

# The Decline of 'Militant Zulu Nationalism': IFP Politics after 1994

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## Abstract

*This article argues that since 1994, but especially since 1996, the IFP has progressively moved away from the Zulu nationalist rhetoric and confrontational tactics of the transition period which we term the 'militant Zulu nationalist' strategy. The reasons for this are not to be found in changed political objectives, for instance the IFP remains committed to provincial autonomy, but rather in changed political and institutional conditions. First, with the completion of the KwaZulu-Natal constitution-making process in 1996, the issues of the transition which divided the IFP from the ANC, namely the form of state and process towards it, have been settled. Second, new political developments such as the 'defection' of the Zulu King, and new institutional conditions such as a stake in democracy and the return of law and order, have made the strategy of 'militant Zulu nationalism' redundant, even counter-productive. To some extent this has been replaced by a conservative-liberal ideology and more co-operative tactics, but it has also heightened internal divisions and exposed a sense of directionlessness symptomatic of an identity crisis.*

## Introduction

The recent rumours of a merger between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) have tended to point to the similarities in policy between the two parties. A less frequently noted point is the extent to which the ideological and tactical gulf between these erstwhile rivals has narrowed since the 1994 election. To some extent this is due to the moderation of ANC positions, but it also reflects a sea-change in IFP politics over the last three years, and it is this shift which this paper addresses. It is argued that while the IFP remains by-and-large committed to securing more autonomy for KwaZulu-Natal, it has moved away from the Zulu nationalist rhetoric and confrontational tactics of the transition period which we term the 'militant Zulu nationalist' strategy. To some extent this has been replaced by a conservative-liberal ideology and more co-operative tactics, but it has also heightened internal divisions and exposed a sense of directionlessness symptomatic of an identity crisis. In brief then, the politics of the IFP has changed to an extent which has called into question the very reasons for its existence.

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The clue to understanding why this shift in strategy, rather than objective, has had such a profound impact lies in understanding the centrality of transition politics to the IFP's identity. We would suggest that it was differences in the preferred form of post-apartheid state, but especially the impact of different parties on this, with all its attendant status implications, which defined the power-struggle between the IFP and ANC. Hence our focus on the provincial constitution-making process after 1994 as the medium through which the IFP made its final attempt to influence the form of, and process to, a post-apartheid state. As our examination illustrates, while the IFP's approach to the provincial constitution largely reproduced the militant Zulu nationalist strategy of the transition years (at the same time as such an approach was on the wane in other areas of its political practice), it was a strategy that failed. Charmed and compelled into the new political order, the IFP found itself playing by a set of rules which rendered old strategies redundant, even counter-productive. However, not only was the final battle over provincial autonomy a hard lesson in liberal-democratic politics but, through eroding key differences between the IFP and ANC, the spur to an identity crisis. The decline of 'militant Zulu nationalism' could therefore, possibly signal the beginning of the end for the IFP.

Our argument begins by outlining the IFP's strategy of the transition period. This is followed by an analysis of how the provincial constitution-making process in KwaZulu-Natal proved *the* crucial lesson in the new strategic imperatives of liberal-democratic politics. Last is an account of the IFP's gradual retreat from militant Zulu nationalism in other domains of political practice, and the identity crisis this has prompted.

## The IFP's Transition Politics

Crudely put, the IFP's politics of the transition<sup>1</sup> was an extension of its practice during the 1980s. With the advent of militant protest politics, especially following the launch of the ANC-aligned United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1984, Inkatha found its leadership of internal anti-apartheid resistance openly challenged. From a position where, at its 1975 launch, it was regarded as the internal wing of the ANC, leadership differences with the ANC grew to the point of open rivalry. Aided and abetted by the state, this rivalry rapidly degenerated into violent conflict. Consequently, in the battle to retain at least provincial control (due to its monopoly of the KwaZulu Bantustan), Inkatha adopted a more explicit advocacy of Zulu interests (Forsyth, 1989:153; Maré, 1992:68-70; Davidson and Strand, 1993:55; Campbell *et al*, 1995:295) and a more confrontational approach to its political rivals, if not the state (see Aitchison, 1988; Kentridge, 1990:25-6; Maake, 1992:593-7; Aitchison, 1993; Taylor and Shaw, 1994:38). Importantly, the reversion to militant Zulu nationalism should be understood as a reflection of the IFP's political weakness. Outcompeted by ANC-aligned rivals for national leadership of the black (rather than just Zulu) anti-apartheid movement, the IFP was forced to turn to its Bantustan base and the key constituencies of traditional leaders, KwaZulu civil servants and businessmen (Piper, 1996:3). Indeed, we would suggest that the more intense the political competition between Inkatha and its rivals, the more it withdrew into its KwaZulu base and embraced

ethnic rhetoric and confrontation.

This relationship between, on the one hand, the strategic couplet of Zulu discourse and confrontational tactics and, on the other, the declining fortunes of the IFP, continued in the 1990s. However, there were important differences. For one thing, the invocation of Zuluness and militant confrontation became more intense as its fortunes declined, climaxing just before the 1994 elections in the IFP's only moment of pure Zulu nationalism - quasi-military mass support for King Zwelithini's call for an autonomous Zulu kingdom (Piper and Piper, 1995:4-6). In response, the ANC did an about turn on its anti-ethnicity position of the 1980s, embracing Zuluness as a political resource, especially in KwaZulu-Natal (interviews with Carrim, 11-8-96; Lubisi, 13-4-96, 15-7-96, 4-9-96; Nzimande, 18-7-96 and 24-7-96). Indeed this particular sensitivity reinforced the ANC's burgeoning discourse of 'rainbow nationalism' reflected in its 'many cultures, one nation' slogan (see, for example, Mathieson and Attwell, 1995:12). In sum then, negotiations saw the Zulu moment to Inkatha's politics of the 1980s both deepened and broadened into the politics of Zuluness of the 1990s.

Why was this the case? Quite simply, negotiations promised to achieve the ultimate goal of all South African resistance movements - the end of apartheid - with high dividends for those able to dominate this process. These stakes pushed political parties into an intense struggle to impose their vision of both the content of, and process to, a post-apartheid state. It was a struggle with divergent results. For those parties like the ANC and NP which enjoyed significant influence, negotiations came to be seen as a positive-sum game where compromise outweighed conflict. Hence the moderation of ANC and NP positions over time. For those parties which did not enjoy much influence, like the IFP, negotiations remained a zero-sum competition (Tonkin, 1996: ii). Thus marginalised, the IFP resorted to Zuluness and confrontation. In the context of negotiations the latter took the form of brinkmanship - upping the costs of its exclusion as an equal partner in the bargaining process to try and force accommodation as an equal. Ironically then, the IFP's invocation of militant Zulu nationalism was more a cry for inclusion in the South African polity than a genuine call for a sovereign Zulu state.

