
Status quo entrenched and no surprises in the Western Cape

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Abstract

Unlike previous elections in the province, there was an expectation that the Democratic Alliance (DA) would retain control of the City of Cape Town, as well as consolidate in other municipalities in the Western Cape. In the run-up to the 2016 local government election, the ANC, in the Western Cape put on a brave face indicating that it could unseat the DA. However, the 2016 election in the Western Cape saw an entrenchment of the status quo. Indeed, the story of the 2016 Local Government Election in the Western Cape is the story of the DA's ascent and the ANC's decline in the province. The DA consolidated its support base in the City of Cape Town from a comfortable majority of 61 percent, in 2011, securing a two-thirds majority of 68 percent in 2016. In the rest of the Western Cape, the DA also consolidated its support base, winning in most municipalities with an outright majority and taking control of the balance through coalition agreements. The African National Congress (ANC), which had lost control of the city in 2006 when it was forced out of power through a DA-led coalition, saw its fortunes decline even further in 2016. The ANC no longer controls a single municipality in the Western Cape. This article examines electoral dynamics in the Western Cape, which saw the consolidation of DA support in the province.

Introduction

The Western Cape has always been a highly contested province (Africa, 2015). However, in this election, the province was not seen as the main story. In fact, there was such a strong sense that the DA would be the majority party in the province that the City of Cape Town was not included in the series of pre-election polls that were conducted by Ipsos in the run-up to the elections. In the past, political parties have seen the Western Cape as an “open race” and the province, typically, became the centre of vigorous campaign efforts and aggressive appeals to race-based fears in the lead-up to the elections (Africa, 2010). However, in 2016, campaign efforts were muted and less racialised because the DA felt comfortable enough to concentrate its efforts elsewhere in the country. In the end, this strategy bore fruit since the party managed to consolidate its power base in the Western Cape, winning a majority of municipalities, with an outright win, and increasing its hold on the City of Cape Town with a two-thirds majority. Irrespective of whether the changes that have occurred were due to voters switching allegiance or to differential turnout, the outcome has been dramatic.

As in previous elections, there was an increase in the number of political parties contesting in the province. This is possibly due to the fact that the Western Cape was previously seen as an “open race”. In the 2014 election, it was the most competitive province with 26 parties contesting at provincial level. As seen in Table 1 below, there has been a steady increase in the number of parties in every local election. In 2016, there was a high level of contestation again, with a record number of political parties at 77. There was also an increase in the number of candidates who stood for election. In the 2011 elections, there was a total of 7 105 candidates (including party PR, party ward and independent candidates). This number increased to 7 869 in 2016. Several new parties competed for the first time in the Western Cape. Similarly, the Cape metropolitan council had the longest PR ballot paper with 37 parties competing for power (IEC, 2016).

Registration Trends

The number of registered voters in the Western Cape shows a steady increase since the 2000 election. The total of registered voters increased from 1.9 million in 2000 to 2.3 million in 2006 with up to 2.7 million in 2011. By election day, in 2016, there were 3.1 million registered voters in the Western Cape. Likewise, the number of registered voters in the metro increased to 2.0 million. This has been to the advantage of the DA. According to Scholtz (2016), the DA has consistently been able to register a disproportionately high number of new voters in its strong areas, while new registrations have lagged in strong ANC areas. As Scholtz argues, “this is probably due to the DA’s much vaunted voter targeting and turnout operation in Cape Town, which is extremely effective at getting DA voters to the polls on registration weekends and election days” and that “over time, this creates an overall electorate that is much more heavily weighted in favour of the DA”.

Turnout Trends

Since 2000, turnout levels in the Western Cape have been consistently higher than turnout in South Africa. This trend remained consistent in the 2016 elections. On election day, 63.6 percent of voters in the Western Cape and 64.3 percent in the Cape Metro cast their ballot compared to 58.1 percent nationally. Voter turnout in Cape Town rose from 1.1 million in 2011 to 1.3 million in 2016. However, turnout was uneven across municipalities.

