Now showing items 5-15 of 15

    • The misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View 

      Beck, Simon (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013)
      Marya Schechtman has argued that contemporary attempts to save Locke’s account of personal identity suffer the same faults that are to be found in Locke, among which is an inability to capture the role our unconscious ...
    • Naturalised modal epistemology and quasirealism 

      Omoge, Michael (South African Journal of Philosophy,, 2021)
      Given quasi-realism, the claim is that any attempt to naturalise modal epistemology would leave out absolute necessity. The reason, according to Simon Blackburn, is that we cannot offer an empirical psychological explanation ...
    • On and beyond artifacts in moral relations: accounting for power and violence in Coeckelbergh’s social relationism 

      Tollon, F; Naidoo, K (Springer, 2021)
      The ubiquity of technology in our lives and its culmination in artifcial intelligence raises questions about its role in our moral considerations. In this paper, we address a moral concern in relation to technological ...
    • Philosophy of education in a new key: Cultivating a living philosophy of education to overcome coloniality and violence in African Universities 

      Waghid, Yusef; Davids, Nuraan; Mathebula, Thokozani; Terblanche, Judith; Higgs, Philip; Shawa, Lester; Manthalu, Chikumbutso Herbert; Waghid, Zayd; Ngwenya, Celiwe; Divala, Joseph; Waghid, Faiq; Peters, Michael A.; Tesar, Marek (Taylor & Francis, 2020)
      In this conversational article, we consider cultivating decoloniality in university education by drawing upon Jacques Ranci ere’s (2010) notion of a living philosophy. Ranci ere’s (2010) living philosophy holds the possibility ...
    • Reconsidering a transplant: A response to Wagner 

      Beck, Simon (Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2016)
      Nils-Frederic Wagner takes issue with my argument that influential critics of “transplant” thought experiments make two cardinal mistakes. He responds that the mistakes I identify are not mistakes at all. The mistakes are ...
    • A social ontology of “maximal” persons 

      Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony (Wiley, 2021)
      In this paper, I address a range of arguments put forward by Kwame Gyekye (1992) and Bernard Matolino (2014) denying Menkiti’s twin propositions that persons differ ontologically from human beings and that human attitudes, ...
    • Technological fictions and personal identity: on Ricoeur, Schechtman and analytic thought experiments 

      Beck, Simon (Taylor & Francis, 2016)
      It is notable when philosophers in one tradition take seriously the work in another and engage with it. This is certainly the case when Paul Ricoeur engages with the thought of Derek Parfit on personal identity. He sees ...
    • This thing called communitarianism: A critical review of Matolino's Personhood in African Philosophy 

      Oyowe, O.A. (Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2015)
      The subject of personal identity has received substantial treatment in contemporary African philosophy. Importantly, the dominant approach to personal identity is communitarian. Bernard Matolino's new book Personhood in ...
    • Thought experiments and personal identity in Africa 

      Beck, Simon; Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony (Cambridge University Press, 2021)
      African perspectives on personhood and personal identity and their relation to those of the West have become far more central in mainstream Western discussion than they once were. Not only are African traditional views with ...
    • Transplant thought-experiments: Two costly mistakes in discounting them 

      Beck, Simon (Taylor & Francis, 2014)
      ‘Transplant’ thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some ...
    • Understanding ourselves better 

      Beck, Simon (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013)
      INTRODUCTION: Marya Schechtman and Grant Gillett acknowledge that my case in ‘The misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View’ (2013) has some merits, but neither is moved to change their position and accept that the ...