Persistent Problems in African Integration and Peace-Keeping

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Abstract

African economic integration and peacekeeping constitute respectively the largest institutionalization, and the largest operationalization, of the African Union (AU) and its sub-regional organisations. The number of African soldiers and police in AU and United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations has grown steadily. Sometimes, major strategic decisions have been mistakes which aggravated, or even catalysed conflicts that would not otherwise have occurred. The peacekeeping missions in Nigeria and Somalia are examples of these. Peacekeeping operations are in the larger scheme of things part of the on-going project of African integration. This paper identifies major problems that remain persistent after half a century of protracted Pan-Africanist endeavours at sub-regional and continental integration. One recurrent occurrence is the chasm between aspirational treaties voluntarily signed, and their implementation, taking at best a decade or decades. Often, entities founded on paper remain dormant, until in a subsequent decade another structure is founded to operationalize the function of the previous paper entity, with this process going through several iterations.

Key Words: African Integration, African Peace-Keeping, African Union,
           AU Commission, Implementation.

1. Introduction

The number of African soldiers and police in AU and UN peacekeeping operations has grown steadily to 75 000 personnel, while the founding of the African Standby Force has been repeatedly postponed since 2010. Sometimes, major strategic decisions have been mistakes which aggravated, or even catalysed conflicts that would not otherwise have occurred. Peacekeeping operations are in the larger scheme of things part of the on-going project of African integration.

The current AU slogan is "a continent that is peaceful, prosperous, and integrated" in contrast to some current war-torn, impoverished, and fragmented realities. This paper identifies major protracted problems that persist after half a century of Pan-Africanist endeavours at sub-regional and continental integration. One recurrent occurrence is the chasm between aspirational treaties voluntarily signed, and their implementation, taking at best a decade. Often, entities founded on paper remain dormant, until in a subsequent decade another structure is founded to operationalize the function of the previous paper entity, with this process going through several iterations. Peacekeeping is a classical instance of this. The efforts at evolving economic integration, from free trade areas through to customs unions and common markets, and attempted monetary unions, provide another area of case studies.

2. Persistent Peace-Keeping and Political Problems

2.1. The standard, time-honoured practices of international peacekeeping include that troops should not be drawn from any state that has contiguous borders with, or is the former colonialist power of, the country where the peacekeeping forces are deployed. In Somalia, the violation of this principle had devastating consequences: *al-Shabaab,* initially only a few hundred persons, mobilized many thousands of insurgents through nationalist appeals to Somali patriots to resist the Ethiopian "invaders". (Agbiboa, 2015:189) Had the AU drawn upon peacekeepers from ECOWAS countries, for example, *al-Shabaab* would have been unable to succeed in such mobilization. While *al-Shabaab* has a religious dimension, it would have recruited far fewer insurgents had Ethiopian forces not been involved.

In the Central African Republic, the use of Chadian troops as peacekeepers led to *pogroms* against the Chad diaspora and the Muslim minority. (*Cape Times,* 24 December 2013). Had peacekeeping operations

drawn upon EAC countries' armies for example, such a backlash would have been avoided.

Had deployments of peacekeepers not been drawn from neighbouring states, this would have made it difficult to observe the principle of subsidiarity between the AU and the relevant regional economic community. However, the 2008 MOU between the AU and RECs on peacekeeping does permit choice between "subsidiarity, complementarity, and comparative advantage" (section 16(1)(b)

2.2. One major problem is lawless behaviour by state forces. Kenyan police and military summarily executed al-Shabab suspects. (Abwao, 2016) In Nigeria, the lawless terror of the Nigerian police, army, and militias, including extra-judicial killings, alienated many citizens whose cooperation against Boko Haram[1] is essential to its defeat. (Solomon, 2015: 225; Matfess, 2017; Taub, 2017) One Nigerian army massacre alone killed 347 Shia Muslim followers of Zakzakry, whose corpses were dumped in a mass grave. (Aljazeera 2016/08) The same applies to the Malian army. Malian army abuses during counter-terrorism operations include arbitrary arrests, torture, and scores of extra-judicial executions. (Dufka, 2017). One UN research monograph reports that the trigger event which caused 71% of insurgents to join a violent extremist organization in Africa was state security forces' arrest or killing of a friend or family member. (Ojielo et al, 2017: 5, 80, 83)

