Introduction

After seven decades of episodic existence through conferences, the Pan-African project became permanently institutionalised with the founding of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963, with a qualitative upgrade into the African Union in 2002.

Much academic literature on African integration and the OAU-AU is pessimistic. Most media commentary is dismissive of the AU, and derogatory of the Pan-African Parliament. This article seeks to trace the on-going evolution of the OAU-AU, and enquire how the AU stands up to contemporary regional organisations. This makes it focus on operationalised ground truth, rather than entities which exist mostly on paper.

The African Union and its regional communities have achieved significantly more - and attempted vastly more - than a score of contemporaries such as the Organisation of American States, the League of Arab States, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, and the Southern Common Market. Among regional communities, the African Union is arguably second in accomplishments to only the European Union, which has a three orders of magnitude larger budget and personnel establishment. The African Union’s operations focus on peace-making, while its institution-building focuses on economic integration and development.

The on-going evolution of the African Union family of associations today shows a complexity interwoven with subsidiary inter-governmental organisations, Quasi-Nongovernmental Organisations (Quangos), and civil society non-governmental organisations. Its constitutional mandates and judicial activism show repeated contestation between autocratic regimes and advocates of the rule of law and democratisation. The “soft law” of regional judiciaries presses beyond inter-governmentalism towards assertions of supra-national authority. This article will then conclude with an assessment of the trends and the future of African integration.
An Overview of Pan-Africanism

Most of the literature on the Pan-African project - to unify Africa, and her diaspora - has several gaps. First, a book or article conceptualizes Pan-Africanism in the narrowest possible sense of inter-governmental organisations, excluding both corporate and civil society activities. Second, even in analysing inter-governmental organisations, books and articles typically consider only either the Organisation of African Unity / African Union (OAU/ AU), or one or more regional economic communities, ignoring a host of treaties which explicitly define these regional communities as the geographic and organisational cornerstones for the AU, its security architecture, and its proposed African Economic Community.

The complex chronology of the Pan-African project starts with non-state actors: conferences of civil society amongst the African diaspora, which from the start also included intellectuals from the continent. It then evolves to become state-centric, and culminates in beginning to re-incorporate civil society.

The choice of venue for the early Pan-African congresses indicates priority for lobbying the Versailles conference of 1919, and lobbying in the capitals of the four vanished imperialist empires that then ruled Africa. The mid-twentieth century marks the home-coming of Pan-African congresses to the continent. Analysis of the 1958 first All-Africa People’s Conference, in Accra, capital of newly-independent Ghana, shows three interesting developments. It was the first to be held on African soil. Second, Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana, the first black colony in Africa to win independence, gave Pan-Africanism a continental rather than ethnic focus. The Conference included both the Algerian liberation movement (the Arab FLN), and the Liberal Party of South Africa, led by mostly white South Africans.

Third, from this point on, inter-governmental organisations overshadowed the remaining civil society conferences. Pan-Africanism became dominated by a state-centric narrative, one of the unintended consequences of which was to marginalise the diaspora. While the literature conventionally names and numbers five Pan-African congresses, research traces at least twelve. (See Table 1) State-centrism means that little of the literature even list the second and third All-African People’s Conferences, nor the sixth and seventh Pan-African congresses. But, however overshadowed by presidential summits and the OAU they were, these four civil society conferences did occur, alongside the state-centric institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism. The turning of the circle started in 2004, with the AU’s Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) statute making provision for twenty-four non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from civil society, plus twenty diaspora organisations represented alongside the majority from Africa. Episodic conferences are now replaced by a permanent Council with annual sessions (ECOSOCC: Article 4).

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1The Belgian, British, French, and Portuguese Empires
Table 1

**CHRONOLOGY: PAN-AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY CONFERENCES**

1893: Congress on Africa, Chicago: name “Pan-Africanism” coined.
1920s: “Africa for the Africans”: zenith years of U.N.I.A. branches in Africa.
1958: First All-Africa People’s Conference, Accra.
1960: Second All-Africa People’s Conference, Tunis.
1961: Third All-Africa People’s Conference, Cairo.


**Precedents and Provenance: Role Models for the OAU & AU**

The OAU was the first permanent institutionalisation of Pan-Africanism. All founders of the OAU were also members of the United Nations Organisation (UNO), and six were also members of the League of Arab States (LAS). They were familiar with these intergovernmental organisations’ aims and procedures. The LAS was founded in 1945 to “coordinate the political activities”, and “safeguard the independence and sovereignty” of its members. Its Council procedure was, like the UNO, the senate principle of one state one vote. It had a number of special committees for economics, finance, public health, and social welfare.

Article 8 specified the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of any member state: each state “shall respect the form of government” in all other states. Some of its members were absolute monarchies; others were authoritarian regimes. Its Council met twice per year (Article 11); between sessions it had a General Secretariat, a Secretary-General, and assistant officials. (Article 12; Pact of the League of Arab States)
Analysis indicates that the League’s definition of an “Arab state” is political, rather than one of language or colour. Three current LAS member states are black nations that have Arabic as their second, not home language: Comoros (Swahili), Djibouti (Somali & Afar), and Somalia (Somali). The LAS was non-aligned through the Cold War decades. Even its official website makes no claims of peacekeeping history, and its proposals for a free trade area are not yet operationalised.

Upon independence, each African state was admitted to the UNO, so all OAU members were also UN members. The UN aims to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to achieve international cooperation, and to harmonise international relations. The Charter of the UN includes Article 2(7) which stipulates non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. Only on a case-by-case basis could the Security Council order a Chapter Seven military force against a state which was “a grave threat to international peace”, but not for reasons of domestic repression and dictatorship. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council – China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the USA – have a veto over all such decisions. UN membership was founded on an all-in universality principle, including all dictatorships. The only exclusions were two of the defeated former Axis powers being delayed in admission, although they became democracies, until 1956 for Japan, and until 1973 for Germany.