TABLE 1: Number of parties that contested the election in the Western Cape (2000-2016)

Election	Number of Parties Contesting PR List	Percentage Increase
2000	20	-
2006	39	49%
2011	62	59%
2016	77	22%

Source: IEC Accredited Observer Briefing Session, 2016

TABLE 2: Registration and turnout in South Africa, the Western Cape and the City of Cape Town

Area	Registered Population	Valid Votes Cast	Percentage Turnout Based on Registered Population
South Africa 2011	23 654 347	13 592 856	57.5
South Africa 2016	26 333 353	15 296 759	58.1
Western Cape 2011	2 706 736	1 738 445	64.2
Western Cape 2016	3 066 649	1 948 892	63.6
City of Cape Town 2011	1 745 853	1 125 845	64.5
City of Cape Town 2016	1 977 690	1 271 923	64.3

Source: IEC, 2016

For example, 75.5 percent of registered voters cast their ballot in Prince Albert compared to 51.7 percent in Witzenberg. Likewise, in the Cape Metro there was significant variability in turnout at the ward level. The DA has benefited from high turnout in areas where it is well-supported, while there has been a decline in turnout in former ANC strongholds.

Cape Metro Results

The DA celebrated an improved performance at all levels. It got more than a two-thirds majority – 68 percent – a notable increase from 61.15 percent in 2011. In absolute numbers, the DA increased its total vote share from 1 357 949 in 2011 to 1 664 514 in 2016, which translates to 306 565 more votes than in the previous local election. Thus, the DA won 154 seats out of 231 available in the metro. Conversely, the number of seats secured by the ANC declined from 73 in 2011 to 57 seats in 2016. In absolute numbers, the total number of valid votes cast for the ANC in the Cape Metro decreased from 731 247 in 2011 to 608 867 in 2016 – amounting to a drop of 122 380 votes.

Municipal Results in the Western Cape

Similarly, ANC support has declined in the Western Cape. From 1 156 352 in 2011, the total number of votes the party gained dropped to 1 004 354 in 2016. This amounted to a drop of 151 998 votes. The ANC received 40.15 percent of the vote in the 2006 elections. This dropped to 34.1 percent in 2011, further dropping to 25 percent in 2016. This amounts to a 25 percentage point drop between 2006 and 2016. At the same time, in absolute numbers, the DA increased its total valid vote share from 1 982 789 in 2011 to 2 425 371 in 2016. The DA secured 442 582 more votes.

The ANC failed to win a majority in a single municipality in the Western Cape – it no longer controls any municipalities in the province. In contrast, the DA won outright majorities in the municipalities of Bergrivier, Breede Valley, Cape Agulhas, Cederberg, Drakenstein, George, Langeberg, Matzikama, Mossel Bay, Oudtshoorn, Overstrand, Saldanha Bay, Stellenbosch, Swartland, Swellendam and Theewaterskloof. The DA, therefore, did not need to enter into coalition partnerships in these councils. This is a continuation of trends that began in the 2011 election, namely the consolidation of the DA's support base, contrasted with the ANC's further decline in the province.

TABLE 3: Cape Metro results 2016

Party Name	Total Valid Votes	Total Party Seats
African Christian Democratic Party	30 285	3
African Independent Congress	14 743	1
African National Congress	608 867	57
Al Jama-ah	16 398	2
Democratic Alliance	1 664 514	154
Economic Freedom Fighters	79 114	7
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania	6 319	1
Patriotic Alliance	4 959	1
United Democratic Movement	6 580	1
Vryheidsfront Plus	10 284	1
Total	2 491 941	231

Source: IEC, 2016

There were eight municipalities that required coalitions. In these municipalities, a number of small, local parties held the balance of power. These parties were Witzenberg Aksie (WA), the Independent Civic Organisation of South Africa (ICOSA), the Active United Front (AUF), the Knysna Unity Congress (KUC), the Karoo Gemeenskap Party (KGP), the Karoo Ontwikkelings Party (KOP), and the Karoo Democratic Force (KDF) (Berkowitz, 2016b).