2.3. Many African heads of government do not consider it in their national interest to implement the treaties they voluntarily signed:

. "…it is important to understand African Regional Trade Agreements on their own terms, because they have contextualizing imperatives grounded in African history, politics and realities [.….] It is a truism that the legal obligations assumed under these treaties are not understood by the leaders as containing punitive sanctions for non-compliance.…. not willing.. to completely surrender certain competencies to the supranational organizations created by these treaties. " (Gathii, 2011: xxvii) (emphasis added)

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[1] "Boko Haram" is one of its slogans; its actual name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad.

"It can take several years for a decision or reform to be actually implemented…. Goverments are jealous of their sovereignty, and many have an unstated interest in a weak AU… One fundamental problem … is the incapacity of the AU to enforce its rules and decisions as well as the cynicism with which many member states regard these rules and decisions." (Mohammed, 2008: 62, 63)

One reason for failure to implement decisions is that the heads of government vote for AU documents that they, and their ministers, have no time to read. (Tieku, 2016: 8, 14, 34-37)

One example is the Yamoussoukro Declaration of 1999 that all African countries should offer open skies to each other's airlines, has not been implemented nineteen years later. The 2018 treaty for a Single African Air Transport Market is basically an unimplemented re-iteration of the unimplemented 1999 Declaration. The EU has in the meantime advanced from open skies to a seamless sky. According to IATA, by just deregulating and liberating African air services in 12 key markets, an extra 155,000 jobs and $1.3 billion could be generated. (Lopes, 2016)

Operationally, the AU is an inter-governmental organisation; in fact it prefers consensus decisions, or taking no action, rather than to force voting to a two-thirds majority to which it is entitled. But *de jure*, its mandates and signed treaties and protocols confer supra-national authority onto at least five sub-regional courts and three continental judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.

Most spectacularly of all, the Constitutive Act, article 4(h): the right to intervene in genocide, crimes against humanity, and other grave circumstances (a statutory world first), implies or requires a *post-Westphalian* epoch. This is also required by the ultimate sixth phase of the AEC Treaty, and the AU Non-Aggression & Common Defence Pact: continental governance with a parliament, a common market, an apex court, a single currency, and "an African army". Whenever a state has submitted to an adverse ruling from the African, ECOWAS, or East African Courts of Justice, we start to have, *de jure* and *de facto,* a polycentric sovereignty.

That is, whenever a national sovereign executive submits to the authority of a court based in another country.

Authoritarian regimes naturally defy such adverse judgements or ceding sovereign prerogatives. The proposed Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa (CEMZA) will imply what Dr. Dlamini-Zuma diplomatically called "the collective exercise of sovereignty" **(**Business Day, 28 October 2013). She has also used the phrase "the pooling of

sovereignty". This would go beyond the current EU to start to acquire the characteristics of a confederation. Needless to say, nominal target dates for such supra-national endeavors, like a mirage, keep inevitably retreating ever-further into the future: 2032, 2050, and 2063. In a nutshell, no head of government who signed any of these treaties will still be in office, nor even alive, to take the blame when deadlines for delivery are not met, but will realistically again require further postponements.

2.4. Pan-Africanism, even more than Pan-Europeanism and the European Union (EU), lacks popular support, and is confined to a tiny middle class elite of some amongst intellectuals, politicians, and bureaucrats. Rare exceptions include post-Nkrumah Ghanaian popular pride in Pan-Africanism, and post-genocide Rwandan popular support for mechanisms of international governance. In South Africa, xenophobic *pogroms* against foreign Africans have led to members of the Nigerian public retaliating, and diplomatic protests. (Bateman: 2017) To deepen the AU from a union of presidents to a union of peoples will, at the very least, require direct elections to the Pan-African Parliament. It will also require a high public profile for the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), and to found some popularizing civil society organizations, such as Friends of the AU, or a non-party partisan Pan-African Association.