The draft name of the OAU was originally the Organisation of African States, (Wolfers: 1976: 21-24, 205, 212) and in both style and substance the OAU was arguably modelled on the Organisation of American States. The latter was founded by a Charter in 1948, with a lineage going back to 1890. Article 19 of the Bogotá Charter emphasised non-interference in the internal or external affairs of a member state. This ensured that military dictators and juntas were for decades the great majority of members in good standing. Tellingly, this principle was only overruled to suspend Cuba between 1962-2009 for adopting a Marxist-Leninist form of government, but not in any of the numerous cases of coups d’état by anti-communist dictators.

The OAS charter was revised and extended over the decades. At the time of the OAS founding, it too ran through summits of heads of government, ministers of foreign affairs, a general secretariat, and specialised organisations. It later adopted in 1969 an American Convention on Human Rights, in 1970 the new organ of a General Assembly, and in 1979 an Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The civil wars, repression, and torture in, for example, Guatemala, and other states (Chamarbagwalaa & Moránb: 2011: 41-61) indicate that the OAS was unable to implement its rhetoric on, and lip service to, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. OAS peacekeeping attempts have been few and insignificant. These arguably mostly legitimated US military intervention.

The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded four years later than the OAU, and so confirms the conventions and mid-twentieth century milieu of regional organisations. Article 2(e) of the ASEAN Charter specifies non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member states. This clearly reduces to non-juridical lip-service Article 2(h) supporting the rule of law, and the principles of democracy. It ensures that Article 2(i) for the promotion and protection of human rights is unenforceable. For example, no one in ASEAN objected to Indonesia’s membership, whose government had, over the
three years preceding ASEAN’s founding, organised pogroms in which over half a million leftists and Indonesians of Chinese ancestry were massacred. (Cribb: 2001: 219-239)

ASEAN, like the OAS, was anti-communist throughout the Cold War, and has several dictatorships as member states. Article 20 laid down the procedure of decisions by consensus, with the consequence of giving each member government a veto.

The 1963 Charter of the OAU, and its subsequent performance, was neither better nor worse, but representative of its mid-twentieth century contemporaries in the developing countries. The organisation was to be run by an Assembly of Heads of States and Governments, a Council of Ministers, and a General Secretariat. (Article VII). It “solemnly affirmed” non-interference in the internal affairs of all its member states, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state (Article III, reiterating Article II). Like the UNO, OAS, and LAS, the OAU was founded on an inclusionary basis for all countries in Africa, regardless of where their governments stood on the spectrum from democratic to dictatorial.

It went further than the charter of contemporary regional organisations by proposing a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration (Article VII) and defence and security cooperation (Article II (2)(f)). While it was unable to implement these, the two proposals kept resurfacing decades later in episodic negotiations, and were finally operationalised in the AU.

In 1963, only amongst the wealthy countries, was the six-year old European Economic Community (EEC) an order of magnitude ahead of other regional organisations. This was founded on the principle that countries which may join must already be democracies, and must demonstrate fiscal and financial stability.

The economic drivers of globalisation show a crowded chronology in their impacts upon regional organisations. The upgrading of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1992 is the same year as the Treaty of Maastricht, where the EU finally achieved its 1962 goal of a common market. The USA responded by proposing the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in 1992. The cascade of responses saw a host of existing regional organisations revise and upgrade their founding treaties: ASEAN, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) renamed the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Coordinating Committee (SADCC) renamed the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the revival of the East African Community (EAC). The OAU made a qualitative shift, starting with the 1991 treaty for an African Economic Community (AEC), and culminating in the 2002 formation of the AU.

The AEC Treaty of Abuja (1991) and the Constitutive Act of the AU (2000) might be the most ambitious attempts in the world at norms diffusion. The Treaty proposed for Africa the wholesale importation of the institutions, procedures, human rights values and other norms of the EU – all to be phased in over an elaborate, thirty-four year schedule matching the 1957-91 evolution of the EU. This was re-iterated nine years later by the Constitutive Act.

These developments were clear when 53 African heads of governments signed the 1991 Treaty of Abuja to, amongst other things, found a Pan-African Parliament, a Court of Justice and Human Rights, an Economic, Social and Cultural Council, an African Central Bank, an
African Monetary Fund, and an African Investment Bank. Existing OAU entities that were re-titled include the Secretariat becoming the Commission, the Council of Ministers renamed as the Executive Council, with a Permanent Representatives Committee being a counterpart to the EU’s Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER). Similarly, the Abuja Treaty started with regional economic communities which should be progressively upgraded to become free trade areas, then customs unions, next common markets, followed by monetary unions, and finally merged into a continental single market. The AEC treaty also paved the way for the later constitutive act in that it did not repeat the 1963 Charter’s emphasis on sovereign independence of its member states, but shifted the phraseology to “inter-dependence” (Article 3(a)), and “inter-state co-operation, harmonisation of policies and integration of programmes” (Article 3 (c).

The norms diffusion from the EU helped the re-engineering of the OAU into the AU become a qualitative shift. First, while the OAU had a founding Charter, a name shared by many organisations, the AU had a Constitutive Act. This nomenclature evokes the constitution of a state, and “act” is the terminology used for a statute passed by a parliament.

Second, the AU’s mandate shows a dynamic contestation between the OAU’s 1963 nationalist narrative versus a twenty-first century human rights assertiveness. That the conflicting clauses are deliberately placed adjacent in the Act appears to reflect a stalemate between the Mbeki-Obasanjo thrust against the more repressive rulers. The Constitutive Act dialectically confronts articles:

- 3(b) defend sovereignty & independence versus 3(c) accelerate political integration of Africa
- 3(h) promote & protect human rights & peoples’ rights
- 5(c) founding the Pan-African Parliament followed by
- 4(g) non-interference in internal affairs versus 4(h) right to intervene in genocide, crimes against humanity, & other grave circumstances
- 3(g) promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance (italics added)

And thus giving a potential mandate for human rights activists to lobby. The AU Constitutive Act is a world first for international organisations in recognising a right of humanitarian intervention in a sovereign independent state. The Pan-African Parliament protocol was the first regional parliament in the world to prescribe a minimum quota for women MPs: one-fifth, though the PAP has not yet refused to accredit national slates of MPs who arrive without one women MP.