For the first time, the ANC lost Beaufort West, an area regarded as its stronghold under the controversial mayor, Truman Prince. The ANC also lost four other councils it had controlled

since 2011: Cederberg, Matzikama, Cape Agulhas and the Central Karoo District Municipality. The DA concluded deals with the KGP, the KDF and the KOP to control the municipal councils in Prince Albert, Laingsburg and Beaufort West, as well as the greater Central Karoo District Municipality. Additionally, the DA concluded an agreement with an independent candidate to control Knysna and entered into a coalition with the Freedom Front Plus to rule Hessequa (Phakathi, 2016). In the Kannaland Municipality, which has a long history of controversial and collapsing coalitions, DA and ANC councillors worked together to vote out the Independent Civic Organisation of South Africa (ICOSA) which won almost 50 percent of the vote (Evans, 2016a).

Wards Results in the Western Cape

The ANC's poor performance at the provincial and metro levels reflects a similarly dismal showing at ward level. The DA won 81 of the 116 wards, while the ANC won only 35 wards (Berkowitz, 2016b). According to Berkowitz, a direct comparison between the 2011 and 2016 results, in former ANC strongholds in the Western Cape, is difficult due to the changing of ward boundaries.

TABLE 4: Composition of councils in the Western Cape

Municipality	Winner 2011	Winner 2016
Beaufort West	ANC majority	DA-KDF coalition
Bergrivier	DA majority	DA majority
Breede Valley	DA majority	DA majority
Bitou	DA-COPE coalition	ANC-AUF coalition
Cape Agulhas	ANC-Ind candidate coalition	DA majority
Cederberg	ANC majority	DA majority
Drakenstein	DA majority	DA majority
George	DA majority	DA majority
Hessequa	DA-COPE coalition	DA-FF+ coalition
Kannaland	ICOSA-ANC coalition	DA-ANC agreement
Knysna	DA majority	DA-Independent candidate coalition
Laingsburg	DA-COPE coalition	DA-KOP coalition
Langeberg	DA-COPE coalition	DA majority
Matzikama	ANC-led coalition	DA majority
Mossel Bay	DA majority	DA majority
Oudtshoorn	DA-COPE coalition	DA majority
Overstrand	DA majority	DA majority
Prince Albert	KGP-ANC coalition	DA-KGP coalition
Saldanha Bay	DA majority	DA majority
Stellenbosch	DA majority	DA majority
Swartland	DA majority	DA majority
Swellendam	DA-ACDP coalition	DA majority
Theewaterskloof	DA majority	DA majority
Witzenberg	DA-COPE-Ind-DCP coalition	DA-COPE coalition

Sources: IEC, 2016 and Berkowitz, 2016b

TABLE 5: Comparison of turnout and results in Khayelitsha and Langa

Area	Wards	Registered Voters	Votes Cast	Turnout	DA Votes	DA % Share	ANC Votes	ANC % Share
Khayelitsha 2011	16, 87, 89-98, 108	200 968	148 108	74%	7 374	5%	109 399	74%
Khayelitsha 2016	16, 87, 89-98, 114	209 191	116 691	56%	15 288	13%	83 714	72%
Langa 2011	51 and 52	27 359	15 632	57%	400	3%	12 774	82%
Langa 2016	51 and 52	28 711	15 360	53%	931	6%	10 700	70%