This trend was evident from virtually the beginning of the negotiations process. Frustrated by the rejection of its strongly federal vision<sup>2</sup> and at its lack of recognition as one of the 'big three' political parties in negotiations,<sup>3</sup> the IFP resorted to a familiar gambit of tactics: hyperbolic and ethno-nationalist rhetoric, ultimatums, walkouts and boycotts of negotiations, legal challenges, public protests and, allegedly, collusion in the escalating violence. Importantly, these tactics did not always enjoy unanimous support from all IFP leadership, but they nevertheless dominated the party's approach. Indeed, these same tactics and confrontational mindset seemed to characterise the IFP's behaviour after 1994. However, by early 1996 the party had largely moved some way from its militant Zulu nationalist strategy. This shift was most evident in the contrast between the IFP's campaigning for the 1994 national elections and the 1996 local government elections. Where, in the former, it presented itself as the virulent advocate of Zulu nationalism, in the latter it had apparently metamorphosized into a conservative-liberal opposition party for whom Zuluness was incidental (see Randall, 1996; Piper, 1997: chapter 8). In short, it appeared as if the IFP was adjusting to the new order and

increasingly engaging in terms conducive to liberal-democracy. This was not an even or linear process however; indeed, as the following section reveals, it was in the domain of provincial constitution-making that militant Zulu nationalism enjoyed its longest, if somewhat patchy, tenure.

### **KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Constitution-Making**

As suggested, the IFP approached the provincial constitution-making process in KwaZulu-Natal in the same manner as it had the national version. The refusal of the ANC to entertain international mediation, and the IFP's rejection of the Constitutional Assembly (CA), meant that the party saw the provincial constitution-making process as a more favourable medium to continue the battle over the national constitution.<sup>4</sup> Further, it continued to regard negotiations in zero-sum terms, not least because of a perception amongst certain leadership figures, if not all, that the ANC was negotiating in bad faith, intending to filibuster and so prevent agreement. Consequently, one might expect that, when confronted by opposition, the IFP would resort to the established couplet of Zulu nationalism and confrontation (in the case of constitutional issues the latter took the form of brinkmanship).

To some extent this is what happened, although from the outset there was clearly a greater ambiguity in the party about the reversion to militant Zulu nationalism, reflected in evermore public divides between party leadership. In part this was a reluctance rooted in doubts about the effectiveness of old tactics, but it also reflected a growing concern amongst more moderate elements about the advisability of such strategies in the new political terrain. As Arthur Konigkramer put it, 'we were no longer opposing a party, the ANC, but the state' (personal communication, 1998). Indeed, we would suggest that the reconfiguration of party power-bases and constituencies under the new liberal-democratic order, along with the associated political culture, made the militant nationalist strategy inadvisable, even counter-productive. This seems confirmed by the fact that the IFP was already beginning to move away from such strategies in domains of political practice outside the constitution-making one. However, despite these developments, militant Zulu nationalism was employed for one last, if ill-fated, time.

### **National Constitution-Making after 1994**

For several months after the 1994 elections political parties basked in the afterglow of a celebrated plebiscite. At its annual conference in July 1994, the IFP spoke in confident terms of expanding its constituency to intellectuals, the youth and other ethnic and racial groups. This positive approach continued at the August opening of the CA which was intended to polish the interim constitution into a final 'birth certificate of the nation' (*Constitutional Assembly Annual Report 1996*). This document had then to be ratified by the Constitutional Court as consistent with the provisions of the interim constitution. According to the IFP's Walter Felgate:

the struggle for the domination of true federalism over unitarianism or some or other form of regionalism will now take place in an arena in which for any party the only unlevelled ground on the playing field will be ground that it churns up by its inability to make its own mark. The constitution-making in this House will be a far cry from what it was in Kempton Park.<sup>5</sup>

By mid-1995 the IFP's optimism had begun to wane. Frustrated by the ANC's dominance of the CA, the IFP insisted that international mediation be resumed before negotiations proceed, arguing that this much was implicit in the 19 April 1994 agreement (IFP Submission to CA, 1995). In this respect they enjoyed the support of peace-broker Washington Okumu who said he had expected mediation to happen soon after the 1994 election (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 24-2-95). The ANC, however, proved extremely reluctant to honour international mediation arguing that the terms of reference needed to be clarified - a position shared by the NP. The ANC also accused the IFP of avoiding democratic forums and pointed out that King Zwelithini, whose constitutional status was an item for discussion, had rejected the call for international mediation (*The Natal Witness* 6-3-95). The IFP responded that the terms of reference were clear, and that King Zwelithini's opinion did not matter as he was not a signatory, but a summit meeting between Mandela, de Klerk and Buthelezi in early 1995 failed to find a solution. At about the same time Frank Mdlalose, KwaZulu-Natal premier, complained that provincial governments were not adequately represented in the CA, and the IFP expressed anger at the way the ANC was using the Government of National Unity (GNU) as a 'rubber stamp' (Constitutional Talk, 6; *Weekly Mail & Guardian* 15-12-94).

On the 21 February the IFP walked out of the national parliament. According to IFP Senator Ruth Rabinowitz it was as 'a last resort to not being taken seriously as a partner in the GNU, parliament or Constitutional Assembly' (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 3-3-95). Significantly, this move was tempered by the evident reluctance of many IFP leaders to be stereotyped as spoilers, as well as a concern over the effectiveness of repeating old tactics (interview with Felgate, 4-2-97). This is also suggested by the fact that it took the IFP more than six months to demand that international mediation replace the CA process. The ANC accused the IFP of trying to distract attention from revelations about its involvement in violence emanating from the De Kock and other trials, saying that it was not serious about international mediation otherwise it would not have 'rushed' the House of Traditional Leaders Bill through the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature and appointed Buthelezi as Chairman (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 23-2-95).

Having walked out of parliament, the IFP faced a scenario where, according to parliamentary rules, MPs would lose their seats if they vacated them for fifteen consecutive days. At a speedily arranged Special Conference on 5 and 6 March 1995, the IFP considered various options, including pulling out of the GNU and parliament altogether and looking to consolidate provincial power - the hard line position advocated by Youth Brigaders. Eventually the IFP agreed to return to the GNU and parliament but boycott the CA if its demand for international mediation was not acceded to by 5 April. In the event, the IFP did eventually leave the CA, but a week after the deadline. Indeed,

when confronted by SABC television reporters as to why his party had not yet left, Buthelezi castigated the reporters for not understanding the 'African' conception of time! A more plausible explanation was that Buthelezi was reluctant to burn his bridges with the ANC while there still seemed hope they might concede. This view is reinforced by the 'accommodatory' comments by IFP Constitutional Spokesman Siphso Mzimela who stated that progress with the ANC was possible, but that Roelf Meyer was the stumbling block (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 31-3-95). In brief then, while the IFP did return to militant Zulu nationalism (for instance some 20,000 IFP supporters held an Anti-Freedom Day march in Durban on 1 May), it was a move somewhat reluctantly made.