The italicised words in the Constitutive Act’s section three are of utmost importance. Political integration is an intention to concede far more sovereignty than cooperation. Likewise, use of the nomenclature Parliament implies the ultimate grant of law-making powers and supra-national authority over at least certain agreed areas. Clearly, the other
diametrical confrontations between article 4(g) and (h) will be decided by diplomatic power struggles on a case-by-case basis each time conflict comes to a climax in Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Madagascar, the Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Diplomats and other lobbyists will battle to accumulate a majority of votes on their side.

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) inauguration came in 2004, with Midrand, South Africa, designated as the permanent site. How does the PAP compare with other regional parliaments? Only the European Parliament, the central American Parlacen, and the ECOWAS Community Parliament are older.\(^2\) The European Parliament first met in 1958, but only upgraded to direct elections in 1979, and has only been able to assert power since the late 1990s. Out of these regional parliaments, only the European Parliament and the PAP post onto their websites an on-line Hansard record of their debates.

The PAP started determined lobbying to acquire authority, and increase its budget and other resources. The PAP has set up ten portfolio committees, including one for Cooperation, International Relations, and Conflict Resolution. (http://www.pan-african-parliament.org) The 2005 AU budgetary reform enabled the AU for the first time to pay not half, but the full PAP allocation in its budget. Simultaneously, Mandela lent his stature to the launch of the Pan-African Trust Fund in 2006, which started with German and UN donations (BUSINESS DAY: 2006b). By 2010 the PAP budget rose to $14 million, the second largest item in the AU budget (Assembly/AU/Dec.287(XIV)). In addition, individual countries are responsible for their own MP’s remuneration and per diem expenses, while the host country South Africa covers all capital and some operational costs of the PAP.

PAP MPs gave priority to objecting to their marginalisation by both the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and the Peace & Security Council (PSC), in negotiations over Darfur and other peacekeeping operations. They assert their right to be involved in all future peace negotiations (BUSINESS DAY: 2006a; THE WEEKENDER: 2006). The PAP has sent fact-finding missions to Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Darfur, Mauritania, Rwanda, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, and Sudan; and election observers to Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, and Zimbabwe. The PAP has the right to receive annual reports from the PSC, and to ask for interim reports (PSC PROTOCOL: ARTICLE 8). The PAP is also lobbying for co-decision over the AU budget, oversight over all AU Commission directorates, and to send monitoring teams to all national elections in AU members. One remarkable aspect is that the Abuja treaty anticipated that founding a Pan-African Parliament would be amongst the toughest achievements to accomplish, and so scheduled it for the final stage forty years ahead, ending in 2034 (Article 6(2)(f)(iv)). But the PAP started three decades ahead of schedule.

Civil society was swift to use the space opened up by the PAP. The first demonstration outside the PAP came from over one hundred Ethiopians protesting on 9 December 2005 against the killing of women and children in Ogaden. Fifty Ugandans followed on 30 December 2005 with a demonstration against the detention of their leader back home, and the banning of their meetings (http://www.pan-african-parliament.org).

A common criticism of the PAP is that since it comprises MPs indirectly elected “on a continent characterised by rubber-stamp parliaments and authoritarian regimes” (LULIE:
The African Union and its sub-regional Structures

2012:19) it cannot be expected to itself be different. Its track record outlined above indicates where it has sought to support those striving for free and fair elections and democracy in their own countries. The PAP intends to move from indirect to direct elections within a shorter period than the two decades this took the European Parliament. In January 2012 the PAP shifted its session to Addis Ababa, to facilitate its MPs lobbying the AU heads of state summit for greater authority. It will need to sustain assertive lobbying for as many decades as the European Parliament did to win more power, including direct elections. One advantage of late starters is to avoid others’ mistakes. European Parliament elections are marked by such low percentage polls that they undermine its legitimacy. It would be far more advisable for the PAP to evolve to direct elections by simply adding an additional voting paper during each state’s own general election.

Analysis of the PAP must point out that its intrinsic importance is far more than the terrain it opens up for oversight over the AU executive, and later legislative authority. First, the AU is constituted as an inter-governmental organisation, comprising an elite of heads of government, cabinet ministers, diplomats, and civil servants. Nowhere in the world may civil servants publically criticise their own governments. The PAP and ECOSOCC are the first AU institutions that broaden participation to include civil society. As part of this, the PAP has the potential to take the lead towards the democratisation of both the AU itself and the continent. PAP and ECOSOCC are the terrains of contestation through which the AU may evolve from a union of presidents to a union of peoples.

Pan-Africanism so far remains confined to a middle-class intellectual elite. Its aspirations are not shared by the working class. Amongst the unemployed and under-employed in shantytowns, the current reality, from South Africa (2008) to Libya (2000 & 2011), is of xenophobic pogroms and riots against African immigrants from other countries. Out of one billion Africans, only around one thousand are full-time participants in the AU family of organisations, plus the political heads of state and diplomats episodically participating in its summits, conferences and other meetings. Direct elections to the PAP would significantly broaden participation in Pan-Africanism.

Founded in 2005, the ECOSOCC brings in civil society through statutory provision for 130 seats for NGOs in the continent. ECOSOCC’s second innovation also has no EU precedent – it also allocates 20 seats for diaspora NGOs. This reverses the marginalisation of the African diaspora since 1963 and mitigates the state-centric dominance of Pan-Africanism. This is the first institutionalisation of the links between a continent and its diaspora. Globally, this appears to be a historic third after the Israel-Zionism movement relationship; and India’s legislation for Overseas Citizens of India to include biennial Pravasi Bharatiya Divas.

The AEC Treaty, which came into effect during 1994, proposed thirty-four years of stages towards Nkrumah’s proposed African common market, which followed the EU’s own evolution during the thirty-four years between 1957 and the 1991 signing of the treaty in Abuja.

Much of Africa implemented the first two stages on schedule. While the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) remain dormant, COMESA, ECOWAS, EAC, and the SADC are operationalised. COMESA, EAC and the SADC each formed free trade areas (FTAs) ahead of the 2017 deadline. The
EAC is a leading example of what the literature calls fast-tracking or variable geometry: it has deepened economic integration into a customs union ahead of schedule.

The AEC treaty proposed that each regional community become a FTA by 2017, then a customs union by 2019, before the different customs unions could merge into a continental common market by 2021, culminating in a single continental currency by 2028.

