From poverty to power?  
Women’s participation in intermediary organisations in site C, Khayelitsha

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Ina Conradie

Abstract

This article examines how women organise themselves in community structures to claim socio-economic rights through participation. The discussion is based on case study research undertaken in Khayelitsha, Site C, where women involved in income-generating projects (IGPs) have also been involved in a dual strategy of trying to improve their living conditions through active engagement. The article looks at the intermediary institutions, the South African national Civics Association (SANCO) and the Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF) which mediate the participatory spaces for engagement created by local government, and how these organisations serve ordinary men and women from the townships in terms of helping them to attain a better quality of life.

Keywords: civil society, collective action, local government participation, women’s empowerment, women leaders

1 INTRODUCTION

It has become a truism that the articulation of socio-economic and political rights and citizenship cannot be fully understood without focusing on gender, socio-economic position and education, among others (Sen & Grown, 1987; Parpart, 1995; Sen, 1999; Kabeer, 2005; Mohanty, 2007; Mahmud, 2010). Arising from this understanding is the further question of how the poor, in both urban and rural contexts, are able to claim rights, both as individuals as well as through collective forms of mobilisation and organisation (Newell & Wheeler, 2006; Thompson & Tapscott, 2010a). In this article, we focus on the linkage between the lived experience of three women’s empowerment groups living in urban poverty and how they engage with local intermediary governance organisations to ensure socio-economic and political rights. We link these lived experiences to a brief description and analysis of both grassroots and local government forms of governance. We locate the ways in which different forms of mobilisation and organisation occur within the analytical frame of ‘spaces’ for participation, as developed by Cornwall and Coelho (2007). In the introduction to their edited volume, Cornwall and Coelho (2007:1) suggest that the participatory sphere, comprising different types of spaces – which are frequently created by
the state but comprise different constituent elements of ‘civil society’– enables us to understand the intersection between citizenship, rights claims and participation. Both the self-created (also called invented) and more formal spaces of collective deliberation and organisation are the ongoing sites of rights claims and contestations, especially those of a socio-economic nature (see Thompson & Tapscott, 2010).

The case study area, Khayelitsha, is but one of many poor urban areas (townships) in the Western Cape, but as the largest township, with a population estimated at anywhere between 450 000 and 1.5 million, it nevertheless provides a clear impression of some of the central challenges and strategies facing the urban poor in South Africa.²

In this article, we examine the ways in which South African women’s empowerment groups construct and negotiate both their individual and collective political voices to claim rights through two grassroots-based intermediary organisations, namely: the South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO) and the Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF). We extend the term ‘intermediary institution’ to cover both large-scale civil society organisations or social movement organisations (in this case SANCO), and large-scale local community organisations working for community upliftment in conjunction with government (such as the KDF).

2 GENDERED RIGHTS ISSUES AT GRASSROOTS IN KHAYELITSHA

In our exploration of the challenges and strategies for meaningful engagement in intermediary spaces on issues of political and economic rights, we refer to the views expressed by the women’s groups who have taken part in income-generating projects (IGPs) in Site C as part of a socio-economic empowerment initiative begun by the women themselves (see Conradie, 2009). The women, all unemployed, volunteered to take part in the selection and setting up of the projects in 2006 through community groupings in Site C that are known as street committees (hereafter SCs). We link the experiences of the women’s groups to a more general investigation of the SCs, formerly a locale for grassroots resistance against the apartheid government, organised through SANCO, that have largely reconstructed themselves into forms of community governance in certain township areas. In certain areas, especially Site B and C of Khayelitsha, SC meetings have become a regular way of organising collective political and socio-economic views and demands in order to express these in both civil society intermediary spaces, such as SANCO and the KDF, as well as in government-organised spaces, such as ward forums. Yet, since a considerable majority of Khayelitsha residents remain economically marginalised, either unemployed or underemployed, the extent to which they are able to exercise any political power channelled upwards into other intermediary participatory spaces remains in question.