Source: Berkowitz, 2016b

Since a comparison is possible in Khayelitsha and Langa, Berkowitz's analysis of turnout shows ANC losses and DA gains in those areas. As Kimmie (2012:129) indicates, "a party's electoral performance depends both on turnout and, specifically, on the level of turnout among party supporters, and the electoral choices of those who choose to vote". Berkowitz illustrates, in his analysis, that the decline in turnout in Khayelitsha and Langa was pronounced. In Khayelitsha, turnout fell from 74 percent in 2011 to 56 percent in 2016. The DA increased its share of the vote from 5 percent to 13 percent in Khayelitsha and from 3 percent to 6 percent in Langa. The ANC lost a significant share of the vote in Langa and also went from over 109 000 votes in Khayelitsha to under 84 000 votes. Berkowitz argues that the ANC was hit by a combination of lower turnout, from its core base, and increased competition by the DA and other parties – in particular, the EFF. Although the EFF didn't win more than 15 percent in any ward, it did best in ANC strongholds, and smaller parties such as the PAC and the African Independent Congress (AIC) also hurt the ANC with gains in and around Khayelitsha.

The DA's Ascent in the Western Cape

The DA has steadily been increasing its support base in the Western Cape. Since 1999, the predecessor of the DA, the Democratic Party (DP), adopted an aggressive strategy. Under the leadership of Tony Leon, it built this strategy around "robust opposition", with a focus on government failings, incompetence, corruption and a lack of urgency (Schrire, 2001:142). At this point, the DP obtained 12 percent in the Western Cape. In 2004, the DA's support base in the Western Cape climbed to 27.1 percent. In 2006, the DA attained plurality (42.7 percent of the vote and 90 out of 210 council seats) in the City of Cape Town. It managed to gain power in the metro through a "fragile six-party coalition, and then a more secure one later when joined by the Independent Democrats" (Jolobe, 2009:136). Helen Zille took over as the mayor of the City of Cape Town. This set the scene for the DA to win outright control of the Western Cape at provincial level in the 2009 elections. The DA ran its "One Nation One Future" campaign under the leadership of Helen Zille. Its message could be summarised by the slogans of two campaign posters: "Vote to win" and "Stop Zuma" (Daniel & Southall, 2009:237). Messages about the challenges to democracy posed by a Zuma-led government and ANC dominance resonated with voters in the Western Cape and the DA received an outright majority, securing 51.4 percent of the provincial vote in the 2009 provincial elections.

The DA consolidated its Western Cape support base in the 2011 local government elections. The party received a boost when the Independent Democrats (ID), formed by Patricia de Lille of the Pan African Congress (PAC) was absorbed by the DA prior to the 2011 local elections. Furthermore, Patricia de Lille was invited into the Western Cape DA provincial cabinet and was later elected as the DA mayor for the City of Cape Town (Jolobe, 2014:50). In the run-up to the 2014 elections, DA parliamentary leader, Lindiwe Mazibuko, and the DA's Gauteng premier candidate, Musi Maimane, managed to achieve national profiles that enhanced the credibility of the DA. The Democratic Alliance emerged from the elections significantly strengthened. The party increased its majority in the Western Cape, winning 59 percent of the vote in the provincial legislature in 2014.

The growth of the DA has resulted in several benefits for the party. It has become more institutionalised. Mainwaring (1998), in his work on institutionalisations, contends that “it is a sign of greater system institutionalization if parties have fi established structures; if they are territorially comprehensive; if they are well organized; if they have clearly defined internal structures and procedures; and if they have resources of their own”. Next to the ANC, the DA has demonstrated significant growth, which extends beyond the support that it receives at the polls. According to Mainwaring, well-institutionalised parties “are not subordinated to the interests of a few ambitious leaders, but possess an independent status and value of their own”. Whether or not the DA is “subordinated to the interests of a few ambitious leaders” is beyond the scope of this article. However, as it grew, the party has been able to extend its structures and, therefore, its organisational capacity. This enables the party to exert more influence as well as generate media interest. In fact, in 2015, the party was able to have its leadership election broadcast live on national television.