Rob Davies, South African Minister of Trade & Industry, argues that a trajectory imitative of EU integration is unrealistic: the formal deepening of economic integration, following orthodox economic theory of the 1950s. (DAVIES: 2011) The AU’s Minimum Integration Programme or MIP (2009) saw the first major revision of the Abuja Treaty. Current plans are to broaden economic integration by creating and merging Free Trade Areas before deepening each into customs unions and then common markets. The AU now aims at achieving a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by a notional goal of 2017 (ASSEMBLY/AU/Decl.1(XVIII). COMESA, EAC and SADC propose to solve the problem of their overlapping memberships by a tripartite merger process that formally began in 2011. The MIP commends this as a model, urging that ECOWAS, ECCAS, CENSAD & AMU should merge. (MIP, pp.30, 99). Davies anticipates that a continental free trade area will precede further attempts to broaden existing customs unions, or forming common markets.

The inauguration of the PSC in 2004, and the *de facto* birth of the African Stand-by Force (ASF) - (commencing with the peace-keeping deployment in Burundi in 2003) - mark the start of the AU’s shift from adoption of EU institutions to adaptation of ECOWAS organs. While the convention has been for academics to write that the AU’s PSC is adapted from the UN Security Council, it is clear that Nigeria and other ECOWAS members of the AU drew upon their own experiences to shape an AU evolution which adapted ECOWAS precedents, down to even the nomenclature. Few scholars seemed to have spotted the obvious precedents. (See Table 2) For example, each of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council may veto any intervention. By contrast, the PSC may order even military intervention by a two-thirds majority, so minimizing paralysis. The UN has no equivalents to the Panel of the Wise, but ECOWAS does have a precedent (PSC Protocol: 2002).
To date, peace-keeping is arguably the AU’s major activity. There have been over three hundred meetings of PSC, compared to the average two dozen meetings of other organs. Not only have boots on the ground in Sudan, Somalia, and elsewhere grown beyond the 15,000 soldiers and police envisaged for the start-up of the African Stand-by Force in 2010; the AU’s 25,000-strong component in AU and hybrid peacemaking missions such as UNAMID and AMISOM means that there is already a de facto African Standing Force, in continuous action for over six years, and now with a permanent Military Staff Committee.3

Another dimension where ECOWAS is ahead of the AU is in the composition of its legislature. The PAP, like the East African Legislative Assembly, is based on the senate principle of equal representation for each state regardless of population. By contrast, the ECOWAS Parliament, hosted in Abuja, has followed the European Parliament with national representation weighted for population through a formula of digressive proportionality (See Table 3). It can surely be only a matter of time before the PAP evolves towards this, as it currently has a 1000:1 inequality between the value of a vote in Nigeria and the Seychelles.

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Table 3

ECOWAS PARLIAMENT’S DEGRESSIVE PROPORTIONALITY FORMULA

35 MPs: Nigeria
8 MPs: Ghana
7 MPs: Côte d’Ivoire
6 MPs: Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal
5 MPs: Benin, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo

Source: www.comm.ecowas.int

The ECOWAS Commission, headed by a President, has since 2006 supranational authority binding on members in agreed areas. The Community Acts passed by ECOWAS Authority are binding without slow ratifications by national parliaments. These 2006 reforms include “strengthening of supra-nationality”, adoption of a new legal regime (decisions directly applicable in member states & by the institutions” (ibid. p.1); and that delegations of member states to ECOWAS Parliament “should take account of the gender approach and reflect the diversity of political sensitivities represented at the national assemblies” (ibid.p.3 ECOWAS Newsletter: 2006).

PEACE & SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

This article is fifty-four years after Kwame Nkrumah proposed an African army and African High Command. While the French military and the US Africom are based in Djibouti, how far has Africa itself progressed? The brief chronology in Table 4 tracks a glacial but cumulative progress. The chronology charts episodic meetings during the 1960s-1980s, followed by escalating peacekeeping and peacemaking from the 1990s onwards.
Table 4

CHRONOLOGY: PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

1958: Nkrumah proposes an African Legion & African High Command
1963: OAU Defence Commission, 1st meeting, Accra
       OAU founds Liberation Committee, with Defence Committee, Dar es Salaam
1965: OAU Defence Commission, 2nd meeting, Freetown
1971: OAU Defence Commission, 5th meeting, Addis Ababa
1979: OAU Defence Commission, 6th meeting
1981: OAU 1st military peacekeeping, Chad, arrives December 1981
1982: OAU 1st military peacekeeping, Chad, withdraws June 1982
1990: ECOMOG peacemaking in Liberia
1991: OAU NMOG in Rwanda, 55 observers
1993: OAU Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution founded
1994-95 OAU OMIB in Burundi, 52 observers
1995: OAU Peace Fund established; decision to set up peacekeeping brigades in each of five regions
1996: OAU 1st Chiefs of Staff meeting
1997: OAU 2nd Chiefs of Staff meeting, Harare
1998: SADC peacemaking in Lesotho
       ECOMOG peacemaking in Sierra Leone
       ECOMOG peacemaking in Guinea-Bissau
       OAU sets up Situation Room in its Conflict Management Centre
       OAU OMIC in Comoros, 29 observers
2003: 3rd Chiefs of Staff meeting
       AU starts peacekeeping mission in Darfur, Sudan
2004: EU Peace Facility [Fund] founded
       Committee of Intelligence & Security Services of Africa (CISSA) founded
       African Centre for Studies & Research on Terrorism founded
       AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact signed
2007: Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) set up
       Panel of the Wise set up
       Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace & Security between the AU, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa & Northern Africa.
       AMISOM peacemakers arrive in Somalia, slow build-up to 17 000
2010: ASF Military Staff Committee founded, meets monthly, advisory, no executive powers.
2012: Current operational strength of AU military in AU and hybrid missions total 25 000 military and police personnel.

In formal terms, the African Stand-by Force has not yet been inaugurated. But de facto, the cumulative peacekeeping and peacemaking missions have seen continuous deployment and action for nine years, and now tally 25 000 boots on the ground. This is quantitatively
and qualitatively vastly more peacekeeping than ASEAN, LAS, or the OAS dared to even attempt. It is second to only UN peacekeeping. Another major advance in both AU and hybrid AU-UN operations has been its evolution from their traditional role of peacekeeping between two front lines in conventional war, as between Algeria and Morocco in the 1960s, or Ethiopia and Eritrea in the 1990s, to complex peace enforcement in civil wars as in Darfur or the DRC “with multiple factions that are often mutating” (Adebajo: 2011: 242). Success in such circumstances requires developing sophisticated multilateral diplomacy in addition to underwriting a robust deployment of military forces.

