub-Saharan Africa’, is at the forefront, with 320 supermarkets (both corporate and franchise) in 14 African countries, and with rapid expansion both within and beyond these countries (Harding, 2011). Sensitive to criticisms of South African companies bypassing local producers, Shoprite has established programmes to assist producers of fresh fruit and vegetables to meet its quantity and quality requirements, and so to indigenize its procurement practices in its other African operations (Shoprite Holdings Limited, 2016). Yet, it was still importing 98% of its retailed fresh fruit and vegetables from South Africa; the same proportion of 98% of manufactured food sold in Namibia is imported from South Africa (Emongor, 2008). By 2014, Shoprite CEO Whitey Basson’s message to his shareholders was summed up as: ‘Don’t bother looking at South Africa — Africa is where the really profitable action is’ (Shevel, 2014). Citing the growing middle classes in African capital cities, and their desire for big brands and access to a greater variety of manufactured and processed foods, he cautioned his own investors to ‘ignore the potential of Africa’s shoppers at their peril’ (Shevel, 2014). Clustering its food retail (Shoprite, Checkers, Checkers Hyper, USave, OK Foods, and OK Grocer) together with fast food (Hungry Lion), liquor (OK Liquor, Friendly Liquor) and its furniture (OK Furniture, OK Furniture Dreams, and House & Home) and pharmacy retail brands (Shoprite MediRite) (Shoprite Holdings Limited, 2016).

Far behind Shoprite is Pick n Pay, with its Zimbabwean subsidiary TM, which has been expanding in Zambia and Ghana, preparing to move into Nigeria, while closing operations in Mozambique and Mauritius. Food Lovers’ Market has also expanded from South Africa northwards into Zimbabwe. Less significant but still present in food retail across several African countries are Spar and Woolworths. High-end chain Woolworths opened three stores in Nigeria in 2012, closing all by 2014 (Goko, 2016). By 2016, though, Pick n Pay was aiming to expand into Nigeria, this time in a 51– 49% partnership with a listed Nigerian company, and initially opening a range of 10 large and small format stores (Goko, 2016).

Of more concern to Shoprite than its South African competitors is the Kenyan supermarket chain Nakumatt, and Walmart (Harding, 2011) and, to a lesser degree perhaps, Botswana’s own supermarket chain Choppies, now also in South Africa and elsewhere. Kenya’s Nakumatt supermarket chain now has 35 retail outlets, spanning Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania, taking over Shoprite’s flagship Dar Es Salaam outlet in 2014, and aiming to expand to Burundi ‘to ensure that we fully cover East Africa before setting off on the Nakumatt 2.0 journey, which involves registering a Pan-African presence’ with the next steps being supermarket expansion in Nigeria, DRC, South Sudan, Malawi, and Botswana, said managing director of Nakumatt Holdings, Atul Shah (Harding, 2011).

Also on the move is a fifth supermarket giant in South Africa, Massmart, which had existing outlets in 11 countries in Africa (Massmart, 2012) prior to US supermarket giant

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Walmart's contentious purchase of it in 2010. This acquisition was contested by the national trade union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions but approved by the Competition Commission. As a result, Walmart, via Massmart, has expanded its African footprint through its new holdings in the food wholesale and retail sectors through its subsidiaries Game and CBW, both of which had existing outlets in several countries. Since this purchase, Massmart has moved into more direct competition with other South African food retailers in West Africa, including Shoprite which already has 16 stores in Nigeria and which, by diversifying its supply chains, now procures 76% of food items from local suppliers and farmers ('Diyan, 2016). Massmart is competing for the same market, while also opening smaller grocery stores aimed at Nigeria's vast low-income market. Rather than eyeing competition from local retailers, or investors from elsewhere, Massmart identifies other South African retailers as its primary competitors: 'Shoprite was first and we're second but with the power of Walmart we hope to overtake them' (Grant Pattison, CEO Massmart, cited in Ventures Africa, 2014).

