PROGRESSING COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWE

KEY LESSONS FOR PROGRESSING COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN POLICY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN ZIMBABWE

The following lessons emerged from a workshop held in Harare in May 2014:

• Emphasis needs to shift from decentralisation towards full devolution beyond the Rural District Councils (RDCs) alongside an increase in capacity of local-level institutions (including RDCs) to fulfil original roles and obligations.
• Transparency of community-based natural resource management processes is needed, including an equalling of power between the institutions of accountability and investors involved.
• Partnerships between central government, local government, communities, and investors are needed to ensure suitable and equitable communication is received by all parties.
• It is vital to increase project emphasis on alleviating poverty and reducing the need for communities to focus solely on their survival so that they can be fully involved.

ACRONYMS:

CAMPFIRE: Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resource Use
CASS: Centre for Applied Social Sciences
CBNRM: community-based natural resource management
ESRC: Economic and Social Research Council
IDS: Institute of Development Studies
RDC: Rural District Council
REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SRI: Sustainability Research Institute
STEPS: Social, Technological and Environmental Pathways to Sustainability

BACKGROUND

Zimbabwe is ushering in a new era of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). It is moving away from place-based wildlife management initiatives to more internationally linked forestry carbon projects which focus on the sequestration of carbon through conservation of forests and the subsequent trading of carbon credits. Learning lessons from the varied and complex history of Zimbabwe’s main CBNRM project – the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resource Use (CAMPFIRE) – is necessary to ensure a successful progression of environmentally and socially just CBNRM in Zimbabwe. As such, the Sustainability Research Institute (University of Leeds, with funding from the University of Leeds Sustainable Agricultural Bursary and the ESRC) and
the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (University of Zimbabwe, with funding from STEPS, IDS, Sussex) held a workshop at the CASS Trust, Harare, in May 2014, titled ‘Progressing CBNRM in Zimbabwe’. The aim of the workshop was to progress debates from the traditionally observed contradictory literature and analysis on the successes and failures of CAMPFIRE into ways forward, given the new CBNRM context emerging within the country. The workshop was attended by a range of professionals from policy making, practice (at both local and national level) and research in the CBNRM arena, who together discussed how to progress CBNRM, both theoretically and practically, given the rise of international emphasis on climate change mitigation and the emergence of subsequent new CBNRM-based projects (i.e. REDD+, co-management etc.). The workshop ultimately identified multiple lessons, including those listed on page 1. It also flagged related areas of urgent focus.

Occurring in a background of landlessness and poverty, CAMPFIRE aimed at integrating biodiversity conservation and rural development through the commercial use of wildlife resources in former tribal reserves (through the 1982 amendment to the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act)1, 2. On paper, CAMPFIRE still remains one of the most innovative CBNRM programmes in the world because of its perceived success in directing policy and rewards to poorer people. However, studies and experiences, as outlined in this brief, echo a decline in the effectiveness and performance of CAMPFIRE projects3-8. It is imperative for policy makers and practitioners alike to understand the criticisms of CAMPFIRE and apply these as lessons for improving the CBNRM approaches in Zimbabwe, especially in relation to the new CBNRM projects already being implemented in the country.

DISTILLED INSIGHTS TO COME FROM THE WORKSHOP

Emphasis needs to shift from decentralisation towards full devolution beyond RDCs, plus necessary increase in capacity of local-level institutions (including RDCs) to fulfil original roles and obligations:

Natural resource decentralisation and devolution to local or community governance ensures sustainable resource conservation as well as rural development through improvements in resource allocation, efficiency, accountability and equity, and local participation. Since the 1980s, Zimbabwe has decentralised the management of its natural resources3. The CAMPFIRE programme decentralised control over wildlife to the Appropriate Authorities (usually the RDCs under existing legislation), with some policy guidelines providing for further devolution to sub-district administrative groups, i.e. wards6, 10. However, the decentralisation of authority over CAMPFIRE decision-making and control has not been enough11. The lack of further devolution to the village and community limits the achievement of the original CAMPFIRE objectives and threatens its long-term sustainability12.

Decentralisation in CAMPFIRE has been partial and conditional due to limited land tenure security, resulting in RDCs and state agencies offloading the costs of natural resources management to local communities, while retaining the control of associated benefit streams. Thus, the decentralisation process has marginalised communities in the management of wildlife projects and the enjoyment of benefits. Moving forward, the emphasis should shift from decentralisation to a devolutionary process, which should be intensified. This should involve the government giving legal status to groups below the RDCs and for them to be recognised as legal entities, capable of gaining Appropriate Authority. This will allow for communities living in communal lands – producer communities – to be able to obtain user rights to wildlife and fully participate in wildlife management, and likewise for other resources as the project focus changes12. This will also allow communities to establish community game ranches, communal conservancies and community trusts to which further devolution of authority can be made.

Moreover, the establishment of efficient technical extension service and administrative oversight that allows for good governance and capacity building of the local people in common property management is needed. This point is stressed because there is a significant problem with elite capture of benefits whereby those in positions of power co-opt the benefits destined for the producer communities for themselves11, 13, 14.

