Browsing Faculty of Arts by Subject "Personal identity"

Now showing items 1-6 of 6

    • The misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View 

      Beck, Simon (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013)
      Marya Schechtman has argued that contemporary attempts to save Locke’s account of personal identity suffer the same faults that are to be found in Locke, among which is an inability to capture the role our unconscious ...

    • Technological fictions and personal identity: on Ricoeur, Schechtman and analytic thought experiments 

      Beck, Simon (Taylor & Francis, 2016)
      It is notable when philosophers in one tradition take seriously the work in another and engage with it. This is certainly the case when Paul Ricoeur engages with the thought of Derek Parfit on personal identity. He sees ...

    • This thing called communitarianism: A critical review of Matolino's Personhood in African Philosophy 

      Oyowe, O.A. (Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2015)
      The subject of personal identity has received substantial treatment in contemporary African philosophy. Importantly, the dominant approach to personal identity is communitarian. Bernard Matolino's new book Personhood in ...

    • Thought experiments and personal identity in Africa 

      Beck, Simon; Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony (Cambridge University Press, 2021)
      African perspectives on personhood and personal identity and their relation to those of the West have become far more central in mainstream Western discussion than they once were. Not only are African traditional views with ...

    • Transplant thought-experiments: Two costly mistakes in discounting them 

      Beck, Simon (Taylor & Francis, 2014)
      ‘Transplant’ thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some ...

    • Understanding ourselves better 

      Beck, Simon (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013)
      INTRODUCTION: Marya Schechtman and Grant Gillett acknowledge that my case in ‘The misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View’ (2013) has some merits, but neither is moved to change their position and accept that the ...