As South African, Kenyan and other supermarkets expand, first into national capitals and then into smaller towns, procurement practices and quality and quantity requirements limit access by local smallholders into formal food retail chains (Weatherspoon, Neven, Katjiuongua, Fotsin, & Reardon, 2004). Such negative impacts reflect the broader contradictions between corporate food retail and more socially embedded food trade networks, and the tendency of the former to displace the latter (Weatherspoon & Reardon, 2003). This is another way in which South African agro-food capital is exporting its contradictions and tendency to exclude small-scale farmers and rely on large-scale procurement of inputs, large-scale farming, large-scale processing and manufacture, and large-scale retail.)

5. Understanding the conditions for failure

Despite the far-reaching expansion, success for South Africa as a (potential) regional hegemon in Africa's agro-food system is far from assured. Rather, we see diverse cases of success and failure by individual companies. This is why we find it instructive to look not only at where South African capital has succeeded – in cases lauded on the popular South African business website 'How we made it in Africa' – but also to understand the reasons for its failures.

Several significant examples of failure suggest a range of reasons, including competition from domestic agro-food capital; competition from regional actors from other middle-income countries; and supply-chain difficulties including input and output markets. Among the 'failures' perhaps the most notable is Tiger Brands' purchase in 2012 of a majority (65.7%) shareholding in Nigeria's Dangote Flour Mill, an investment which lost nearly a quarter of its market value in the year 2013–2014 before Tiger Brands pulled out. Second, also in Nigeria, is the demise of the Woolworths retail venture, which foundered on supply-chain problems and high pricing of its clothing lines, unlike its competitor Shoprite which, through South African-Nigerian joint ventures, managed to get anchor positions in 10 new malls at the time of the demise of Woolworths Nigeria (Douglas,

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2014). Third, Pioneer, too, divested its unprofitable subsidiary Quantum Foods, which owns the milling and food manufacture companies Bokomo Uganda and Bokomo Zambia. Fourth, after an initial expansion into Tanzania, all three of Shoprite's stores in the country, in Dar es Salaam and Arusha, were bought out by Nakumatt for $45.5million in 2014 (Ciuri, 2014; Who Owns Whom, 2017b). Fifth, several farmland investments have dwindled from ambitious initial plans to a modest scale of farming. For instance, in Congo, a decline from a plan of 10 million hectares, to agreement on 200,000 ha, to initial allocation of 80,000 ha, only a fraction of which has been cultivated, and with massive attrition of initial investors, with most returning home (Hall et al., 2015), echoing the experience of white Zimbabwean farmers who moved into Mozambique after fast-track land reform (Hammar, 2010).

We hypothesize that one reason for failures such as these is the fact that not all elements of the system – which have been combined to create South Africa's corporate agro-food system – are present in new destination markets. The export of some elements of this model into countries where states have neither the capacity nor the willingness to create a capitalist farming class through regulation and subsidy in the way that the apartheid government did, does not always gain traction, and in practice has foundered on numerous occasions. Land deals for primary production depend on the provision of both infrastructure and political support to facilitate the movement of big capital through the agro-food system, as the South African state provided for several decades. The absence of such conditions makes corporate investments vulnerable to conditions that differ considerably from those that enabled accumulation at home. Capital is thus vulnerable to a degree, suffering setbacks and losses in the face of an absence of the conditions that enabled the development of a capitalist agro-food system in South Africa in the twentieth century.

6. Conclusions

This article explores the expanding role of forms of agrarian capital based in one of the BRICS countries, South Africa, in agro-food systems in Africa more widely. We have noted the ways in which the structure of the South African economy has both conditioned and precipitated this process of regionalization. We have argued that there are a number of significant 'push' factors, including stagnating domestic demand in the context of massive, structural unemployment, with capital driven to seek new markets for products. Against this backdrop, we argue that the end of apartheid and the increased degree of integration into the global economy that this entailed came at a good time for South African capital. Here we concur with Bernstein (2013, p. 23) who notes 'the importance of the removal of the limits on international mobility of capital and commodities imposed by the apartheid regime' and the ways in which these policies, and their timing, have enabled South African agribusinesses to reposition themselves in the era of deregulation and liberalization.