Drawing on ongoing focus group interviews with the women’s groups,³ individual interviews with leaders of the IGPs, community outreach projects and councillors, and the leadership of SANCO and KDF we map the ways in which ordinary women access organisations to improve their daily quality of life, as well as the main forms of collective organisation within in which they participate. Open-ended questions to the women’s groups and their leaders were framed broadly to focus on how they felt the different forms of democracy were working for them and how they made a difference to their lives. We asked them to tell us about how they organised themselves around whatever major problems they faced, and to explain to us what their problems
were. As the discussion below makes clear, while the women participating in the groups are far from politically apathetic, their aspirations are towards ensuring greater socio-economic security and wellbeing for themselves and their families. Certainly, the legitimacy of the state is accepted, perhaps because of the recent history of apartheid and the ANC’s role in the liberation struggle.4

In South African women’s empowerment groups, most qualify as chronically poor. Of the women interviewed in the focus groups, most have been resident in Khayelitsha for upwards of 10 years, and in some cases for as long as 20 or even 25 years (i.e. since Khayelitsha was set up as a ‘dormitory’ township by the apartheid government). Prior to their involvement in the IGPs, they were unemployed, hence their willingness to become involved in the IGPs. Bulelwa’s personal history is an example of the chronic poverty that Khayelitsha survey data have shown to be common:

In 2002 the government grant came. My husband then got a disability grant because he suffers from asthma. It then became better. Now I live in separation with my husband. He is in Umtata in the Eastern Cape and I am here, but we are not divorced, we just stay in different places. The twins are schooling here, and I’ve also taken in two other girls. One of them is the child of my first-born daughter, the other is the daughter of my sister. With the changes in Site C we will get a built house. I still have no job – that’s why I went to you to join the amakhosikazi (IGP). (Bulelwa, interview, 2007)

Bulelwa, as of 2010, is surviving on two child-support grants (a monthly income of R540) with which she must feed a family of five. Yet she has been successful in obtaining a house through a People’s Housing Project (PHP) scheme.

Like Bulelwa, the IGP participants represent a broad spectrum of ages and backgrounds; most are married and have children, but a minority of the women who attended the focus group interviews are single with one or more dependents. Our aim has been to probe their understandings of their political and economic location, and what constraints and opportunities the new democratic dispensation has provided for them as citizens located in Khayelitsha.5 The women are representative of a broad spectrum of Khayelitsha residents, as many of the inhabitants, mostly migrants from the Eastern Cape, have lived there for many years (between 15 and 20 is common) (Conradie, 2009; Thompson & Nleya, 2010). To understand the linkages between the women’s socio-economic position and access to basic services, we refer to the data from a random stratified survey that was conducted in Khayelitsha in 2008/09.
Table 1: Migration patterns: Residence before Khayelitsha

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of residence before Khayelitsha</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape Other</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Employment status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No (not looking)</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (looking)</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes part-time (not looking)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes part-time (looking)</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes fulltime (not looking)</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes fulltime (looking)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Length of residency in Khayelitsha

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of years</th>
<th>Valid per cent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6–10</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11–15</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16–20</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21+</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Access to basic services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water supply</th>
<th>Toilets/sanitation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yard pipe</td>
<td>Communal pipe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal/yard flush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communal flush/chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pit latrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bucket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
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<td>26</td>
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</table>

3 THE ARTICULATION BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY INTERMEDIARY ORGANISATIONS, SANCO AND THE KDF, AND COMMUNITIES

In understanding people’s grassroots understandings of political identity, citizenship and citizen action we need to remind ourselves that the term ‘civil society’ is used in a variety of ways. As Lewis (2002:570) articulates it, civil society is used variously as a loose analytical category as well as in terms of the processes of political engagement between state and societal actors. NGOs, CBOs and other organisations are often categorised as part of civil society, as well as being representative of civil society, although it is clear that in many contexts NGOs are not faithful to the interests of the constituencies they purport to represent.

We use the term ‘civil society’ here to refer both to organisations representing civil society, and to looser forms of associational life, using the Gramscian notion of the relationship between society and the state as both mutually constitutive but also as an arena of contestation (see also Cornwall & Coelho, 2007). In so doing, we recognise that the state and civil society are not rigid categories. This helps, for example, to understand the complex adaptation of SANCO to democratic politics and governance, as well as the way in which this has affected civic organisations.

The history of both SANCO and the KDF serve to highlight the fuzzy nature of the relationships between civil society groupings and government in the present context of Khayelitsha, impacting on people’s understandings of both political identity and civic action.

