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dc.contributor.authorBeck, Simon
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-03T12:10:46Z
dc.date.available2018-05-03T12:10:46Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationBeck, S. (2016). Reconsidering a transplant: A response to Wagner. South African Journal of Philosophy, 35(2): 132-140.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0258-0136
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2016.1161432
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10566/3632
dc.description.abstractNils-Frederic Wagner takes issue with my argument that influential critics of “transplant” thought experiments make two cardinal mistakes. He responds that the mistakes I identify are not mistakes at all. The mistakes are rather on my part, in that I have not taken into account the conceptual genesis of personhood, that my view of thought experiments is idiosyncratic and possibly self-defeating, and in that I have ignored important empirical evidence about the relationship between brains and minds. I argue that my case still stands and that transplant thought experiments can do damage to rivals of a psychological continuity theory of personal identity like Marya Schechtman’s Person Life View.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherPhilosophical Society of Southern Africaen_US
dc.rightsThis is the author-version of the article published online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2016.1161432
dc.titleReconsidering a transplant: A response to Wagneren_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.privacy.showsubmitterFALSE
dc.status.ispeerreviewedTRUE
dc.description.accreditationDHET


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