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dc.contributor.authorBeck, Simon
dc.date.accessioned2014-08-04T20:09:17Z
dc.date.available2014-08-04T20:09:17Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationBeck, S. (2013). The misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 20(1): 33-42en_US
dc.identifier.issn1086-3303
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10566/1150
dc.description.abstractMarya Schechtman has argued that contemporary attempts to save Locke’s account of personal identity suffer the same faults that are to be found in Locke, among which is an inability to capture the role our unconscious states play. To avoid these problems, she advocates giving up the mainstream Psychological View and adopting a narrative account like her ‘Self-Understanding’ View that, she claims, has the further virtue of maintaining important insights from Locke. My paper argues that it is misleading to understand the Psychological View as sharing Locke’s commitments and that (partly as a result) Schechtman has not isolated a problem that needs fixing or any reason for going narrative. It further argues that the Self-Understanding View is a great deal more at odds with Locke’s view than Schechtman cares to acknowledge.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherThe Johns Hopkins University Pressen_US
dc.rightsCopyright Johns Hopkins University Press. Publisher granted permission to reproduce the article as published.
dc.subjectPersonal identityen_US
dc.subjectNarrative theoryen_US
dc.subjectPsychological continuity theoryen_US
dc.subjectLockeen_US
dc.subjectParfiten_US
dc.subjectSchechtmanen_US
dc.titleThe misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding Viewen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.privacy.showsubmitterfalse
dc.status.ispeerreviewedtrue
dc.description.accreditationWeb of Scienceen_US


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