The historical development of Khayelitsha, which means ‘our new home’, is pertinent to our exploration. For many years, but increasingly during the 1970s and 1980s, people moved to Cape Town from the more rural and poorer Eastern Cape in search of work. The area where most of the women in the empowerment groups live, Site C, was one of three original ‘suburbs’ of Khayelitsha in 1984/85, where people were given a tent, half a plot of sandy soil, a shared toilet that worked on the bucket system, and a shared tap for more or less every 12 households. As of 2006, houses are being built to replace corrugated iron and wooden shacks and services are being upgraded in a slow but gradual process.

In the light of this history and the strength of organisations like SANCO in Khayelitsha in the late 1980s and early 1990s, how have people’s understandings of political identity and civic activism changed over time? We explore what continuities might exist between these earlier ‘invented’ (or self-created) political spaces and those we currently observe, both at the level of civil society as well as in more formal spaces of representation.
SANCO has been a focal point for organisation in Site C and in other areas of Khayelitsha (such as Site B, although SCs are less active in better serviced areas like Ilitha Park), as well as in many other areas outside Khayelitsha. However, its history since its official national formation in Uitenhage in 1992 has been difficult, and this continues to problematise its functioning to the present day. SANCO’s national structure was created by the ANC in the period after 1990, when a settlement was being negotiated between the ANC and the Nationalist Party. This was done partly to channel the work and contribution of the numerous civic structures that had been the internal front of the ANC during the period of struggle against apartheid (Seekings, 1997; Zuern, 2004, 2006). It played a powerful and important role in the planning of local government development for the new South Africa, even helping in the drafting of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), but after the elections in 1994, many of its strongest leaders went into government and there followed a period of great flux. This was exacerbated by reports of financial decline and corruption. However, a new membership drive took place shortly afterwards and in 2004, the national chairman claimed a potential membership of 6.3 million, with 4300 branches in 56 regions (Zuern, 2004, 2006).

Nationally, SANCO has been perceived as largely an ANC-based organisation. Its relationship with the ANC made its intermediary role in grassroots communities initially very clear, as it was seen as part of the liberation struggle and a ‘legitimate’ form of grassroots organisation and affiliation. Its current status is that of an organisation struggling to define a role for itself that is distant enough from government to be able to be critical of it (Seekings, 1997; Zuern, 2004, 2006; Interviews with women’s focus groups, July 2009). Interviews with SANCO as well as the women’s groups (who were located through the street committees in 2006 and have close affiliations with them), show the ongoing link between SANCO and the ANC. In an interview with the current Khayelitsha Zone Chairperson, Nyameko Khabingisi, and Secretary, Dalisile Mfaziwe (Interview, 28 October 2010) the allegiance to the ANC throughout the organisation was again reaffirmed as an outcome of SANCO’s 2008 Durban conference, and as part of the way in which they currently function within Khayelitsha as a whole.

However, since the formation of the Congress of the People (COPE) in December 2008, SANCO’s relationship with the ANC has become even more of an issue, as both women leaders and the communities to which they belong have chosen to associate with or join COPE. As Seekings (1997) and Zuern (2004) have formerly emphasised, SANCO has struggled to redefine an existence that is distinct from the ruling party. The formation of COPE contributed to a split in SANCO into two rival organisations in Site C (arguably a SANCO stronghold, with 3 400 recognised members), each calling themselves SANCO, in July 2009. This situation caused a great deal of tension in local governance structures in which SANCO is represented (Bottoman, interview, 14 August 2010). For approximately a year and a half, SANCO continued to function in Site C as two different structures, each claiming legitimacy. According to Ward Councillor Teresa Bottoman, the situation at the time was so conflicting that the appearance of favouring either organisation carried grave risks. While the problem has been resolved (according the current chairperson for the ‘Khayelitsha Zone’, as it is called), it is clear that SANCO is still struggling to define its relationship with the ANC as the ruling party and within governance structures. According to Mfaziwe, the allegiance will again be discussed at the next SANCO general conference in 2011 (Interview, 28 October 2010).
These political issues within SANCO have a long history. As Zuern says:

SANCO has been variously defined as a ‘social movement’, a ‘civil society actor’, and an ‘institution in a state of decay’. These competing definitions are significant, because the choice of definition represents not just a position in academic and political debate, but sharply contrasting models for popular activism and organisation. (Zuern, 2004:3)