Perhaps the reason was, as Walter Felgate put it, that 'the ANC had already digested [*walkouts*] as a tactic' (personal interview, 4-2-97). Certainly this move had little impact on the CA. As Cyril Ramaphosa remarked, 'when [the IFP] walked out we agreed to stick to the original time frame ... this is a train which will not stop for it' (*Mayibuye* 6 [6]). With the IFP out, the ANC's dominance of the CA made the finalisation of the constitution something of a procession. Indeed, according to the AWB, 'the NP put up a fight with the ANC which can only be compared to cats giving the impression of "fighting" whilst they are actually copulating' (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 10-5-96). This one-way traffic was undone a little bit in early 1996 when the NP began to offer resistance on several outstanding clauses, but this was overcome by the ANC's threat of a national referendum should minority parties fail to concur. In the event, the most significant challenge to the CA came from the provincial constitution-writing process in KwaZulu-Natal.

### Provincial Constitution-Making in KwaZulu-Natal

Having turned its back on the Constitutional Assembly, the IFP looked to challenge the ANC's constitutional hegemony through the drafting of the KwaZulu-Natal constitution. The IFP's tactic moved from the premise that the national and provincial constitution-making processes were of equal standing politically, if not legally (interview with Smith, 23-7-96). According to Walter Felgate, 'the more we claim our rights now, the more difficult it will be for the national constitution to take away our powers' (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 20-10-95). That he had a point was reflected in the ANC's instruction to the provinces it controlled to wait until after the national constitution was completed before drawing up their constitutions. Consequently, the early ratification by the Constitutional Court of a KwaZulu-Natal constitution which asserted significant powers would force 'further politics' from the ANC, perhaps even international mediation. As IFP constitutional adviser Mario Ambrosini put it, 'although there is no obligation for the Constitutional Assembly to accommodate the provincial constitution, they will have to declare it unconstitutional to challenge it. That will mean going against a whole region and will result in crisis. More likely is that they'll say "let's talk" and we'll have an opportunity for international mediation' (personal interview, 25-11-95). Further, as the IFP was the majority party in the KwaZulu-Natal legislature, it believed it was well placed to implement its version of the provincial constitution. The race, as it were, was on.

The IFP nevertheless remained ambivalent over how to pursue its objectives. Confronted with the realities of multi-party decision making in the KwaZulu-Natal legislature, the IFP seemed torn between the need to build consensus in order to secure the two-thirds majority required for the provincial constitution, and a more confrontational attempt to rail-road its vision through. This equivocation was reflected, at least in part, by the comparative influence of provincial and national leadership respectively. Where provincial IFP leaders began the constitution-making process in accommodatory style, national IFP leadership soon took over the process, generally pursuing a more confrontational approach. Importantly, even they periodically returned to accommodation in the attempt to secure a two-thirds majority timeously. This ambivalence was also reflected in the way the IFP vacillated between trying to secure a deal which included the provincial ANC, or simply ignoring it and relying on the support of all the remaining minority parties. In sum then, even when brinkmanship was the preferred choice of key IFP leadership, the requirements of liberal-democratic politics quickly exposed its limitations.

Given its pre-occupation with the CA, it was only really in February 1995 that the IFP turned to the province. Under the leadership of the moderate provincial IFP leader Arthur Konigkramer, the KwaZulu-Natal constitutional committee spent six months in multi-party discussion which, in August 1995, yielded the 'Working Document of Constitutional Principles' or 'Fernhill Agreement'. Significantly, in an attempt to make the process an inclusive one, Konigkramer gave minority parties on the committee (The Minority Front, Democratic Party, Pan-African Congress and African Christian Democratic Party) representation greater than their popular support warranted. Partly this reflected the IFP's stated approach to negotiations (interview with Konigkramer, 8-7-94), but it also meant that if these minorities could be brought on board, the IFP could secure a two-thirds majority without the ANC - a fact which spurred ANC participation. The upshot of this co-operative approach was that the Fernhill Agreement was a compromise document which affirmed significant provincial powers while avoiding the bolder assertions of the IFP's previous proposals. The Zulu King was recognised as the constitutional monarch of the whole of KwaZulu-Natal; the name of the province as the Kingdom of KwaZulu-Natal was accepted for discussion; and various 'sunrise clauses' (these are clauses which only take effect when enabled by subsequent national legislation) were put in a schedule as part of the constitution. At the same time however, the IFP recognised that exclusive powers could not be the right of the province alone, and would have to be shared with national government (*KZN Briefing*, 1996 [1]). In brief then, the Fernhill document reflected a positive-sum approach to negotiations which assumed a degree of good faith amongst the parties involved.

However, neither this agreement nor the assumption of good faith sat well with certain powerful IFP leaders. For Sipho Mzimela, Walter Felgate and adviser Mario Ambrosini, the IFP's national constitutional negotiations team, the Fernhill document was not assertive enough, and if it was not assertive then it was less likely to achieve the kind of constitutional crisis it was intended to. This concern was underwritten by the belief that accommodation with the ANC was pointless as it was committed to forestalling any provincial constitution (interview with Felgate, 4-2-97). Consequently, discontent began

to surface in mid-1995 when, under the influence of hardliners, the IFP drew up a '20-point plan' which asserted provincial powers similar to the IFP's various constitutional proposals since 1990 (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 2-6-95). These included provincial control over KwaZulu-Natal's trade and commerce, education system, media and security forces. Sensing an imminent backlash, moderates in the IFP leaked the document in June 1995, prompting the ANC to denounce the proposal as a 'plan for secession'. While the IFP defended its plan as a proposal to 'speed up the process towards federalism', Buthelezi's public condemnation of 'white racist' IFP members 'vilifying him through media leaks' (*Financial Mail* 2-6-94) reflected real divisions within the IFP over appropriate constitution-making strategies.