Additional criteria identified by Mainwaring are active mass memberships, sizable and professionalised staff, as well as strong loyalty on the part of elected representatives. The DA may need to work on developing an active mass membership. However, its professional and well-choreographed election campaigns are indicative of a professionalised staff. There is an expansion of prominent party leaders. The DA benefitted significantly from the absorption of Patricia de Lille and the ID into the DA. Patricia de Lille had a fairly substantial support base in the Western Cape and, despite the critiques that have been levelled against her, is seen as a widely credible leader. The election of Musi Maimane as Helen Zille’s successor has been seen as a significant asset for the Democratic Alliance. Certainly, the DA appears to be moving to a higher level of institutionalisation.

The DA’s main challenge has been to shed an image of being a party concerned with “elite interests”. The DA has been acutely aware of this challenge and has made a concerted effort to stress that it is a party of inclusion. While the view that the DA has perpetuated inequality and apartheid-era spatial planning in the province persists, it did little to dampen the DA’s stamina in portraying itself as a competent alternative to the ANC.

Of significance is the growing sense of loyalty to the DA among voters in the Western Cape. Data from Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 2008, 2011 and 2015 shows a dramatic swing in party identification away from the ANC and towards the DA.

The data in Figure 1 on the following page shows an increase in party identification among voters in the Western Cape. Levels of party identification increased from 48 percent in 2008 to 61 percent in 2011 and 79 percent in 2015.

FIGURE 1: Party identification in the Western Cape (2008, 2011 and 2015)



Sources: Afrobarometer, 2008; Afrobarometer, 2011; Afrobarometer, 2015

In 2008, of the 48 percent who indicated that they felt close to a political party, 27 percent said they felt close to the ANC and 34 percent said they felt close to the DA. At that stage, 22 percent declined to indicate which party they felt close to. In 2011, of the 61 percent who indicated that they felt close to a political party, 49 percent said they felt close to the ANC and 45 percent said they felt close to the DA. By 2015, 79 percent of respondents in the Western Cape said that they felt close to a political party. Of this proportion, 37.6 percent said they felt close to the ANC, while 55.3 percent said they felt close to the DA. This indicates that the DA is starting to develop firm links in society in the Western Cape. This represents quite a dramatic swing in party identification. Once a voter indicates identification with a political party, they tend to review political events and campaign information through the lens of that identification. Campbell, Converse and Miller (1960:121-122) define party identification as “a psychological identification which can persist without formal membership and even without a consistent record of party support”. They argue that “party identification has a wide range of intensities in each partisan direction and that national politics are deeply affected by the individual’s enduring party attachments”. According to Campbell *et al.* (1960:133), “identification with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favourable to his partisan orientation”.

While Afrobarometer data shows the swing in support from the ANC to the DA over a period of time, Moses (2014) conducted a qualitative study to explore the behavioural motivations of

voters who switched from the ACDP and COPE to the DA. She found that the primary motivation for the movement away from these parties was leadership and the party's image. The respondents interviewed were drawn to what they saw as the DA's strong leadership orientation. To these voters, the DA's leadership and governing track record in the City of Cape Town created hope and inspiration. According to Moses, negative perceptions about the leadership of the ACDP and COPE were linked to the poor presence and visibility of the parties during the 2011 election. Participants felt that party leaders, candidates and campaigners should have been more visible in their communities. They indicated that positive engagement with the DA motivated them to change their vote to the DA in the 2011 election. The formation of COPE, in all likelihood, helped facilitate the movement of voters from the ANC to the DA, since those voters who abandoned the ANC to vote for COPE did not return to the ANC.

The DA's Campaign

High visibility and effective campaigning remain important to South African voters. What makes for a good campaign? According to Africa (2009:20), "campaign messages are effective when the party weaves its messages together into a well-blended and internally consistent theme congruent with previous campaigns using comparative messages". Additionally, campaign messages should be conveyed as widely as possible and through accessible and credible mechanisms. The DA fares well on all of these criteria. The DA used multiple channels to communicate its campaign messages and there was no significant departure from previous campaigns.