Improved transparency of CBNRM processes, including an equalling of power between the institutions of accountability and the private actors involved:

Accountability and transparency are other aspects that can play an important role in improving local attitudes towards conservation. Accountability of stakeholder representatives and of management structures to their constituents is essential for effective local-level natural resource management. The decentralisation process that has occurred thus far in Zimbabwe is such that it has garnered upward rather than downward accountability. The lack of capabilities at the local level has reduced the need for transparency in governing processes15, 16. Where it occurs, transparency generates trust and buy-in of CBNRM processes, especially among local people who are used to being excluded from management by local authorities and investors. Going forward, CBNRM will have to apply itself to this, ensuring that local people, through their representative leadership, take part in the many negotiations concerning CBNRM projects. By giving sub-district community entities legal status and official recognition with the CBNRM process – alongside socioeconomic development and
satisfaction of basic needs – communities will have increasing
capacity to hold more powerful actors, from RDCs to investors,
to account. Furthermore, communities themselves will be
expected to be transparent, holding one another to account,
without fear or favour5.

It is important to note, however, that transparent collective local
governance institutions are highly unlikely to emerge overnight,
particularly where institutions are newly created and take time
to evolve. They are also unlikely to emerge where there is a
tradition of institutional closeness, as is perhaps the case with
Zimbabwe’s traditional authority systems5, 17. An important
element in taking CBNRM forward must be a long-term
outlook, not the expectation of quick wins.

**Partnerships are needed to ensure that suitable communication and information on how best to implement and manage projects are received by all parties:**

As Mandondo18 explains, it is not easy to bring together
the variety of different actors involved in natural resource
management, yet establishing such partnerships is key to
achieving good local governance and providing suitable
communication and information exchange. The current
disconnect in information and communication between many
of the actors involved in natural resource management in
Zimbabwe has increased issues in the process of ensuring
decision makers gain an understanding of reality on the
ground. This in turn hampers the resolution of key community
and programme issues. Partnerships need ‘reciprocal,
constructive, and respecting relationships between actors
whereby they [actors] work successfully together for mutual
benefit’6. However, in Zimbabwe, recent studies have shown
that partnerships are far from being formed, resulting in a
detrimental lack of shared information and communication
which is key to successful outcomes.

Causationally, the ‘governance gaps’ identified by Harrison
et al.5 both underlie and cause these lacks of partnerships
at the local and district level – there has been the cutting out
of traditional actors, lack of RDC capacity and the reduction
in central government involvement, lack of relationship
between chiefs and councillors, overarching power control
of private actors and the continual lack of involvement of
local communities. Without these partnerships, unreliable
information will continue to misinform project designs
and management, inefficiency will continue to plague the
implementation process and there will be few opportunities
for people to build knowledge, skills, participation and
accountability – all key for good local governance of natural
resources management.

**Need for increased emphasis on alleviating poverty and reducing the need for communities to focus solely on their survival:**

In Southern Africa, most CBNRM programmes have been
initiated in areas with high poverty. The need to support rural
development and address poverty issues was also a driving
force19. In Zimbabwe, CAMPFIRE’s emphasis was on using
natural resource management to drive rural development in
areas where conventional agriculture was limited by low rainfall
and climatic variability. Murphree20 described CAMPFIRE as
firstly a programme of rural economic development, secondly a
programme of community empowerment and democratisation,
and thirdly, a conservation programme enhancing sustainable
use. During the phases when it was most people oriented
striving to balance people’s interests against those of
conservation, CBNRM had some buy-in from local people21.
At some point this balancing of interests changed with a shift
to more focus on conservation and resultant frustration on the
part of communities. This is where we are now. Going forward,
CBNRM needs to put emphasis on material concerns of people,
ensuring that people benefit appropriately in the process. In
doing this, CBNRM must avoid making speculative, or easily
misinterpreted, promises as was the case with CAMPFIRE. This
leads to unrealistic expectation with negative results. Future
projects using the concept of CBNRM in Zimbabwe must
ensure that people benefit from the contracts, both financially
and in kind. More particularly and for good uptake by local
people, future CBNRM deals must protect local livelihoods –
whether agriculture, foraging or hunting – rather than be the
basis of their destruction22.
RECOMMENDATIONS

• CBNRM should be a process by which local communities gain access and use rights to, or ownership of, natural resources. Increasing security and clarity of land tenure is necessary.
• Increase the regard of local people as partners in the CBNRM process with their interests to be respected – not as passive victims.
• De-modernise CBNRM with shifts away from domination by bureaucrats to a more equal footing between central government systems and the traditional systems.
• To repair fragmented government policies and sectors, consolidate stakeholder participation in natural resource management and environmental conservation under umbrella discussions.
• Decriminalise livelihood strategies so that people are free to pursue livelihoods that supplement CBNRM.
• To increase the downward flow of benefits, hold government and local level institutions more accountable to local people.
• Streamline, clarify and input the required legislation and legal structures necessary for CBNRM to take into account the highlighted recommendations.
• Next step: get all stakeholders on the same page about what CBNRM means, requires, and results in.

REFERENCES AND RESOURCES


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