The KDF, on the other hand, remains a firmly localised structure that claims to include all 11 political parties represented in Khayelitsha and to bring together the 100-odd NGOs working on community development, empowerment and capacity building (NGOs have to ‘cluster’ and present issues collectively). Founded in 1992, the KDF brings together business, local government, NGOs and civic organisations in an affiliated format. A core structure of chairperson, project manager and secretary underpin a labyrinthine number of sub-structures in the areas of business, disability, education, health, human settlements, sport, religion, safety and security, social development and youth. Each of the structures in these areas, called either councils (in the case of youth and sport) or sectoral forums (the rest), support the executive committee. The organisation has a separate financial structure, called the Khayelitsha Development Trust. In addition, a registered Section 21 development company, known as the Khayelitsha Community-Based Development Company (KCBDC), helps to add capacity to existing companies working in the area of development in Khayelitsha. The three arms – KDF, KDT and KCBDC – work together to further development in Khayelitsha.

The decision to make the KDT and KCBDC separate from the overarching KDF structure has been deliberate, as has the decision to remain a community-based organisation rather than a registered non-profit organisation (NPO). From the discussion that follows below it is clear that KDF definitely has ‘street credibility’ among the women we interviewed. While it is clear how the organisation’s success tangibly benefits their lives with regard to claiming socio-economic rights, such as social housing, the economic empowerment aspect seems to have a more limited reach (Thompson & Tapscott, 2010a).

Individualised notions of citizenship and civil society are poorly embedded in the social fabric of Khayelitsha, although most residents are politically conscious and well informed of the news of the day (see Thompson & Nleya, 2010 for a comprehensive discussion of this). In many ways, SCs remain a key focal point of organisation and action, and organisations like SANCO and the KDF provide the necessary channels for organisation around socio-economic rights in particular.

Both survey and qualitative fieldwork emphasise the importance of the SCs as the building block of associational life in Khayelitsha, and this is strongly confirmed by our research in Site C. Street committees are made up of 15 representatives of the ‘street’ (consisting of 50 houses), and report on all matters of significance pertaining to the street (or block) on Thursdays. These matters are discussed again at SANCO branch committee meetings every Tuesday. The issues raised here are taken by the chairperson of the branch to the zone meetings, held on Sundays. All the women in the three focus groups interviewed stated that they were members of SCs and that SCs were very important to getting things done in Khayelitsha – from resolving issues of criminality, to addressing issues and problems with services, unemployment, the problem of HIV/AIDS orphans and the like (focus group interviews, December 2008, July/August 2009).
Thus, in terms of redefining its role after apartheid, it is clear that SANCO found a niche for itself as forum within which communities can express grievances to do with their daily political or socio-economic wellbeing. However, the SANCO committee structure at zone level remains completely under-resourced. SANCO has no office space, even at zone level, and must rely on the goodwill of councillors for meeting space (Khabingisi & Mfaziwe, interview, 28 October 2010). It is also clear that SANCO has struggled to define a role for itself in relation to other developmental governance structures.

It is telling that broader questions on what citizenship and democracy meant to the women’s groups collectively and individually were most frequently answered by reference to what developmental opportunities government has provided, either through services such as housing, electricity and water and sanitation, or through state grants, in particular child support grants, disability grants and pensions. In a number of instances, these grants are a mainstay of income.

In the focus group interviews, the role of SANCO does not emerge clearly, although it claims it is the first port of call for both individual and collective issues pertaining to basic services as well as helping with community issues such as HIV/AIDS orphans and destitute families. This may be partially because of resource constraints, as SANCO positions in Khayelitsha are all entirely voluntary and not all of those in leadership positions in SANCO have employment themselves. The scarcity of resources is a problem for all, and definitely hinders SANCO from playing a more constructive community liaison role.

The problem of resources and lack of employment echoes the underlying interpretation of how most women in the focus groups understood how democracy is working for them. Bulelwa’s answer in August 2009 repeats much of the information of previous focus group work, ‘I am getting a house now, but there is no employment, I have no job, my husband is not working and my first born is not working’. Nontsikelelo faces a different but equally dire situation: ‘I am single, I have three kids, I am not working, we are suffering’.

Notions of political identity relate specifically to party political and associational life in the SCs and the relationship between political identity and socio-economic position remains inextricably interwoven. In 2007, most of the women still belonged to the ANC, but the formation of COPE has seen the groups re-organising their political affiliations. For some of the women, allegiance to the councillor (who joined COPE) has led to a change in political affiliation. For many of them, political affiliation and membership of either SANCO or the KDF have until recently been seen as one and the same thing.