In the event, party hardliners gained the upper hand in August 1995, mobilising the IFP's National Council to replace Arthur Konigkramer with the more pliable Mike Tarr as chair of the constitutional committee (interview with Konigkramer, 22-1-97). The provincial constitution-making process was now driven by Felgate and Ambrosini who, motivated by the objective to secure as federal a constitution as possible, took a more confrontational approach. The Fernhill agreement was thrown out and replaced by 'The Twelve-Point Plan'. This contained a series of sunrise clauses intended to 'express the aspirations of this province to achieve a substantially greater degree of autonomy and self-rule within the parameters of a united South Africa once the national constitution so allows' (*The Natal Witness* 17-8-95). Correspondingly, the IFP chose to take the process outside the provincial constitutional committee, and insisted that the Twelve Point Plan be put to the vote in the provincial assembly. When the two-thirds required agreement was not forthcoming, the party threatened to call a provincial election if a draft was not concluded by the end of August (*Financial Mail* 25-8-95).

It was also at this time that Chief Buthelezi called an *imbizo*, a gathering of the Zulu nation, at King's Park. Before a crowd of 40,000 Buthelezi read out a 'covenant' pledging all Zulus to the battle for an autonomous provincial kingdom wherein their 'freedom and prosperity' would be realised. He also announced that the *amakhosi* had resolved to call an early election if, by 1 September, an adequate constitution protecting the 'freedom and autonomy' of the Zulu kingdom had not been secured. Shortly after this the ANC accused the IFP of fostering violence on the KwaZulu-Natal South Coast in an attempt to add pressure to have the provincial constitution passed. In short, IFP strategy seemed to have returned to the militant Zulu nationalism of the transition: brinkmanship in negotiations was again married to confrontational tactics and Zulu nationalist ideology at the mass level. Importantly however, the link between brinkmanship in negotiations and militant Zulu nationalist tactics at a mass level was only briefly maintained. For reasons outlined below, militant Zulu nationalism was simply not sustainable in other domains of politics outside of negotiations, and thus there was no follow up to the *imbizo* and nothing was heard of the election threat again.

If, in contrast to the transition period from 1990 to 1994, the IFP's constitutional power-plays were limited to parliamentary committees and processes, it was an approach that remained doggedly confrontational. In the provincial constitutional committee, Ambrosini and Felgate managed to extend the Twelve-Point Plan into a forty-seven page 'Green Paper'. Remarkably similar to the IFP's 1992 'Constitution of the State of



KwaZulu-Natal', the Green Paper unequivocally asserted that the province be renamed 'The Kingdom of KwaZulu-Natal', and provided for extensive provincial powers which would prevail over national ones. Indeed it cast the 'kingdom' as a 'federate province' of the Republic and established dual citizenship of both KwaZulu-Natal and South Africa. Further, it provided for a provincial judiciary and provincial control over the police, civil service, local government, as well as a provincial militia. It also established Ulundi as the capital of KwaZulu-Natal (*Green Paper: Constitutional Principles*, adopted by the KZN legislature on 3 October 1995). The ANC rejected this as 'a document ... written under the supposition of and in preparation for secession' (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 15-9-95). However, the IFP's strategy at this time was not to win over the ANC, but the third largest party in the province, and potentially the key to the other minority parties, the NP.

In September 1995 the IFP and NP MPPs held a *bosberaad* which saw significant progress, indeed Smith describes it 'as the breakthrough needed to generate consensus' (personal interview, 23-7-96). Further meetings between Buthelezi and de Klerk, and Felgate and NP KwaZulu-Natal leader Danie Schutte, saw a proposal for a 'Council of State' cemented. This was to consist of six MPPs, appointed by the provincial parliament's three largest parties on the basis of two members for each party, provided that a refusal of a party to participate in the Council would not prevent its functioning (a move obviously designed to prevent the ANC from rendering the Council unworkable). The Council would ratify decisions by the provincial cabinet regarding legislation concerned with specified areas of competence, including provincial law and order, security matters, the media, the provincial budget and any amendments to the constitution (*KZN Briefing*, 1996 [1]). In effect, the Council would have significantly disempowered the provincial cabinet, giving the NP an effective veto over key areas of provincial decision-making. Certainly the ANC rejected the notion as 'inherently impractical and undemocratic' and accused the NP of 'a betrayal of trust and confidence' (interview with Jeffries, 15-7-96). In fact, so concerned were the ANC at these initiatives that national constitutional negotiator Pravin Gordhan was 'invited' to help manage the ANC's response (*Ibid*).

From this point on in late 1995, events moved with increasing frenzy and complexity as the pressure to finish the provincial constitution mounted. In this context, the IFP's strategic dilemma became more pronounced. On the one hand it was concerned to secure a constitution as federal as possible, on the other it required the support of other parties who were lukewarm, even antagonistic, towards federalism. This dilemma played itself out around two axes, one within the IFP's control, and one outside of it. In looking to secure a federal constitution the IFP tended to err on the side of confrontation, often beyond the point of tactical sense. Whilst partly due to the pressure to secure a constitution sufficiently federal to prompt a constitutional crisis, it also reflected the particular personalities driving this politics. The second variable was the resistance of minority parties, especially the ANC. Essentially looking to filibuster rather than reach agreement, the ANC pushed the IFP into a position where it had to gain the support of all the remaining political parties - a near impossible task. Consequently the IFP equivocated between trying to achieve this, or alternatively, looking to agreement with the ANC to an extent which would at least bring the other parties on board.

A good illustration of this dilemma is revealed in the IFP's attempts in October and November 1995 to get the Green Paper through the provincial legislature. Despite the agreements reached with the NP, the IFP was finding the NP unwilling to commit itself. Interviewed in November 1995 Ambrosini said 'for the last three weeks things have been in place but the NP refuse to sign. I don't trust them. They are opportunistic and ignorant idiots.' The NP's equivocation was rooted in two sets of factors. First, in looking to strengthen its hand, the IFP used the provincial parliament to amend the composition of the constitutional committee to reflect its dominance, in the process ignoring a 'gentleman's agreement' with the NP to postpone the matter until the majority of the NP MPPs had returned from a caucus meeting in Johannesburg. An NP spokesperson complained that his party had been 'stabbed in the back'. In addition, and more importantly, the NP was coming under pressure from the ANC. According to John Jeffries, provincial NP leaders were under pressure from de Klerk (and presumably from the ANC nationally) to ensure that the provincial constitution-making process did not exclude the ANC (*KZN Briefing*, 1996 [1]). Indeed, it was shortly after this, on Tuesday 23 January 1996, that the ANC secretly met the NP's Roelf Meyer in Cape Town and promised 'greater facilitation' at national level if the NP backed the ANC provincially (interviews with Smith, 23-7-96; Jeffries, 15-7-96). It seems then that if the IFP was using the provincial constitution-making process to influence the national one, the ANC was using the national one to influence the provincial.