The DA's steady growth would have enabled more personalised campaigning in 2016. The DA ran a highly visible national campaign under the banner "Change that moves South Africa forward again" (DA, 2016). The party ran a series of television and radio advertisements. Television advertisements were also loaded on to YouTube. Their campaigning methods covered the full spectrum. This included political rallies, door-to-door volunteer work, posters and billboards. Rallies were held in Nelson Mandela Bay, Tshwane and Dobsonville Stadium in Soweto. This was in line with its strategy to win Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane while retaining Cape Town and reducing the ANC's majority to below 50 percent in Johannesburg. Even though the DA chose to focus on the more contested metros in the Eastern Cape and Gauteng, it received significant media coverage of rallies and door-to-door events. The DA also made extensive use of SMSs and phone calls as well as social media platforms through Facebook and Twitter. DA posters urged voters to "honour Madiba's dream". Importantly, there has been congruence in the DA's campaigns. As in previous elections, the DA urged voters to "Vote for Change". The DA promised to: create more opportunities and jobs, make local government responsive, provide better service delivery, stop corruption and make communities safer. The DA message argued that its core values are freedom, fairness and opportunity.

Congruent with previous campaigns, much of the DA's strategy was focused on highlighting the shortfalls of the ANC while, simultaneously, highlighting the party's achievements in the Western Cape. In fact, the DA went one step further by focusing its campaign messages

on how the ANC had failed to fulfil former President Nelson Mandela's legacy. When Maimane addressed DA supporters at Dobsonville Stadium on 30 July 2016, he said they shouldn't worry because the DA was going to do it for Madiba (eNCA, 2016a). He made the following key points at its final rally.

- The ANC has turned its back on everything Nelson Mandela fought for.
- Under President Jacob Zuma, Chris Hani's fears (liberators would emerge as elitists) have come true.
- The time has come for a peaceful revolution in our country.
- Where the DA governs, we have the lowest unemployment in South Africa.
- A vote is not a tattoo that stays with you forever.

Not only did the DA appeal to Nelson Mandela's legacy, it brazenly flighted an advert, which used excerpts of Nelson Mandela's recordings, calling for peace and justice. This caused quite an outcry, with the Mandela family releasing a statement accusing the DA of abusing the late statesman's name (Eyewitness News, 2016b).

As in previous elections, the DA has been able to use its incumbency in the City of Cape Town and in provincial government to its advantage. The DA continued using comparative messages highlighting its record of governance in the province and the City of Cape Town, while criticising the ANC nationally and in other provinces. The Western Cape has been used as a model for strategy to be used in other provinces, namely to gain control of the metro and use this as a base to take control of the province. The story of the Western Cape was used as the DA's campaign theme. The DA's strengthened position is a combination of greater institutionalisation, astute campaigning and voter frustration with the ANC.

National Trends and Frustration with the ANC

The story of the DA's ascent in the Western Cape cannot be separated from the national context, which has seen the ANC face a myriad of complex challenges and fractious internal battles. The view that the ANC would be in for a tough election in the Western Cape clearly had merit. National events and struggles in the ANC, which has seen voters in the Western Cape turn to the DA, have not abated. The crises in the ANC, at national and provincial level, certainly helped the DA and continued to create a situation that adds credibility to the DA's messages. In addition to the Western Cape ANC's own problems, any headway that it could make has been overshadowed by the whirlwind of events occurring at national level.

By their own admission, the ANC has been grappling with factionalism and division within its ranks. Most notably, there has been sustained controversy and a significant public uproar about the Public Protector's findings regarding the inappropriate use of funds to upgrade

President Jacob Zuma's private residence in Nkandla. On 31 March 2016, the Constitutional Court ruled that Zuma had failed to uphold the Constitution when he ignored the Public Protector's recommendation to repay a portion of the funds used to upgrade his private residence in KwaZulu-Natal (*News24*, 2016). President Zuma issued a public apology for the "frustration and confusion" around Nkandla. In line with the Constitutional Court judgement, the National Treasury determined that President Zuma needed to pay R7.8 million back to the state (*Mail & Guardian*, 2016a).