In contrast to the 1960s record of unilateral Belgian, French and UN military intervention in the Congo and elsewhere, twenty-first century peace-making in Africa now has the UNO and EU operating hybrid missions as partnerships with the AU. African agency is more evident.

These developments are part of the AU emerging as a player in global governance that asserts African agency to negotiate the terms of the continent’s engagement with both peace-making in Africa and its international relationships. The growing stature of the AU, compared to the earlier OAU, saw a new development. In 2006, the USA became the first of fifty-three states to formally accredit ambassadors to the AU. Alongside these, regional organisations such as the EU, Arab League, and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) followed suit (http://www.au.int/en/partnerships). No state had contemplated accrediting diplomats to the former OAU, but they clearly decided that the AU carries more weight in international affairs.

Conversely, the AU started to have an embryonic diplomatic corps. It has permanent diplomatic missions in New York to service its coordination of African delegates to the UNO; a mission to UN specialised agencies in Geneva, a mission to the EU in Brussels, and one in Cairo to the Arab League. It also runs a diplomatic office in Washington DC, headquarters of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as the US capital. DialloTelli (then OAU Secretary-General) negotiated with U Thant (then UN Secretary-General) in 1965 that the UN and its Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) would prepare research and papers for the OAU. The African Development Bank has also partnered with the ECA and OAU to draft bargaining positions for the African bloc in economic negotiations (Wolfers: 1976 :99, 102). These diplomatic alliances augmented the OAU and AU capacity above its own budget and personnel resources.

**HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM**

Amongst the first erosion of the OAU Charter’s Article 3 prohibiting intervention in the internal affairs of states was the signing of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1981. This empowered the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to officially comment on issues of the rule of law and human rights. While rhetoric cannot yet remedy ground truth in authoritarian jurisdictions, lip service opens up a gap with reality that provides an arena for mobilization by the continent’s human rights campaigners.

One unexpected development has been judicial activism in two of the new regional courts. Such intergovernmental courts are established by treaty to adjudicate border and other disputes between governments, and between a government and the regional economic community. This is the way that the COMESA Court of Justice operates. In the
EU’s history, it took four decades before the governments agreed that individuals could appeal from the highest court of their country to the EU court. Gathii is the first legal scholar to point out that African regional judiciaries:

"entertain a broad range of disputes from an extremely broad category of litigants, unlike the International Court of Justice, for example, which only accepts cases from states that have accepted its jurisdiction… Many of these judiciaries … have also often entertained cases that are well beyond their treaty-defined jurisdictional bases… Another feature that comes out clearly is the boldness of their decisions in relation to the fact that they are relatively new institutions operating in a context in which adherence to notions of national sovereignty is very strong” (GATHII:2011:xxxii) (emphasis added).

The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECJ) asserted its jurisdiction over human rights within two decades, while the SADC Tribunal made a world first for such a regional court when it agreed to hear as its first trial a human rights case, then other human rights cases:

1. ECW/CCJ/APP/04/07 was a habeas corpus application on behalf of Ebrima Manneh, a Gambian journalist who in 2006 was illegally abducted into secret detention incommunicado. The ECOWAS Court ordered both his release, plus cash compensation for unlawful imprisonment and loss of earnings.
2. SADC(T) no.11/2008 concerned Mike Campbell, whose Zimbabwean farm was seized, after which the 73 year old was tortured to force him to instruct his lawyers to abandon the SADC-T litigation.

The AU, ECOWAS and the SADC showed the same political realities as the UNO, ICJ, OAS, LAS, and ASEAN. They were politically frightened to enforce these ECCJ and SADC-T court rulings on human rights. Indeed, Mugabe denounced the SADC-T rulings as “nonsense and of no consequence” (The Namibian 11 July 2009). This inaction is the opposite of repeated AU rhetoric, of which its several Darfur resolutions are typical:


“6. reiterates the AU’s unflinching commitment to combating impunity and promoting democracy, the rule of law and good governance throughout the entire Continent, in conformity with the Constitutive Act.
7. condemns the gross violations of human rights in Darfur, and urge the perpetrators be apprehended and brought to justice.”

followed by:

AU Exc. 16th ordinary session, 1 Feb 2010 Addis Ababa.
"The Executive Council [.....] CALLS ON Member States which have not yet done so… to make the declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court to receive applications directly from individuals and Non-Governmental Organizations"
Siegmar Schmidt has cautioned that “[t]here is no doubt about the revolutionary character of the African Union’s curtailment of state sovereignty, but revolutions can fail” (in Besada: 2010:19). So far, the rule of law advocates have yet to win their campaign to import EU norms of legality and justice to The Gambia and Zimbabwe. These two test cases are nevertheless important, as marking courageous and unprecedented judicial activism on our continent. Its defeats and successes over the next decades will chart part of the progress of Pan-Africanism towards “a continent of democracy ... a continent of good governance, where ... the rule of law is upheld” that Mbeki advocated for in the AU’s inaugural speech (Mbeki: 2003: 187). That the AU and ECOWAS fear to act against even the mini-state of The Gambia is a stark example of condoning repression, as that Government has minimal resources to defeat a peacemaking expedition. It speaks to the powerlessness of the African Commission on Human Rights and People’s Rights, based in Banjul.

Nonetheless, these landmark judicial rulings that have been politically unenforceable still have significant importance. They pull the rug out from under dictators whose clichéd defence is that human rights are western cultural imperialism that ignores African traditions.