The IFP's problems with the NP were soon generalised when the IFP tried to force a vote on the Green Paper, a move which angered opposition parties who perceived this as an attempt to bind the constitutional committee to the document's principles. The ANC insisted that the provincial constitution remain subordinate to the national one. It also objected to the title of 'Kingdom', the proposed siting of the capital in Ulundi, and the notion of provincial citizenship. The DP criticised the IFP for undoing the progress achieved in multi-party talks, and complained that the federalist cause was being undone by the 'bloody-minded attitude of the IFP' (*The Natal Witness* 16-11-95). In the event, opposition parties refused to vote on the Green Paper, generally put up significant resistance and eventually walked out of the parliamentary sitting. Confronted with this setback, the IFP looked to adopting a different tack, initiating an intense series of bilaterals with opposition parties, and began making significant concessions on the proposals outlined in the Green Paper. Indeed, the release of the draft national Constitution in December 1995 seemed to prompt the IFP towards compromise with minority parties. Urgently requiring consensus to secure the provincial constitution, the IFP agreed to scrap clauses calling for a separate provincial judiciary, militia and constitutional court. The siting of the capital city was removed as a constitutional issue, while sunrise clauses were recognised as 'aspirations that have to be negotiated at national level in the constitutional assembly to be validated' (*Financial Mail* 15-12-95).

However, just when it seemed that the moderate line had prevailed, the IFP underwent a mood swing back to intransigence which, as before, failed. In short, a pattern was beginning to emerge: caught between securing a sufficiently federal document and the two-thirds support required, the IFP was repeatedly forced from asserting its preferences in confrontational fashion, to compromise with minority parties. Hence, in early January

1996 the IFP cancelled a meeting where minority parties were to present their proposals, declaring that it 'had no mandate to negotiate further' (*The Natal Witness* 6-1-96). The party insisted that it had done all it could to seek an all-inclusive settlement, and Buthelezi warned that 'if the ANC sabotages the adoption of a provincial constitution in KwaZulu-Natal, current problems between the ANC and IFP will pale in comparison to the crisis that will develop' (*The Natal Witness* 4-3-96). Tensions between the parties remained high during this time, and relations in the provincial legislature were characterised by 'constant bickering rather than getting on with the job of governing' (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 8-12-95). On 7 February 1996 the Official Draft Constitution for KwaZulu-Natal was published in the Provincial Gazette. The issue of provincial autonomy remained unresolved, as did the status of traditional leaders, the Council of State, the provincial Constitutional Court and the Bill of Rights. The committee's constitutional advisers also expressed many doubts over the constitutional legality of many clauses, especially phrases declaring a federal relationship between the 'kingdom' and the 'Republic'. Nevertheless, the constitutional committee remained committed to 11 March as the final deadline for the submission of the constitution to the legislature for ratification.

In the event, resistance from minority parties forced the IFP back from confrontation to accommodation as disgruntlement with the document and especially the conflictual process around it became evident. In late February 1996 the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) withdrew from the constitutional committee in frustration that its appeal for an anti-abortion clause in the official draft had not been included. This left the IFP little alternative but to seek agreement with the larger parties. In short, riding the horns of its strategic dilemma prompted the IFP to vacillate between wanting to exclude the ANC to being forced to include it. Consequently, on 10 March a three-way ANC/NP/IFP workshop took place, but failed to make any progress. The next day the IFP was back in bilaterals with minority parties, notably the ACDP, now leaning towards excluding the ANC from the process. However, the IFP had left things too late to consolidate support. Hence, on Tuesday 12 March the Constitutional Committee put the new constitution to vote, unable to postpone it any longer. The IFP, NP and ACDP voted for it, the ANC and DP against, while the PAC and MF abstained. This deadlock necessitated further discussion that collapsed on 13 March when the ANC withdrew from the constitutional committee in objection to IFP demands that decisions be taken by simple majority, complaining of 'off-hand' treatment by the Speaker and Premier (*The Natal Witness* 14-3-96) (5).

With the ANC out of the process the IFP persisted on the course of compromise in the hope of securing the required two-thirds majority (for example, the ACDP had agreed to a referendum on the abortion issue). It was now, for instance, that the Council of State proposal was finally jettisoned. Then, just when it looked as if the deal was imminent, for reasons which remain opaque,<sup>6</sup> Amichand Rajbansi of the Minority Front put forward ANC position after ANC position, frustrating the IFP at the final hurdle. Stalemate was reached, forcing the IFP to return to negotiating with the ANC, and inaugurating the final round of horse trading. In this process the IFP conceded the suspension of the status of traditional leaders as the primary tier of local government, while the ANC in turn

conceded the inclusion of various contentious clauses in the final document as sunrise clauses,<sup>7</sup> with the proviso that these could be challenged within the forum of the Constitutional Court once the general framework had been agreed upon. By 15 March 1996 the IFP and ANC had reached agreement on a draft provincial constitution which, according to John Jeffries, looked like it had 'been shot with an AK47' (personal interview, 15-7-96).

### The Final Round of Constitution-Making - The Constitutional Court

On 19 March 1996 the final draft of the KwaZulu-Natal Constitution was sent to the Constitutional Court for approval, having been ratified by the provincial legislature on 15 March. On 9 September 1996 the Constitutional Court announced its refusal to certify this constitution on the grounds that it was 'not consistent with the interim constitution and the constitutional principles' (*The Natal Witness* 10-9-96). Its major flaw was the claim to give powers to the provincial legislature and executive above those allowed by the interim constitution. References to KwaZulu-Natal as 'a self-governing province', seeking 'greater self-determination within a united federal framework', were found to undermine the national emphasis on 'one sovereign, democratic state', based on national unity and 'indivisibility'. The draft proclaimed the constitution 'the supreme law of the province', asserted its 'exclusive legislative and executive powers and functions', and stipulated that 'a law of the province shall prevail over legislation of the RSA inconsistent therewith', in contravention of the supremacy of the national constitution. The Court ruled that the constitution 'seemed to have been passed by the KwaZulu-Natal legislature under the misunderstanding that it enjoys a relationship of co-supremacy with the national legislature, and even the Constitutional Assembly' (*Ibid*). The provincial constitution was thus rejected and referred back to the legislature for amendment. The KwaZulu-Natal constitutional committee has yet to meet to amend it.

In sum then, not only did the provincial constitution bear scant resemblance to the IFP's initial hardline proposals, but the IFP's tactic proved to be based on a faulty premise. Quite simply, the Constitutional Court did not see the legal status of the document in the same light as the IFP did. Further, even had the Constitutional Court concurred on this matter, the manner in which the IFP managed KwaZulu-Natal's constitution-making process, plus the resistance of minority parties, effectively quashed hopes of achieving a radical outcome. All the IFP really achieved was to alienate itself from potential allies and exacerbate internal divides. Indeed, we would suggest that the demise of Ambrosini and Mzimela and the defection of Felgate were in no small way the result of the failure of the provincial constitution-making process. In hindsight then, it seems that had the IFP been willing to settle for less, it would probably have achieved more.