On 29 April 2016, the High Court in Pretoria ruled that the former head of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), Mokotedi Mpshe's 2009 decision to drop corruption charges against Zuma was irrational (*Mail & Guardian*, 2016b). This matter stems back more than a decade to the protracted and well-publicised corruption trial of Schabir Shaik. In 2005 Shaik was found guilty and the basis of the conviction hinged on payments he had made to the then Deputy President, Jacob Zuma.

Another disastrous series of events that damaged public perceptions of the ANC and President Zuma occurred in December 2015, when he removed the Finance Minister, Nhlanhla Nene, from his position and replaced him with David van Rooyen, provoking widespread criticism. Given the negative reaction of the markets, President Zuma was forced to reassign the newly appointed Finance Minister to another position, four days later, and appoint Pravin Gordhan as the new Finance Minister (*Mail & Guardian*, 2015a). In a press statement, the deputy Finance Minister, Mcebisi Jonas, publicly stated that members of the Gupta family offered him the position of Minister of Finance to replace the then Minister, Nene (*Mail & Guardian*, 2016c). This was one of a series of damning revelations by ANC officials regarding the influence of the Gupta family.

The controversies around President Zuma have caused significant damage to the ANC, causing severe divisions within the organisation. Notably, senior ANC members and past party leaders have also publicly criticised Zuma and have supported calls by civil society organisations and the opposition for his resignation. President Jacob Zuma remains at the centre of many of the challenges facing the ANC. Despite this, the ANC chose to retain President Zuma as the face of the ANC in their 2016 local government election campaign.

In April 2016, there were significant protests relating to disputes about municipal boundaries following a failed court bid to compel the Municipal Demarcations Board to reverse its decision to merge certain municipalities. Scores of schools were either vandalised or completely torched during the protests (eNCA, 2016b). Shortly before the 2016 elections, violent protests erupted in Gauteng, following the announcement of Thoko Didiza as the ANC's mayoral candidate for the party in Tshwane. ANC members took to the streets to express dissatisfaction with the nomination, burning buses and looting malls as well as other businesses (Nhlebelo, 2016).

A more extreme manifestation of factionalism and division was the killing of several candidates reportedly related to political rivalry in the ANC, which occurred in the lead-up

to the local government elections. A task team was set up to investigate the rise in the number of political killings, which occurred primarily in KwaZulu-Natal. Indeed, Police Minister, Nathi Nhleko, noted “with serious concern, the incidents of killings, particularly where political figures are victims or where the killings are being linked to the upcoming local government elections” (Gqirana, 2016b).

Already, in the run-up to the 2014 elections, the ANC had increased condemnation from its own supporters and, indeed, former party leaders. So much so that Ronnie Kasrils, among others, embarked on the *Sidikiwe, Vukane*, “We are fed up” campaign, to either spoil one’s vote or vote for a small party. The party also faced criticism from the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) for the rollout of highway tolling fees in Gauteng, as well as sections of the National Development Plan. The National Union of Metalworkers of SA (NUMSA) strongly criticised the ANC and President Zuma, and decided not to endorse the ruling party in the 2014 election (Africa, 2014). This followed the significant criticism it faced after events such as the televised death of community activist, Andries Tatane, in 2011 at the hands of police in the Free State, and the lethal use of force where 34 Lonmin mineworkers were shot and killed by police officers, in August 2012, in what has become known as the “Marikana Massacre”. At that time, civil society organisation, Right2Know, also led a highly visible campaign against the so-called “secrecy bill”, while rights organisation, Section 27, highlighted inefficiencies in the public school system, particularly around the non-delivery of textbooks in Limpopo (Africa, 2014).