CORNERSTONES OF CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION: REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECs)

The Abuja treaty of 1991 specifies the regional economic communities (RECs) are the geographic cornerstones “to establishing a Customs Union at the continental level” (Article 6(2)(d); 4(2)(a) & (b)). The Constitutive Act of the AU in 2000 commits the states to “coordinate and harmonize policies between ... regional economic communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union” (2000: Article 3(l)). The PSC protocol of 2002 reiterates that “the regional mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the Union” (Articles 16; 7(j)). The 2007 MOU on Cooperation in Peace and Security, which includes ECOWAS, SADC, the East African Standby Brigade Coordinating Mechanism (EASBRICOM), and the North African Regional Capacity (NARC), institutionalises them within the AU (Articles I, III). The regional organisations agree to submit reports every six months to the AU Commission’s chair; the AU Commission’s chair will have annual meetings with the regional organisations’ chief executives, and open liaison offices in the regional organisations’ headquarters, with reciprocal arrangements also encouraged (ArticlesI, III, VI, XVI (3)(5)(6), XVIII). The AU liaison office to ECOWAS opened in Abuja in 2011.

Indisputably, Africa’s four leading RECs today are, in sequence of their founding: ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, and the EAC. They have markedly different origins and evolution, but some generic features. The Kenyan-born scholar James Gathii alerts us to their dynamics:

“African Regional Trade Agreements are not predicated on a vision of market-led integration. Instead, they are largely designed as forums for a variety of initiatives” (Gathii: 2011: xxix).

For example, the treaty formally titled “to establish an African Economic Community” goes on to commit its signatories to cooperation “in every field of human endeavour” (emphasis
added). He draws attention to the Regional Economic Communities having “contextualizing imperatives grounded in African history, politics and realities”. They are not contemplated as purely trade agreements, nor treated by African heads of government as legal obligations entailing punitive sanctions for non-compliance, but rather as “agreements that encompass ... an extremely broad range of areas of cooperation” (See Table 5). Operationally, these ostensible RECs have multiple objectives including the political, and have in practice variable geometry, and multiple memberships (Gathii: 2011: xxvii).
Table 5

AFRICAN UNION FAMILY
Focusing on actually functioning entities

ACRONYMS:
COMESA – Common Market of Eastern & Southern Africa
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States
SADC – Southern African Development Community
EAC – East African Community
NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa’s Development
*the only OAU organs in 1963
Gathi’s analysis is more insightful and nuanced than Hélène Gandois’ argument that African regional communities “were created as economic communities, failed as such, were later turned into security institutions and have started addressing other issues such as human rights or promotion of democracy” (Gandois:2009:24).

One intriguing point of analysis that emerges from Table 5 is that while the activities of the AU family of organisations is focused on peacemaking, reflecting current exigencies, its institutionalisation is focused on economic integration and development, reflecting a long-term perspective and commitment.

The economic impact of a continental free trade area, and even the proposed SADC-EAC-COMESA tripartite FTA by 2017 will be considerable. Research of the Mckinsey Global Institute and Columbia University’s National Bureau of Economic Research both confirm that Africa has sustained for a decade a broad-based economic growth rate double that of the European and North American countries. Should that continue for another few decades, it will certainly end Africa’s marginalisation (Mckinsey: 2011; NBER: 2011). Africa’s one billion people include over 300 million, 34% of the population, who are consumers, defined as purchasing power parity of annual income over $3900 (City Press: 2011), plus 100 000 high-worth individuals worth one trillion USD, i.e. average $10m each (Business Day: 2011). A free trade area or common market of a billion would be comparable to either China or India, and constitute the tenth largest GDP in the world.

Equally important as formal institutional integration is physical integration through major upgrades of the transport and energy infrastructure between African countries. Equally important too is successful action against corruption and red tape harassing transport. One South African supermarket company has to spend $20 000 per week on import permits to truck milk and meat to Zambia. Another South African retailer finds that documentation exempting it from customs duties to transport clothing and food is more expensive than the customs tariffs themselves between South Africa and other SADC states (Business Day: 2012).

CONTINENTAL AND SUB-REGIONAL QUANGOs

The diverse organisations outlined below share three characteristics. Few are formally part of the AU organogram. They are autonomous from national civil services. Their members are entirely or mostly governments or state-owned entities, or are at least funded by governments. This is the definition of Quasi-Non-Governmental Organisations (QUANGOs). Six of these Quangos are listed on the official AU website as AU scientific and technical offices; one scholar lists another five as OAU specialised agencies. Dozens of other forums, institutions, and organisations are affiliated in one way or another through treaties, MoUs, or endorsed in AU resolutions, or through a continental or sub-regional mandate.

All of them in one way or another are examples of Africans acting in multi-lateral ways as a continent or sub-region. Their headquarters truly represent a continent, stretching from Dakar to Nairobi, from Algiers to Johannesburg. They construct Pan-Africanism by integrating the continent or its regions in a host of practical ways, from regional electricity grids to continental project finance. These Quangos typically have annual meetings, with an executive meeting biannually.
Table 6 selects the continental Quangos active in the key development prerequisites of transport, communications, and energy. Much literature in political studies, security studies, and law, cover the human rights dimension of the AU. Far less literature seeks to analyse energy, and currencies. The Comité Maghrébin de l’Electricité (COMELEC), Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), and West African Power Pool (WAPP) connect, even if currently on a small scale, nineteen national electricity grids into three regional grids. SAPP has been the pace-setter, pioneering the day-ahead market (DAM) for buying and selling of electricity. Such regional networks are the foundations towards a continental energy smart grid. In the twenty-first century, such energy infrastructure plays a role analogous to the importance of the European Coal and Steel Community in the birth of the EU. It allows for more efficient use of less expensive power generation facilities, greater security of supply, wider access, and less vulnerability to oil price fluctuations.
The first regional grid up and running was the Comité Maghrébin de l’Électricité (COMELEC), founded in 1975. By 2003 Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt were all inter-connected, with every one of those countries both importing and exporting electricity to neighbours during the most recent year for which statistics are published, 2006 (FAÏD: 2008: 110).

The Southern African Power Pool, established in 1995, today inter-connects nine countries out of the fourteen SADC countries. The SAPP established a day-ahead market (DAM) for spot trading of electricity, (http://www.sappmarket.com) as well as providing the infrastructure backbone through which South Africa imports power from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique.