While the IFP was embroiled in its provincial constitutional-making efforts the national constitution was passed by the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament on 8 May 1996 and sent to the Constitutional Court for ratification. Although the IFP took some comfort from the Constitutional Court ruling in September that powers allocated to the province were 'substantially less than and inferior to' those set out in the interim

constitution (*Keesings*, September 1996), by then the battle was already lost. Thus, although the CA had ninety days to rewrite the national constitution, the IFP remained divided and ambivalent about what its approach should be. This was because while the hardliners in the party were in the ascendancy, their strategy had clearly failed. After some public equivocation the IFP returned to the CA, but soon demanded an extension of the negotiating deadline to the 11 October on the basis that 'the constitution was being hurried through' (*New Nation* 27-9-96). Believing itself marginalised in the process, the IFP withdrew from the CA a week after rejoining. The *Financial Mail* opined that the IFP's move had achieved nothing other than 'to confirm its image as the petulant delinquent of South African politics which kicks and screams when it cannot get its way. Inkatha cannot seem to reconcile itself to its status as a minority party' (11-10-96). On 11 October the final amendments to the national constitution were approved by the Constitutional Court, and President Mandela signed the document on 10 December 1996.

The IFP's failure to participate in the national constitution-making processes before and after the KwaZulu-Natal fiasco raises a further question: would the successful prosecution of the provincial strategy have generated the 'further politics' it so desired? Given the response of the ANC to international mediation, and the legal priority the national constitution enjoyed, it is far from clear that the ANC would have been required to behave in the way the IFP wanted. It also leaves open the question of how successfully the IFP would have managed such 'further politics' anyhow. Given its record it is not clear that the ANC had much to fear. In retrospect it seems that had the IFP pursued the more accommodatory tactical strain evident in Konigkramer's Fernhill Agreement, it probably would have enjoyed greater success at both national and provincial levels. Instead, it simply ended up marginalising itself from the national constitution-making process, squandering an opportunity to advance the cause of federalism, exposing its obstinate tendencies, and proving itself a slow learner in the fundamental requirements of liberal-democratic politics.

### **The Wider Decline of Militant Zulu Nationalism in IFP Politics**

That the KwaZulu-Natal constitution-making process proved such a hard lesson in the strategic requirements of liberal-democratic politics for the IFP is all the more remarkable given the party's move away from militant Zulu nationalism in other domains of politics. Thus, while there were moments when brinkmanship was accompanied by a more general turn to confrontation and Zulu rhetoric, they remained isolated and infrequent. Generally, the IFP prosecuted its negotiations tactics without the link to the mass level militant Zulu nationalism that characterised the transition period. Indeed, as Ambrosini put it, 'the struggle over the form of state has moved into the institutional domain' (personal interview, 25-11-95). Further, the IFP was aware that this would weaken their chances of success for, as Walter Felgate observed, 'constitutional

demands need to be backed by power-factors' (personal interview, 4-2-97). In this light, one would expect the party to have behaved a little more circumspectly during the provincial negotiations process, demonstrating some awareness of the limitations and opportunities that an institutionally-limited power struggle posed. Of course, even had the IFP pursued Konigkramer's more accommodatory approach, there was no guarantee of a better outcome. The reason for this is simply that the party did not enjoy the dominance of the provincial legislature as it had the KwaZulu government. Indeed, the more general shift away from militant Zulu nationalism outlined below can be related to the way in which the new institutions of post-apartheid politics have reconfigured the IFP's power-base and constituencies.

By the KwaZulu-Natal local government elections of June 1996, the IFP had been largely charmed and compelled into the new deal. It was charmed by its provincial victory and its participation in the national government which gave it a stake in the institutions of democratic governance. Conversely, it was compelled by the public defection of the Zulu King, sharing provincial government with a large and vigilant opposition, and by the slow resuscitation of law and order. These developments undermined its previous assets of Zulu nationalist rhetoric, monopoly of key state institutions (the KwaZulu government, police etc.), and the freedom to organise militarily. They also broke the IFP's exclusive hold over the old KwaZulu constituencies of the civil service and small business.<sup>8</sup> Importantly, this shift away from militant Zulu nationalism should not be overstated given the continued reliance of the IFP on traditional leaders. Indeed, it seems that traditional authorities are virtually as central to the IFP's new power-base as they were to its previous one. Thus the post-1994 period has been one characterised by ambiguity, indecision and internal conflict for the IFP as the strategies of the past have waned without being replaced by a coherent alternative. This argument is traced through an outline of developments in the political domains of institutional design, governance, mass mobilisation and party organisation.

Besides constitution-making, traditional authorities are the other aspect of politics central to the institutional domain. Perhaps the most dramatic development here after 1994 was the public distancing of King Zwelithini from Buthelezi and the IFP. In early September 1994 Zwelithini publicly repudiated Buthelezi's claims to being 'traditional Prime Minister', reportedly saying to Mandela: 'You were a prisoner for 27 years. I was a prisoner for 24' (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 23-9-94). Zwelithini's move threatened to puncture a hole in the IFP's ideological balloon and undermine Buthelezi's social standing, and so a fierce battle for the loyalty of the traditional elite ensued. By late 1995, after a somewhat petulant and bitter struggle which saw Buthelezi and Zwelithini calling rival gatherings, boycotting each other's events, invading live television shows, and attempting to mobilise provincial and national governments behind them, something of a stalemate was reached. Buthelezi seemed to have grudgingly accepted the reality of Zwelithini's independence, while Zwelithini was well aware of his limited powers in the traditionalist domain. Aligned to Buthelezi, the House of Traditional Leaders seemed an influential institution at provincial level, and the tribal elite even more so at local level. This uneasy standoff has perpetuated itself from late 1995 through to the present, aside from instances of violence against the royal family,<sup>9</sup> and against the backdrop of anti-

monarchy protests in Swaziland.

In respect of governance, political dispute has moved away from the institutionally-related issues of the transition years towards more policy-related questions, thus removing a spur to old strategies. The central reason for this has been the burgeoning realisation that effective provincial governance requires co-operation between the political parties, especially the IFP and ANC. In part this reflects the division of political power between the ANC dominated national government and KwaZulu-Natal's cities, and the IFP dominated provincial government. However, it also reflects the division of power within the provincial legislature where the IFP's slim majority is a limit on domineering ambitions. Further, the IFP's overwhelming control of rural areas, and the ANC's monopoly of the urban domain (as reflected in the 1996 local government election results), means that province-wide implementation is greatly facilitated by party consensus. Lastly, the fact that IFP and ANC MPPs have had to work together has also ameliorated tensions. Consequently, many of the ostensibly divisive issues such as provincial powers and the location of the capital of KwaZulu-Natal have been contained after initial disputes (interview with Erskine, 8-1-97), whereas issues of common cause like economic growth and delivery, or unforeseen issues like crime, have proved more troublesome.