However, capital moving from and via South Africa into other Africa countries has also encountered substantial obstacles to entry, and been challenged by severe competition

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from other companies in its destination markets. These companies are located both in and from other middle-income countries with expanding agro-food industries of their own. While a 'first-mover advantage' may have buoyed South African corporate investors in the late 1990s and early 2000s, since then their expansion has been more chequered, and seen several notable failures as well as some successes. The ambitions of giant South African agribusinesses to become regional hegemons are thus often thwarted.

Apartheid policies from the 1940s onwards established the conditions for the emergence of a particular form of agrarian capital, corporate agribusiness, in which an authoritarian state was able to enforce low levels of subsistence while simultaneously increasing the productivity and output of capitalist agriculture through subsidies made possible by funds from a lucrative mining sector. In other African countries, given their different histories and circumstances, these conditions rarely exist.

South African corporate investment in countries across the continent – in the food system, but also in mining, telecommunications, finance, construction, transport, and logistics – often involves companies retaining their South African base. But, as the example of major brewer SABMiller illustrates, many companies are 'transnationalizing', rebranding themselves for an African market, while providing a route through which global capital can partner with South African capital in its expansion strategies. As the examples of the Chinese stake in Standard Bank and the purchase of Illovo Sugar by Associated British Food plc show, the notion of 'South African capital' is becoming increasingly moot.

Understanding the links between internal and regional agro-food transformations requires that we examine both 'push' and 'pull' factors conditioning the behaviour of capital, as well as the impacts of the entry of South African companies. These are the core of an agenda for future research. The key questions can be posed as follows: first, which actors in agro-food value chains are the key drivers of regional expansion – for instance, is this primarily a production-, processing-, or retail-led dynamic? Second, what are the conditions that make exporting elements of the South African agro-food system feasible or unfeasible, and influence the outcomes of such investments – in other words, what explains the variable track record, and outcomes of 'success' and 'failure', and for whom? Third, how do 'host states' position themselves in soliciting inward investment while also aiming to support local ownership of core farming, processing, and retail companies, and how does the character of the local political economy shape the terms on which outsiders – South Africans and others – are allowed to enter into Africa's agro-food system? Fourth, where is the South African state in all this? How is the state positioned with respect to agribusiness and related capital, South African and multinational, in an era of deregulated commodity and financial markets?

In this article we have argued that South African agrarian capital's engagement elsewhere on the continent exhibits a degree of path-dependency, reflecting its domestic accumulation path and its socially and politically contradictory focus on benefiting a

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narrow (racially defined) elite. However, the ways in which this plays out in practice are highly contingent, as capital encounters different conditions and new competitors. What is under way is the export of elements of South Africa's agro- food system into countries where states lack either the capacity or the willingness (or both) to create a small, elite class of capitalist farmers, through regulation and subsidy, in the way that the apartheid government did. It is for this reason that, despite the narrative of 'Africa rising' and the allure of growing markets, South African capital suffers not from only competition but also severe setbacks, often due to the starkly different conditions into which elements of South Africa's agro-food system are inserted. Export of this system is thus built on shaky foundations.

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Notes

1. Standard Bank now also operates in Angola, Botswana, Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. But through acquisitions it has also extended beyond Africa to the Americas (Brazil, Argentina, and the USA) and to China, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and United Kingdom.
2. RCL Foods, formerly Rainbow Chickens Limited, changed its name in 2013 to reflect its wider spectrum of brands, and is majority owned by Remgrow.
3. Brining is the injection of brine – salty water – into the chicken, ostensibly to retain succulence and improve flavour, thereby increasing weight without commensurate nutritional benefit.
4. http://www.unitrans.co.za/customers
5. http://www.unitrans.co.za/about http://www.kap.co.za/about/our-history/ http://www.kap.co.za/ – but contradicted by this: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACT/2005/9.pdf about Steinhoff and forestry expansion.

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