The other major continental Quangos in Africa may be analytically categorised as in the financial, scientific and cultural sectors (See Table 7). Two reflections are pertinent here. First, there seems to be duplication between the remit of the existing African Development Bank (AfDB) and the proposed African Investment Bank contemplated in the Abuja Treaty, for which a preparatory committee is set up in Tripoli: a merger or reconstitution would appear optimal. Also, since the era of gold-backed fixed exchange rates ended four decades ago, there is no reason to perpetuate the duplication of the IBRD and IMF with a separate AfDB and the proposed African Monetary Fund: the AfDB and the proposed AMF will be more cost-effective as divisions of one financial institution. Similarly, the role of the Development Bank of Southern Africa, and similar regional banks in ECOWAS and COMESA, might also benefit from harmonisation. Second, the Pan-African Infrastructure Development Fund (PAIDF) established three global records. It is the world’s first continental sovereign wealth fund, as opposed to a national fund. It is the globe’s first hybrid public-private such fund, and it is the first whose mandate is specifically infrastructure.
### Table 7

**QUANGO in OTHER SECTORS**

**FINANCIAL**
- African Development Bank (AfDB), Tunis
- African Export - Import Bank (AFREXIMBANK), Cairo
- African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), Pretoria
- African Trade Insurance Agency, Nairobi
- Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), Khartoum
- Association of African Central Banks (AACB / ABCA), Dakar
  - *Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest* (BCEAO), Dakar
  - *Banque des États de l’Afrique Centrale* (BEAC), Yaoundé
- COMESA Infrastructure Fund, Port Louis
- Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), Pretoria
- East African Development Bank, Kampala
- ECOWAS Bank for Investment & Development (EDIB), Lomé
- Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (IDC), Pretoria
- NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, Midrand
- Pan-African Infrastructure Development Fund (PAIDF), Johannesburg
  - [COMESA] PTA Bank, Bujumbura
  - [COMESA] Regional Investment Agency, Cairo
- Zep-Re PTA Reinsurance Company, Nairobi

NOTE: the IDC, notwithstanding the “South Africa” in its name, has had its statutory mandate expanded to be continental, as has the DBSA.

**SCIENTIFIC**
- African Regional Organisation for Standardisation (ARSO), Nairobi
- Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR), Nairobi*
- Inter-African Phyto-Sanitary Council (IAPSC), Yaoundé*
- Inter-African Bureau for Soils (BIS), Lagos
- PAN-African Veterinary Vaccine Centre (PANVAC), Debra Zeit
- Semi-Arid Food Grains Research & Development (SAFGRAD),* Ouagadougou
- Scientific & Technical Research Centre (STRC),* Lagos

**CULTURAL**
- African Academy of Languages (ACALAN), Bamako*
- Afro-Arab Institute for Cultural & Strategic Studies, Bamako
- *Centre d’Études Linguistiques et Historiques par Tradition Orale* (CELTHO) / (Centre for Linguistic & Historical Study of Oral Tradition), Niamey*
- Pan-African News Agency (PANA), Dakar #

* listed on the official AU website as AU scientific and technical offices
# listed by El-Ayouti as OAU Specialised Agencies

One major challenge for the AU and ACALAN is that linguistic and translation funding in Africa is from only former colonial powers, to sponsor the language of their vanished
empires, such as French, and to a much lesser extent, English and Portuguese. This means that Kiswahili and Tamazight, for example, as the most multi-state of indigenous African languages, enjoy no such donors. While the OAU formally added Kiswahili onto its list of official languages in 1984 – a year ahead of Portuguese – the OAU in practice lacked the budget to ever hire translators to use it for the remaining two decades of its existence. It was only the PAP in 2004 that for the first time actually translated documents into Swahili and used it on its official website. Even now, this is limited to solely the PAP, and limited to only a symbolic number of documents on its website.

Culture is also the sole terrain to date that has broader players than the elite of politicians and intellectuals who support Pan-Africanism. The African Cup of Nations soccer series, and the Confederation of African Athletics games are the only activities in a pan-African format that today enjoy mass participation and viewership measured in the tens of millions.

CONTINENTAL CIVIL SOCIETY (NGOs)


The most vibrant continental academic association is the Council for Development of Social Research in Africa, CODESRIA. There are many continental discipline-specific learned societies, such as the African Association of Biological Nitrogen Fixation, founded 1982. The African Publishers’ Network was convened in 1992 in Abidjan. Abidjan is also headquarters for the African Parliamentary Union, founded in 1976.

The African Stock Exchange Association, founded in 1993 in Nairobi, represent corporate interests. There are numerous continental business sector organisations, such as the Inter-African Coffee Organisation which has grown to twenty-five countries since its founding in 1960 (www.iaco-oiac.org).

More important than an exhaustive inventory of these civil society organisations is analysis of their impact for the constructivist theoretical framework. All of these develop a continental perspective for their profession, business sector, class, or institutional base. They deepen multilateral ways of thinking and acting. In a global governance framework where major decisions on the business environment are taken outside the continent, Africa increasingly needs coordinated bargaining positions.
DONORS AND DEPENDENCY

The OAU, AU, and some regional organisations confront an additional challenge not shared by the EU, ASEAN, LAS, MERCOSUR, or OAS: self-sufficiency. Only during the OAU’s inaugural year was its membership fees essentially paid up, after which over twenty states were in arrears (Wolfers: 1976:178-179). Throughout the thirty-nine years of the OAU and the first four years of the AU, the majority of member governments defaulted on paying their annual assessments, and those who paid usually paid late, and only in part. AU members had developed the habit of claiming there was an “administrative budget” which was compulsory and an “operational budget” which was voluntary:

“What is the use of paying salaries if you do not pay them to do anything?” (Dlamini-Zuma: 2006).

The consequences included that OAU programmes could not be implemented; that the OAU Defence Commission could only meet twice during the 1960s; and that most funds and weapons for liberation movements were paid not from the OAU Liberation Committee, but directly by the Soviet and Chinese Governments (Wolfers: 1976: 189). At the start of the AU this meant that it could only allocate the PAP half of its budget. The PAP had to adjourn its sessions half way through; and could only hire 24 of the needed 94 support staff (Cape Times: 2006).