This shift away from the issues of conflict of the transition has been paralleled by a slow, but steady, drop in mass confrontation and political violence. The period following the national elections of 1994 saw significant political contests between the ANC and IFP including the dispute over international mediation, the contest over the constitution-making process and the run-up to the local government elections. Critically, while there were significant instances of violence, notably the Shobashabane massacre of 25 December 1995 and various flare-ups in the run-up to the 1996 local government elections, these tended to remain isolated incidents rather than spark sustained violence linked to political contests. Not surprisingly therefore, general levels of violence have dropped gradually but steadily since 1994 (HRC, 1997). Indeed it seems that political conflict increasingly became institutionalised with politicians handling their disputes in the corridors of power rather than on township streets or rural hillsides.

There are two sets of reasons for this trend. First, for reasons outlined above, was the lessening of political competition. Second was the gradual return of law and order which included both a series of special interventions and a more general transformation of the security forces. The former included the Investigative Task Unit set up to investigate hit squads, high profile national trials, the establishment of Special Task Units to investigate particular incidents, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. These initiatives exposed the South African Military Intelligence-Special Branch-IFP triumvirate at work during the 1980s and even into the 1990s (Taylor and Shaw, 1998). In doing so they removed an important source of military patronage for the IFP and embarrassed it politically, thus making the prosecution of similar tactics more difficult, even counter-productive. The latter refers to the slow transformation of the security forces into institutions which serve and protect rather than repress, not least as the state is no longer able to suspend the rule of law when it suits its interests to do so.

In sum then, the IFP has largely endorsed and acquiesced to a post-apartheid state

constructed against its express wishes. However, this has not been an easy adjustment, indeed it has plunged the party into an identity crisis. This is reflected in the strategic vacillation noted already, but also in the mood swings that have accompanied this, as well as the numerous divisions which have become public knowledge. These developments, we have argued, are rooted in the IFP's changing political fortunes which, in turn, can be related to the way in which the institutions of liberal-democracy have reconfigured the party's power-base. This ambiguity is reinforced by the shifts in the actual and potential constituencies of the IFP since 1994. As already noted, the IFP can no longer rely on its traditional KwaZulu constituencies in quite the same way, for while it has been able to retain the support of most traditional authorities, and therefore its association with the rural constituency, it has lost its monopoly on the loyalties of old KwaZulu civil servants and small businessmen. At the same time, the demands of electioneering and policy-making have pushed it to reach out for comparatively new constituencies of conservative-liberal white and Indian people.

These developments were reflected in the IFP's various attempts at reorganising itself since 1994, attempts which have generally failed as the party remained ambiguously poised between old styles of operating as a patronage party, and attempts to move to a conventional liberal-democratic alternative. At the July 1994 Conference the IFP adopted a new constitution which devolved powers to provincial, regional and branch levels. An attempt to develop into a more democratic organisation, this project was the baby of new leadership, notably Secretary-General Ziba Jiyane, and was based on business techniques borrowed, a little oddly, from scientology (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 13-1-95)! Although the 1994 constitution resembled the 1990 version quite closely, the IFP pointed out that the latter was 'suspended' because of the 'war situation' in the early 1990s which forced Buthelezi 'to take virtually total control' (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 22-7-94). However, while the new constitution opened space for an energetic and visionary leader to exploit, and it looked like Ziba Jiyane might be that leader, this did not come to pass. For a range of reasons, including the lack of a coherent strategic orientation by party leadership, the inherent centralism of Buthelezi's leadership and Jiyane's own weaknesses, he failed to seize the opportunity. Indeed, as a political party the IFP remained in an organisational shambles (interview with Grinker, 22-1-97).

It was not long before these tensions manifested themselves in various public spats. The strategic and geographical divisions over the constitution-making process have already been noted. Another line of conflict was the ideological split between Zulu 'traditionalists' and 'modernists' in regard to the status of traditional leaders in local government. These cleavages were exacerbated by personality conflicts and racial tensions (interviews with Smith, 23-7-96; Mars, 21-1-97). Thus in June 1995 Buthelezi went on a tirade against the 'coterie of whites' in his party saying, 'It is unfortunate that we have attracted to the IFP ... this type of white racist with twisted minds. They have convinced themselves that there is nothing we as blacks can do on our own ... such is the political megalomania of these nuts' (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 9-6-95). These comments were aimed at the newer recruits like Mike Tarr who had been exploiting the comparative freedom they enjoyed in the province. Such actions angered the Zulu 'old guard' more used to Buthelezi's rule (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 2-6-95). Shortly after this



incident IFP whips at national level corralled Indian IFP MPs and berated them for 'laziness', a move which prompted IFP Senator Farouk Cassim to publicly accuse the IFP of racism (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 7-7-95).

The results of the June 1996 local government elections prompted a 'prolonged period of self-criticism and internal wrangling for the IFP', reopening divides between 'traditionalists' and 'modernists'. National Council meetings were described as being 'frequently dominated by back stabbing confrontations which had spawned a series of divisions along racial, ideological and geographical lines.' Younger party members criticised Buthelezi's autocratic leadership style and called for the democratisation of party structures. Yet repeated efforts at this have amounted to naught, not least because of Buthelezi's strong patronage relations with traditionalists. Indeed, in January 1997, tensions reached a head with Buthelezi berating certain members as 'indolent who expect political success to fall into their laps', and accusing them of creating party divisions. The party's general conference at the end of January witnessed an unprecedented purge of moderates - KwaZulu-Natal Premier Frank Mdlalose, Secretary-General Ziba Jiyane and Gauteng legislature leader Musa Myeni all resigned their posts, allegedly under pressure from hardliners.

This organisational unhappiness was not limited to the more moderate elements however, as by late 1997 key hardliners in the party, notably those who had driven the provincial constitution-making process, began to feel the pinch. Mario Ambrosini has all but disappeared from party processes, Sipho Mzimela was threatened with expulsion from the IFP for publicly advocating a merger with the ANC, and Walter Felgate left the IFP for the ANC, complaining of Buthelezi's heavy-handed and uncompromising attitude. Whilst the reasons for these developments are complex, they are related to a general malaise in the IFP which has much to do with its inability to fully transform organisationally and culturally into a conventional liberal-democratic party. Important here is Buthelezi's personal style which, according to one member of the National Council, means that 'only praise singers of the leader are likely to remain in office ... questioning of authority or even debate is completely unacceptable ... there is no such thing as democracy within the party ... That is why there is no secondary leadership layer or even remote indication as to who would replace Buthelezi if he suddenly disappeared.'