2.5. One recurrent occurrence is the chasm between aspirational treaties voluntarily signed, and their implementation, taking at best a decade or decades. Often, entities founded on paper remain dormant, until in a subsequent decade another structure is founded to operationalize the function of the previous paper entity, with this process going through several iterations. An extreme example of this is the African peace and security architecture. (See Table 1).

3. Persistent Budgetary and Economic Problems

3.1 African governments, decade after decade, lack the political commitment to pay the bills. At the most basic level, the failure of most states to pay annual membership fees throughout the thirty-nine years of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the first four of the AU paralysed them from doing little beyond photocopying resolutions, unless they found foreign donors. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also functions overwhelmingly on Nigeria paying for all fifteen members. (eg., Adebajo, 2008: 144) Some individual

AU members were in turn dependent on a foreign donor. South African former president Mbeki queried if a country may be called sovereign, if half of its budget comes from its former colonial power. (Mbeki, 2012) Half of the AU budget, and over nine-tenths of its peacekeeping budget, and 61% of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) budget, comes from foreign donors - overwhelmingly NATO donors. (Mataboge: 2015; https://www.enca.com/africa/sadc-look-ways-cut-down-reliance-donor-funding) The Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) also has donor dependency. (http://www.comesa.int/?s=Comesa+Adjustment+Facility) After 2005, the AU's big five by GDP – Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, South Africa – agreed to collectively pay 75% of the African half of the AU budget in addition to their own annual membership fees, with the fifty other countries only paying one-quarter between them: that is, one-eighth of the total AU budget. There are other states with an oil windfall, such as Angola, and Equatorial Guinea, who could also contribute far more to the AU budget.

In 2007, nine states were up to date with their membership fees, twenty-five states were in arrears for the current year, and twenty-one states were in arrears for more than one year. Of the five states that had agreed to come to the rescue by paying in an additional 75% of the AU budget, only Algeria, Nigeria, and South Africa had paid up, with Egypt and Libya behind schedule. (AU Audit, 2008:29) The latest proposal is that all states will pay 0.2% of the value of their imports to the AU. (Business Day 18 July 2016) Analysts wait to see if the funds actually paid over will be higher than in the past.

One extreme example of donor dependency is the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, which depends on foreign donors for one-third of its budget, even depending on a Danish institute to write its documents:

> "a strategic plan is the operational plan of the Mandate of an Organization and cannot be outsourced to a foreign interest" (AU Audit, 2008: 85).

A critic of the Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) and the Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC) argues that they are "African in name only: they have no monetary policies of their own, nor do they even know how much of the 85% of their forex held by the French Treasury belongs to them". (cited in Gathii, 2011: 360).

3.2. The potential benefits of merging free trade areas, and upgrading transport infrastructure, are in too many cases negated by corruption at borders and along the highways. The problem of extortion by police or militia serial roadblocks, each acting like feudal toll barons on the Rhine and Danube rivers, occurs in country after country.

Roadblocks by rival Kenyan police forces on the Lake Victoria to Mombasa road extort the equivalent of $100 from lorry drivers. (African Independent, 12 January 2016) Between Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, the Abidjan-Yamoussoukro road has five roadblocks demanding bribes. (*The Economist,* Special Report. Business in Africa. 16 April 2016.) One freight company in Boksburg, South Africa, has to issue each lorry driver with the equivalent of $200 in US banknotes to pass roadblocks in the DRC. (Sunday Times Business Times, 3 October 2010.) The Zimbabwe police also harass drivers for bribes. (http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opin ion/reflections-on-corruption-in-zimbabwe 28 November 2016) and officials demand at least $6.(Manayiti: 2016). The cumulative consequenc es of such corruption, as medieval tolls, are to limit long-distance trade to only high value items.

3.3. One failure with escalating consequences is the failure to provide compensation mechanisms for least developed economies entering free trade areas, customs unions, or a common market: "given the absence of distributional mechanisms, *laissez-faire* market integration increased internal disequilibria" (Zajontz & Leyssens, 2015: 306) On its own, free trade creates loser regions as well as winners.