The AU sought to remedy dependency on donors through a major revision of its funding formula. First, from 2006 the big five – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, South Africa – agreed that on top of their own annual membership fees they will pay 75% of the annual budget, with the rest of the fifty members paying the remaining 25%. Second, the AU moved to off-book budgeting. Countries who seek the prestige of hosting AU institutions must themselves pay the capital costs and some of the running costs. Examples are South African funding of the PAP; Tanzania for the African Court of Justice and Human Rights; and Ethiopia for the AU HQ and PSC. Third, the AU spun off some expenses by launching a number of dedicated funds for specific purposes. It set up a “Peace Facility” to receive donations for peacekeeping operations. Mandela lent his prestige to launch a PAP Trust Fund (Business Day: 2006b).

The most serious remaining donor dependency, probably over nine-tenths of funding, is for AU peacekeeping operations, and that the SADC and COMESA depend for around half their budgets through foreign donors.

Where there is consensus between AU members and dominant external powers, this results in the AU’s largest peacekeeping and peacemaking operations to date, as in the Sudan and Somalia. But where western powers and major AU members held divergent views, as over the Libyan 2011 civil war, the AU found itself marginalised by NATO powers. Divergent positions between African governments themselves can sometimes also be blamed on donor dependency. Mbeki has queried if a state that receives half its revenue from its former colonial power may be categorised as sovereign (Mbeki: 2012).

The same donor dependency is evidenced in many NGOs in Africa. Over 90% of their funding may come from not membership fees, but foreign donors, typically a single donor. When that donor stops giving, the NGO collapses. One case in point pertinent to readers of
this journal is the African Association of Political Science (AAPS). This vulnerability is aggravated by the fact that many such voluntary organisations are, in developed countries, run unpaid by salaried scholars in addition to their day job. Low salaries and scant research funds in most of Africa mean that when the executive of a voluntary organisation succeed in winning extra-Africa donors, then they write into that organisation’s budgets salaries for paying themselves. One consequence is that the proportion of such an organisation’s budget now dependent on donors becomes far higher, increasing its vulnerability and undermining its sustainability.

CONCLUSIONS

In Nkrumah’s prescient book, *Africa Must Unite*, published in 1963 - with nine reprints and editions since - he advocated “The ultimate goal of a United States of Africa” (143) with “a continental parliament” (221):

“In my view ... a united Africa – that is, the political and economic unification of the African continent – should seek three objectives:

Firstly, we should have an overall economic planning on a continental basis. This would increase the industrial and economic power of Africa…. The lesson of the South American republics vis-à-vis the strength and solidarity of the United States of America is there for all to see … We should therefore be thinking seriously now of ways and means of building up a Common Market of a United Africa […] Such a [continental] Government will need to maintain a common currency, a monetary zone and a central bank of issue. […]

Secondly, we should aim at the establishment of a unified military and defence strategy. … For young African States, who are in great need of capital for internal development, it is ridiculous – indeed suicidal – for each State separately and individually to assume such a heavy burden of self-defence, when the weight of this burden could be easily lightened by sharing it amongst themselves. […]

The third objective we should have in Africa stems from the first two which I have just described. If we in Africa set up a unified economic planning organization and a unified military and defence strategy, it will be necessary for us to adopt a unified foreign policy and diplomacy … The burden of separate diplomatic representation by each State on the Continent of Africa alone would be crushing, not to mention representation outside Africa. The desirability of a common foreign policy which will enable us to speak with one voice in the councils of the world, is so obvious, vital and imperative that comment is hardly necessary.” […]

Under a major political union of Africa there could emerge a United Africa, great and powerful, in which the territorial boundaries which are the relics of colonialism will become obsolete and superfluous […] Here is a challenge which destiny has thrown out to the leaders of Africa” (Nkrumah:1998: 218-222).

Thirty-one years after Nkrumah published this, the Treaty of Abuja for an African Economic Community came into effect. Forty-one years later, the Pan-African Parliament held its ceremonial inauguration. Forty-six years later, the NEPAD Planning and
Coordination Agency was formed to address continental infrastructure development and broad macro-economic policy. Forty-eight years later, African peacekeeping missions total 25,000 boots on the ground. And the technical steering committee for the African Central Bank meets in Abuja, preparatory to its intended opening in 2021, which would be fifty-eight years after Nkrumah’s advocacy.

Also, as Nkrumah foresaw, out of fifty-six current governments in Africa, only Egypt and South Africa can afford to maintain embassies in all of the other countries. The AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, and the UN Headquarters in New York, are the only places where all of them have diplomats in the same town.

This article’s major conclusions are:

First, Pan-Africanism has provided the political will, and globalisation the economic driver, that sustain this project of continental integration.

Second, the AU, with sixty-three traceable, operationalised institutions, has clearly evolved institutionally, including free trade areas and operational peace-making, more successfully than any of the ASEAN, the LAS, MERCOSUR or the OAS. Only the EU of wealthy countries is orders of magnitude ahead. In 2006 the AU started formal harmonisation and integration with the RECs. The planned tripartite merger of SADC, EAC, and COMESA is the trailblazer towards a continental Free Trade Area. The continental GDP is significant and increasing.

Third, if the OAU became a club of dictators, the AU is now a contested terrain between authoritarians and democrats, with some judicial activists unexpectedly leading the way ahead of politicians. The regional courts, and the embryonic PAP and ECOSOCC deserve future scholarly attention in this regard.

Fourth, a myriad of continental QUANGOs, NGOs, professional and business associations, are weaving a multi-dimensional fabric of continental integration in every area from airlines, energy, ICT, transport, to universities. In the AU era, these make the whole greater than the sum of the inter-governmental parts, and have few equivalents in the OAU epoch of the last century. These form economic and social forces that buttress, supplement, and reinforce the state-centric linkages.

Fifth is a dimension of the AU where reality is in advance of rhetoric. The African Standby Force has had its formal inauguration, scheduled for 2010, postponed without one public word on a new timetable. But AU peacekeepers have grown to over 25,000 boots on the ground, mostly in the DRC, Sudan, and Somalia. The ASF has de facto evolved into an African Standing Force. That is, it does not consist of troops on standby for episodes of intermittent secondment. Its boots on the ground have seen continuous action since 2003, nine years ago. The first decade of the twenty-first century also saw a regional and continental security architecture spelt out in protocols, treaties, pacts and MoUs.

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