## Conclusion

That the IFP's politics has shifted significantly over the last four years is beyond doubt. Gone are the frequent and overt invocations of Zuluness, and gone too are the confrontational tactics and threats of violence. In their place is a more ambiguous and vague affirmation of conservative and liberal values and a more accommodatory style. Importantly though, we get the sense of a party in hiatus, uncertain of precisely which mast to nail its colours to. The reasons for this, we have argued, are not incidental, but related to the manner in which the new institutions and culture of liberal-democracy have reconfigured the power-bases and constituencies of the party. Simply put, under these

new conditions, the old militant Zulu nationalist strategy is redundant, even counter-productive.

As our examination of the KwaZulu-Natal provincial constitution-making process has shown, this reality has slowly but inexorably forced itself on the IFP. Thus even at a time when militant Zulu nationalism was on the wane in other areas of politics, so breaking the link between brinkmanship and mass level militant Zulu nationalism which typified the transition years, the IFP repeatedly pursued confrontational tactics only to be forced to turn to accommodation. In this instance the lessons of liberal-democracy were learned the hard way. The focus on the constitution-making process brings out a further contrast between the core dynamics of the transition and burgeoning features of post-apartheid politics. Where the former was dominated by the often violent struggle between political parties, the latter is moulded around routinised institutional processes. In sum then, political parties in general have to adapt to the reality that future politics will be conducted more in the corridors of power than on the streets of townships or rural hillsides.

Finally, one outcome of this transformation of politics means that the IFP finds itself in a scenario where, having failed in its bid to turn the provincial constitution-making process into the final stand against the ANC victory during the negotiations process, it is no longer clear what distinguishes it from the ANC. In respect of objectives, the key difference is the IFP's firmer commitment to provincial autonomy which, in part anyway, is rooted in the contingency of using the KwaZulu Bantustan as a 'Trojan horse' to fight the system from within. Given that the party had always regarded the national stage as its primary ambition, a place within the ANC could be one means of securing this. In respect of political standing, the comparative status of the two parties is largely settled. Considering the common origins of the two, and the similar constituencies, some form of merger is now a real possibility. It is not inconceivable then, that the demise of the KwaZulu-Natal constitution could also mark the demise of the IFP.

## Notes

All interviews referred to in this article were undertaken by Laurence Piper, namely: Ambrosini, M. *IFP Constitutional Adviser* (25-11-95); Carrim, Y. *SACP National Executive Committee member, ANC MP* (11-8-96); Erskine, H. *Head of Administration, KwaZulu-Natal National Council of Provinces (NCOP)* (8-1-97); Felgate, W. *IFP MP and negotiator* (4-2-97); Grinker, A. *IFP Deputy Campaign Manager, Local Government Elections* (22-1-97); Jeffries, J. *ANC MPP and constitutional negotiator* (15-7-96); Konigkramer, A. *IFP MPP, Managing Editor of Ilanga newspaper* (8-7-94 and 22-1-97); Lubisi, C. *Former ANC and SACP office bearer* (13-4-96, 15-7-94 and 4-9-96); Mars, I. *IFP MP* (21-1-97); Nzimande, B. *ANC and SACP NEC member, Chair of Education Portfolio Committee, National Assembly* (18-7-96 and 24-7-96); and Smith, P. *IFP constitutional adviser* (23-7-96).

1. The transition is used here in conventional terms to mean the negotiations between 2 February 1990 and 26 April 1994.
2. A long-standing and defining feature of Inkatha's politics has been its advocacy of a range of quasi-federal constitutional arrangements for a post-apartheid South Africa. These include Buthelezi's suggestion of a 'black federation' of homelands in 1973, the consociational proposals of the Buthelezi Commission of 1980 and the Indaba of 1986, as well as the Joint Executive Authority for KwaZulu and Natal of 1987 (Horrell, 1973:20; Buthelezi Commission, 1981:111-4; Langer, 1983:14; Forsyth, 1994:79-80). During the transition the IFP released the strongly federal 'Draft Constitution for the State of KwaZulu/Natal' in December 1991, a final form of which was released a year later as the 'Federal Constitution for the State of KwaZulu-Natal' (see De Haas and Zulu, 1993).
3. This was particularly evident in the IFP's frustration at the deadlock-breaking mechanism of 'sufficient consensus' used during negotiations. Supposedly a device to be employed when full consensus was being blocked by the opposition of minor parties, it came to mean agreement between the NP and ANC. Thus, 'sufficient consensus' saw ANC/NP agreement become the sufficient condition for a negotiated settlement (Friedman, 1993:24). Consequently, a central demand of the IFP was for negotiations processes in which it enjoyed the same status as the ANC and NP. Hence, the key concession given by the ANC on 19 April 1994, the agreement which facilitated the IFP's participation in the national elections, was international mediation (Buthelezi, 1994; also see Cassidy, 1995:145-190; and *The Sunday Tribune* 24-4-94. This was precisely the kind of inclusive process that the IFP was looking for.
4. At this point it is worth noting that the right to draft provincial constitutions was a concession wrung from the ANC by the IFP in the build-up to the 1994 election (Atkinson, 1994:37). Hence, Chapter 160 of the Interim Constitution empowered provincial legislatures to adopt a provisional constitution with the support of two-thirds of its members - so long as the provincial constitution was not 'inconsistent with - (a) a provision of this Constitution, including this Chapter and the Constitutional principles set out in Schedule 4...'.  
 5. Walter Felgate defected to the ANC in late 1997. He was interviewed while still an IFP member, on 4-2-97.
6. Somewhat ironically, the ANC was objecting to a deadlock-breaking mechanism not dissimilar to the tactic of 'sufficient consensus' which it had employed during national constitutional negotiations, and which had similarly annoyed and marginalised the IFP.
7. Speculation of a deal between Rajbansi and the ANC was rife. Some suggested that the ANC would not contest Rajbansi's strongholds in Chatsworth, Durban, in the upcoming local government elections (*KZN Briefing* 1996 [1]; interview with Smith, 23-7-96).
8. We wish to thank John Wright for bringing this point to our attention.
9. In December 1995 one of Zwelithini's brothers, Prince Mbousi Zulu, was

killed, and in March 1996 the residence of one of Zwelithini's wives, Queen Buhle, was attacked. The Queen was injured and one of her daughters, Princess Sibusile, killed (*Weekly Mail & Guardian* 1-5-96). Although the attackers remain at large there is no doubt that Zwelithini holds the IFP responsible for both incidents.

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