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Protocol on the Fund for Compensation for Loss of Revenue has not yet been implemented. The ECOWAS treaty 1975 Article 50 (1993 revision: Article 21), specified an ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation, Compensation, and Development - which no member state would fund, 1979-1999[2]. Instead, as next-best, the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) was set up: but a bank cannot make substantive grants, only loans.

The African Economic Community (AEC) Treaty of 1991, article 80, also requires founding and capitalizing a Solidarity, Development, and Compensation Fund. A quarter of a century later, there is no trace of it. The COMESA Adjustment Facility is the only such fund that is

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[2] Article 39 also specifies remedies for trade deflection due to lowering of import duties. The original 1975 ECOWAS Treaty Article 25 empowered the Council of Ministers to determine compensation.

operational and is partly donor dependent. (http://www.comesa.int/?s= Comesa+Adjustment+Facility) Even in the third largest economy on the continent, South Africa, the SA Paint Manufacturing Association (SAPMA) has complained that the Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) agreement leaves them disadvantaged by the future imports of Egyptian paint with export subsidies. (Cokayne, 2017).

As the FTAs and Customs Unions which exist on paper become actually implemented, the need for such compensatory mechanisms for the least developed countries becomes more urgent. Currently, only the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) has South Africa paying *de facto* annual compensation to Lesotho and Swaziland for lowering customs duties upon which they depend for government revenue. In the continental context, the oil-windfall states could capitalize such a fund. Other states such as South Africa could offer asymmetric and variable geometry terms: soft borders for migrant workers; lower fees for remittances; grants for trans-border transport and energy infrastructure, are amongst feasible modes of compensation. In the specific case of South Africa, compensation could also take the mode of providing pensions and medical aid, especially for respiratory diseases and STDs, to former migrant mine workers who after retirement, retrenchment, or medical boarding out, have returned to their homes in Lesotho or southern Mozambique. The signing of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) protocol makes the case for compensatory mechanisms to regions and states that lose out, more important. Since an AfCFTA is envisioned in both the African Economic Community treaty of 1991, and in the AU Minimum Integration Programme, as merely a stage towards a continental customs union, delay in addressing this point risks a rising backlash, as is already occurring amongst some voters of countries within the European Union.

4. Persistent Administrative and Institutional Problems

4.1. One rarely-stated problem is the lack of quantitative and qualitative capacity of continental and regional secretariats. The EU has 23 000 Eurocrats to service twenty-seven countries totalling five hundred million people. By that standard, the AU Commission, servicing fifty-four countries with one billion citizens, requires 46 000 Afrocrats: it currently has 1 474 posts filled. (Tieku, 2016:31) Even adding on the combined posts of the secretariats of the sub-regional economic communities, plus those of the supra-national courts, the total number of full-time Afrocrats is around 2 300. To service crucial and interminable

negotiations with the EU and WTO, both the AUC and the regional community secretariats need, above all, 4 key categories of professionals – employment of econometrists, economists, statisticians, and trade lawyers. The SADC secretariat, for example, has posts for only two trade lawyers. The urgency of creating such professional posts is that most important economic decisions affecting Africa are still taken outside Africa. Most of the AU diplomatic missions in Brussels, Geneva, New York, and Washington do not have the technically qualified professionals needed to give input to very complex negotiations affecting AU states. (AU Audit, 2008: 63)

4.2. The "strictly confidential" Adu Report of 1972 spelt out other major failures of management with the OAU secretariat. An international organization must have staff demonstrating loyalty to it alone. But the OAU had instances of some staff members lobbying their own country's ambassador or head of state for support against their employer or manager. (Wolfers, 1976: 89) By the 1970s, managerial authority had declined. The secretariat had "poor control" over such basics as stores and handling post. The Secretariat was unable to discipline staff for unpunctuality and absenteeism. (Wolfers, 1976: 88-89) Such problems persisted three decades later. The 2008 AU Audit Report found the AUC is characterized by "internal institutional incoherence and disarray with a dysfunctional working and managerial culture at all levels". It recommended that only the AUC Chair and Deputy Chair should be elected by the heads of state, but all other officers selected solely on merit. (Handy, 2012:16) The Chair of the African Union complained in 2007 of:

> "inadequacy of financial resources, limited and ambiguous mandates and incongruity of portfolio content and inadequate human resources". (Adejumobi & Olukoshi, 2008: 12-13)

The AU Audit flagged organisational and managerial issues from top to bottom. The AUC Chair, Deputy Chair and Commissioners' relationship "can best be described as dysfunctional" (Audit, 2008:44), a problem that continues until today. The eight commissioners who were appointed to office in September 2003 did not meet until September 2005. After that, in contrast to most states having weekly cabinet meetings, they averaged only one meeting per three weeks where substantive issues were "hardly ever discussed". The Chair and Deputy "hardly attended", and on average five out of ten Commissioners failed to attend each meeting as

they preferred to travel. This is due to over-generous *per diem* allowances raising their gross remuneration if they travel excessively. Minutes of these meetings were untranslated from their original language, and not circulated for over a year. (ibid:48) There was no consistent attempt to bring directors together who consequently had a silo approach. (ibid:49) Five out of thirteen directors appointed in 2001 had resigned by 2004:

> "a failure to accept or articulate a chain of command …poor to non-existent internal communication strategies and ineffective accountabilit y mechanisms are central to the disempowerment and demoralization among staff" (ibid: 47)

There was no initial induction of staff, no performance-based system; staff trying to claim benefits and payment were blocked when the Administrative Tribunal was not convened for four years. Quality staff left for better remuneration at other inter-governmental organizations. (ibid:52) Some members of the Permanent Representives Council pressured the AUC to hire their relatives or fellow-citizens, or applied themselves, and when rejected, this increased tensions. (ibid: 59) An analyst notes

> "A number of unhelpful and bureaucratic practices developed and became entrenched in the OAU, which hindered the professionalism and effectiveness of the organization – these practices create obstacles for the AU." (Mohammed, 2008: 61)

The AU is also hurt by the same difficulties as the UNO:

> "The AU is understaffed and, like many such bureaucracies, suffers from a surfeit of the incompetent, lazy, or indifferent. As with many multilateral organizations, sacking the corrupt or inefficient is extraordinarily difficult and runs into political objections from member states […] Stronger mechanisms for accountability are needed that allow for the investigation and removal of senior officers if they are guilty of malfeasance or other misdemeanors." (Mohammed, 2008: 64, 72)

The same capacity problems are as true of the regional economic communities, for example: "there is inadequate capacity in the ECOWAS Commission to embark on this range of [peacekeeping] activities… there is still a dire shortage of such expertise … the Commission is grossly understaffed to undertake many of the related responsibilities" (Olonisakin, 2008: 359)

4.3. Some OAU subsidiary organisations appear to have become defunct. Desktop search turns up no website for them, but only the original OAU treaty, plus numbers of on-line databases listing their name, but without any reports of any activities. Examples of this include the African Accounting Council, founded 1979 in Kinshasa as a specialized agency of the OAU. (SA DIRCO, 2012) Another is the African Rehabilitation Institute, set up in 1991 in Harare. As this article goes to print in 2019, even the search engine of the AU website reveals no trace of them. On-line search for the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations (headquartered in Tangier), the Oganization of African Trade Union Unity (Accra), and the African Timber Organization (Libreville), yield no websites for them, but only a very few third-party references to their activities within the past decade. The AU gives no activities of UMA later than 1989 (http://www.au.int/en/recs/uma) and the UMA website itself mentions an average of only one event per year. The most recent successful achievement, back in 2010, appears to be as non-political as possible: a conference of national institutes of meterology to help cooperation in weather forecasts. (http://www.maghr ebarabe.org/en/news.cfm?type=2&id=289)The African Petroleum Fund was on paper founded in 2010 – not one African state would contribute towards it - so it still does not exist. (Ghana Business News: 2012)