4 GENDER REPRESENTATION IN INTERMEDIARY ORGANISATIONS

In terms of gender representation in intermediary civic organisations, at the SC level, most members are women who have been living in close proximity for decades. Most problem-solving at SC level would be taken to the weekly SANCO General Council meeting for Site C, where they will also be discussed for the purpose of finding local solutions. Here the leadership is male. Some issues might need to be referred to the WDF or, when it concerns municipal services, to the CCT ward forums. At this level, the executive members of KDF and CCT Ward Forums are also predominantly male. Gendered decision-making thus seems to be somewhat submersed by
the ways in which decision-making procedures have been brought down to community level, and the high degree of participation by women at that level. This should not detract from the fact that the formal spaces for decision making are largely empty in gender terms.

The real decisions on local development issues appear to be taken at the WDF level, and these are important forums in the area. Some decisions will be transferred to the KDF, and they might refer these for specialised attention to the sectoral forums. Of the civic structures in Khayelitsha, the KDF has the highest authority in terms of development issues and ultimately decides on who gets what in terms of employment opportunities. This does cause tensions with other civic organisations, especially SANCO, as the competition to show results of membership to communities is largely through engagement in activities relating to the provision of developmental opportunities that generate forms of employment.

5 Strategies of Engagement

If we reflect on the strategies of engagement that are used by the communities in Khayelitsha of which the women’s groups are a part, a complex picture emerges. Engagement opportunities are numerous and there are a number of overlapping ways of ensuring an individual or a community problem is attended to. SCs function well to ensure a forum for grievances of a day-to-day nature, as well as for more intractable issues, such as crime and unemployment. According to the citizen leaders, the relationships between the various intermediary organisations, such as SANCO and the KDF, are good and what rivalry and power brokering there is seems to be contained by continuous dialogue and consultation. The relationship between these organisations and ward councillors and local government is also ostensibly functional and effective, particularly in Site C. Further research is required to examine the extent to which these power dynamics affect specific project and policy decisions. A positive example is that, as recently as August 2009, a local government development initiative in Khayelitsha that was initially going to use outside contractors was persuaded through the SANCO/KDF/City ward forum plenary to appoint leaders within the community as project managers. Two of the women leaders, Viviane and Xoliswa, were appointed as managers after lobbying for community-based management.

Yet the question remains: if these community organisations are ostensibly working so effectively through intermediary institutions, why is there still so much protest in Khayelitsha? As recently as July 2009, government officials were speculating again that a ‘Third Force’ – some unnamed intermediary form of organisation – was inciting people to violent action against the state. Our interviewees, as well as our 2007 survey data, indicated that protest is a last resort strategy for those in communities where public services (such as streets, lighting and housing, as well as basic services like water and sanitation) have been lacking for as long as 25 years (Thompson & Nleya, 2010). ‘People are tired of promises and tired of waiting,’ stated Bottoman (Interview, 14 August 2010), and many of the women leaders echoed the same sentiment. In 2010, Abahlali baseAmandjolo (the South African shack dwellers’ movement), stood at the centre of encouraging protest action, and recent protests on housing and sanitation in Khayelitsha have been under its auspices. SANCO and the KDF officially distance themselves from this organisation both through the media and within the community. As the current SANCO Zone leaders stated: ‘We don’t say people can’t protest with the leadership of Amandjolo, but we as SANCO say we must talk with local government, not protest’ (Khabingisi & Mfaziwe, interview, 28 October 2010).
For many of the poor in Khayelitsha, especially those in under-serviced shack areas, strategies for engagement thus appear to range from grassroots involvement through SCs and organisations like SANCO and the KDF, to taking to the streets and blockading major roads. Yet protest is seen as ‘illegitimate’ by most of those closely working with the civic intermediary organisations recognised by government. ‘We don’t protest, we discuss things,’ stated Xoliswa, leader of a Site C SC (Interview, July 2009). SANCO leadership at zone level are also emphatic that dialogue, not protest, is seen as the way forward. Formal spaces of participation are accepted as the legitimate channel for the resolution of service delivery issues. Another interviewee (Florence, a community leader with considerable power and influence through overlapping roles in an SC, a PHP housing project, and the leader of the sewing group, (Informal discussions, 2007-2010) assured us repeatedly that protest is only seen as the final resort. This is consistent with other research on forms of participation and protest in Khayelitsha, showing that forms of participation and protests tend to occur on a continuum of action and through conscious strategising – although the spontaneity of some protests cannot be discounted (Thompson & Nleya, 2010). The slow rate of service delivery and urban upgrading stands squarely at the centre of dissatisfaction, and protest is less about transforming the nature of the state than it is about communities’ socio-economic difficulties.

6 CONCLUSION

The changes in the nature of participation in decision-making structures and procedures in Khayelitsha in recent years are worth noting. Women have been elected to leadership positions alongside men, although the top structure of the KDF and SANCO are still male. Women also reported a sense of freedom to participate on an equal footing. Some very significant changes have therefore occurred since four traditional leaders were the voice for this community 25 years ago. Ultimately, there is also a hierarchy of decision-making, which is male dominated, although a number of ward forum councillors are women.

In both political and socio-economic terms, the intermediary spaces presented by both civic and government intermediary spaces allow for the articulation of rights claims. It is not clear to what extent it is possible for the average urban township woman (or man, for that matter) to exercise influence in these structures without resorting to party political affiliation. This dilemma is faced by SANCO in particular. To the extent that access to participation depends on complex political allegiances and alliances, the freedom to participate may not be all that it initially seems to be, nor is it sufficient to ensure poverty alleviation. Other organisations, like the KDF, appear to offer the potential to provide a working example of effective local governance on developmental issues that has its foundation in workable structures of community participation.

It is not easy to determine the extent to which decision-making within the KDF and in relation to other intermediary spaces has political overtones. Competition for scarce resources and employment certainly politicises even the most basic decision onto socio-economic issues and this is probably the greatest stumbling block to claiming rights across communities, and particularly for economically marginalised women. The ongoing reality of impoverishment within the women’s groups shows that an ‘enabled’ environment, in which groups, including women, can participate, does not necessarily lead to effective poverty alleviation. It is this reality that is perhaps the most frustrating for the urban poor.
NOTES

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3 An earlier version of this article was prepared for the SAAPS Regional Colloquium, hosted by the Political Studies department, UWC, 8–9 October 2009. It has also been published in ACCEDE’s working paper series in 2010.

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2 The figures here are based on a discussion with the previous chairperson of the KDF, Mr Sogayise. According to Sogayise, the census figures calculated in 2001, which gave Khayelitsha’s population as under 400 000, were erroneous due to poor counting methods in shack areas. The under-estimation plus the lack of newer figures mean that the CCT of Cape Town is working ‘in the dark,’ as it were, with regard to population figures for the area. Sogayise mentioned the high rates of migration to Khayelitsha as a factor in his estimate of 1.5 million as of 2010. A new national census will be conducted in 2011.

3 Regular interviews took place with the three groups, namely, sewing, catering and home-based care. Each group consists of approximately 15 members, although these numbers have varied over the years.

4 Cox (1987) argues that the transformative potential of the economically marginalised is reduced by chronic poverty. Improving their material security assumes priority. However, it does not seem as if the women we interviewed are anti-state, although the current local political dispensation in the Western Cape (dominated by the Democratic Alliance (DA) led by Helen Zille, who is herself white and has a political following that is mostly white or coloured), has been mentioned in our survey work as problematic in that resources are not channelled into black (read ANC) areas but into DA areas (Thompson & Nleya, 2010). Subsequent research has shown this perspective to be shifting, with Zille making a huge effort to follow up on service delivery.

5 Most of the women lived in Site C to begin with, but some have moved due to changing circumstances or social housing opportunities, such as the decanting of 2300 households to Kuyasa so as to enlarge the plots in Site C in preparation for social housing schemes there (Report prepared for the Provincial Department of Local Government and Housing on the role of Beneficiary Committees in Housing Selection, ACCEDE, July 2010).

6 As discussed above, the conceptualisation of different spaces was developed through case study research on citizenship, participation and accountability within the international Development Research Centre on Citizenship (CDRC). The CDRC network of research institutions based in Bangladesh, Mexico, India, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Angola has explored the different contexts within which such spaces are used and whether they develop stronger and more democratic civil society (see, for example, Kabeer, 2005; Cornwall & Coelho, 2007; Newell & Wheeler, 2006; Coelho & Von Lieres, 2010; Tandon & Gaventa, 2010; and Thompson & Tapscott, 2010b).

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