4.4. One scarcely discussed problem is the duplication of expensive institutions and structures, which also require expensive and scarce high-level personnel. In terms of the phases of the African Economic Community and other treaties, protocols, and policies, the sub-regional communities should be merged into continental institutions. This implies merging the secretariats into the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, but one may anticipate bureaucratic inertia or resistance. It might be argued that since the AU services a continent around four times the size of the EU, this would merit regional AU offices. But even in that case the SADC and COMESA secretariats in Gaberone and nearby Lusaka respectively would still need to be rationalized, as would the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) headquarters in Djibouti, close to the AU HQ in Addis Ababa. Another example is the proposed African Investment Bank, for which a Technical Steering Committee is already set up in Tripoli. This would appear to have its functions duplicated by the already existing African Development Bank (Abidjan), the Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour l'investissement et le

Commerce/ Sahel-Sahara Bank for Investment and Trade (Tripoli), the African Export - Import Bank (AFREXIMBANK, Cairo) and over a dozen other sub-regional financial Quangos listed in Table 2. It will be a tough challenge to amalgamate them, or at the least reconstitute them as divisions within one parastatal bank.

5. Conclusions

Problems in African peace-keeping include peacekeeping soldiers drawn from a neighbouring state to where they are deployed, and widespread lawless actions during counter-terrorism operations. Problems in African integration include protracted delays in, or non-ratification of treaties. Also, Pan-Africanism is too often confined to a small elite of intellectuals, politicians, and bureaucrats. Persistent budgetary problems stem from widespread failure to pay annual dues. Corrupt roadblocks exact extortion on many routes. Administrative problems in continental and sub-regional organizations include protracted managerial failures, a lack of technical capacity, and far smaller number of posts in contrast to EU norms.

   Notwithstanding the above, we can unequivocally affirm that the AU and sub-regional family of organisations' achievements have cumulatively surpassed its contemporaries such as the Arab League, Organization of American States, Union of South American Nations, and the Association of South-East Asian Nations. Only the EU has achieved more, and it has a budget three orders of magnitude higher than the AU. AU and sub-regional community peacekeeping is on a scale other regional communities do not even contemplate. The founding of free trade areas, customs unions, and monetary unions is ahead of most other southern states. The EU was founded by six states, and the other regional communities were founded by typically a dozen. To negotiate the lowest common denominator of interests between fifty-five sovereign states is phenomenally difficult: no entity but the UNO has even attempted this. But further progress towards deepening African integration will depend on remedying the protracted and persistent problems summarized above.

Annexures

Table 1:

The long walk to an African Peace and Security Architecture

1958: Nkrumah proposes an African Legion and African High Command.
1963: OAU Charter articles VII and XIX propose a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration; never set up.
OAU Defence Commission, 1st meeting, Accra.
 OAU founds Liberation Committee, with Defence Committee, Dar es Salaam.
1965: OAU Defence Commission, 2nd meeting, Freetown.
1970: OAU Defence Commission, 3rd and 4th meetings, Addis Ababa, Lagos.
1971: OAU Defence Commission, 5th meeting, Addis Ababa.
1979: OAU Defence Commission, 6th meeting, Addis Ababa.
1981: OAU 1st military peacekeeping, Chad, December 1981-June 1982.
1990: ECOMOG peacemaking in Liberia.
1991: OAU NMOG in Rwanda, 55 observers.
1993: OAU Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution founded.
1994-95:OAU OMIB in Burundi, 52 observers.
1995: OAU Peace Fund established: decision to set up peacekeeping brigades in each of five regions.
1996: OAU 1st African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) meeting.
1997: OAU 2nd Chiefs of Staff meeting, Harare.
1998: SADC peacemaking in Lesotho.
    ECOMOG peacemaking in Sierra Leone, almost 15 000 at peak.
    ECOMOG peacemaking in Guinea-Bissau.
    OAU sets up Situation Room in its Conflict Management Centre.
    OAU OMIC in Comoros, 29 observers.
2002: Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union signed.
2003: OAU-AU 3rd Chiefs of Staff meeting.
    AU 3 000 peace-keepers in Burundi.
    AU starts peacekeeping mission in Darfur, Sudan.
2004: 4th Chiefs of Staff meeting.
    1st meeting of African Ministers of Defence.
    PSC & EU Peace Facility [ie. Fund] founded.
    Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) founded.
     African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism founded.
     Common African Defence and Security Policy adopted.

2005: Algerian, Egyptian, Libyan, Mauritanian, SADR, and Tunisian Chiefs of Defence. Staff meeting in Tripoli: MOU for North African Regional Capability signed.

   AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact signed:
   Article 4(d) "As part of the vision of building a strong and united Africa, State Parties   undertake to establish an African Army at the final stage of the political and economic integration of the continent."

2007:   Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) set up.
   Panel of the Wise set up.
   Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa.
   AMISOM peacemakers arrive in Somalia; slow build-up to 17 000.

2008:   5th ACDS and Heads of Security & Safety meeting.

2009:   6th ACDS and Heads of Security & Safety meeting.

2010:   ASF Military Staff Committee founded; advisory only.
   ECOWAS sets up Observation & Monitoring System, HQ Abuja.
   SADC sets up Early Warning System HQ, Gaberone.
   IGAD sets up Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, HQ Addis   Ababa.
   CEMOC founded (Algeria, Mauretania, Mali, Niger. HQ: Tamanrasset)
       Launch of African Standby Force postponed.

2011:   7th ACDS and Heads of Security & Safety meeting.

2012:   ECOWAS and Chad forces in Mali.
   ECOMIB in Guinea-Bissau.
   Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) and Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU).   Founded 1998, has in 2012 its mandate broadened to anti-terrorism. (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria (ie Lake Chad Basin Commission and Benin. first HQ: Baga)
    (From now on, operational strength of AU military in AU and UN-AU hybrid Missions, plus other multilateral forces, exceeds the 25 000 military and police personnel proposed for the ASF launch in 2010.)

2013:   AFISMA in Mali. AU and SADC contingents in UN force in DRC.
    MICOPAX and FOMAC forces; then AFISM-CAR in Central African Republic.

2014:   MISCA force in CAR rises to 6 000.   MJFT relocates HQ to N'djamena, reinforced to 8 700 soldiers and police.
    Adoption of African Integrated Maritime Strategic Plan for 2050, including a *Combined* Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa (CEMZA).
   African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity operational, 5 000 personnel strength.

2015:   Association of African Air Forces (AAAF) founded; now up to 23 member nations.

2016:   AU Mission in South Sudan.

2018:   8th annual symposium of African Air Force chiefs, Marrakech.

20XX?:   latest postponed date for formal launch of African Standby Force two decades after *continuous* deployment of *ad hoc* ECOWAS, SADC, AU, military and police peacekeeping forces.

Table 2: Before the African Investment Bank is founded:

Pre- Existing Financial Quangos
African Development Bank (AfDB) Tunis
African Export - Import Bank (AFREXIMBANK) Cairo
African Institute for Remittances (AIR) Nairobi
African Risk Capacity Agency (ARC), Johannesburg
African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) Pretoria/Tshwane
African Trade Insurance Agency, Nairobi
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), Khartoum
Association of African Central Banks (AACB / ABCA) Dakar
Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAI), Dakar
Banque des États de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC), Yaoundé
Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour l'investissement et le Commerce (BSIC), Tripoli/ Sahel-Sahara Bank for Investment & Trade
COMESA Infrastructure Fund, Port Louis
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), Pretoria/Tshwane[1]
East African Development Bank, Kampala[2]
ECOWAS Bank for Investment & Development (EBID), Lomé
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (IDC), Pretoria/Tshwane[1]
NEPAD Planning & Coordinating Agency (NPCA), Midrand
L'Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA) / Organisation for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, Dakar[3]
 Pan-African Infrastructure Development Fund (PAIDF), Johannesburg
[COMESA] Trade and Development Bank, Bujumbura
[COMESA] Regional Investment Agency, Cairo
Zep-Re PTA Reinsurance Company, Nairobi

Notes:

1. The DBSA & IDC, notwithstanding the "South African" remaining in their names, have had their statutory mandates expanded to be continental.

2. Note also the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Monetary Union, 2013: the track record of the EAC to date indicates that their intentions may be taken seriously.

3. Technically OHADA is juridical & legal in nature, but is included here as its work is to facilitate intra-African business, commerce, & finance

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