Of course, one of the most deft moments was the ANC elective conference in Polokwane in 2007. As Booysen (2009:90) indicates, the ANC “entered a spiral of contestation between Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki, centring on issues of succession and incumbency” and culminating in the removal of Thabo Mbeki as president of the country. In September 2008, just more than six months before the 2009 general elections, Judge Chris Nicholson delivered a high court judgement that inferred that Mbeki and senior members of his Cabinet had interfered with the work of the NPA in regard to the decision to prosecute Zuma (Jolobe, 2009:139). The judgement provided the basis for a vote of no confidence in Mbeki. Following Mbeki’s televised resignation, ANC deputy president Kgalema Motlanthe became South Africa’s acting president. These events also led to the resignation of several ANC members, and the Congress of the People was formed under the leadership of Mosiuoa Lekota and Mbhazima Shilowa. As Butler (2009:69) points out, the unprecedented defeat of an incumbent ANC president was followed by a wave of instability during which officeholders were “recalled” and perceived Mbeki-loyalists purged.

While these events occurred at national level, there is no doubt that they influenced the perceptions of voters in the Western Cape. These national political developments had a very damaging effect on perceptions of President Zuma and the ANC among voters in the Western Cape. An Afrobarometer survey conducted in late 2008 revealed that only 13 percent of respondents in the province said they trusted Zuma “always” or “most of the time” (Africa, 2010:19). By 2016, these sentiments had hardened with a substantial majority of respondents, in a nationally representative survey conducted by research house Citizen Surveys,

indicating that President Zuma should resign both as the leader of the ANC and as the president of South Africa. According to the surveys, the sentiment was strongest in the Western Cape with over three-quarters of respondents saying that President Zuma should step down, both as president of South Africa and as leader of the ruling party. Indeed, there has been a signifi critique against the national leadership of the ANC for not taking public sentiment against President Zuma to heart.

The latest Afrobarometer survey also revealed a sharp decline in public distrust of President Zuma. (Lekalake, 2015). Given these deep-seated negative perceptions of President Zuma and the ANC, it is hard to see how any campaigning would persuade South Africans to vote for them. According to Newman and Perloff (2004:27), “persuasion experts unquestionably agree that the source of a message can significantly influence political attitudes”. Indeed, the literature reveals that, in most situations, people accept or reject persuasive messages based on their evaluation of the credibility of the source of the message (Milburn, 1991; Lupia & McCubbins, 2000; Iyengar & Valentino, 2000; Popkin & Dimock, 2000; Newman & Perloff, 2004). Lupia and McCubbins (2000:48) assert that “without trust there is no persuasion ...”.

Perceptions of campaign leaders are also important because, in many instances, campaigns centre on the style and personalities of party leaders. Character traits (such as competence, warmth, activity, strength, integrity, honesty and empathy) of leaders are considered important to voters’ political attitudes (Kinder, 1986; Masters & Sullivan, 1993).

TABLE 6: Perceptions of whether Jacob Zuma should step down as ANC leader

% Who Agree/Strongly Agree			
Province	April 16	May 16	June 16
Eastern Cape	66.5%	56.9%	58.4%
Free State	43.3%	56.8%	48.3%
Gauteng	66.1%	53.8%	57.0%
KwaZulu-Natal	48.4%	33.9%	31.6%
Limpopo	69.5%	54.2%	53.4%
Mpumalanga	53.3%	67.8%	59.9%
Northern Cape	81.4%	66.6%	79.6%
North West	71.4%	72.1%	60.4%
Western Cape	69.8%	84.7%	72.7%

Source: South African Citizens Survey (Total Sample for April, May and June: 3900)

TABLE 7: Perceptions of whether Jacob Zuma should resign as president of South Africa

% Who Agree/Strongly Agree			
Province	April 16	May 16	June 16
Eastern Cape	59.0%	56.5%	52.7%
Free State	53.8%	53.8%	48.2%
Gauteng	69.4%	57.1%	54.1%
KwaZulu-Natal	47.3%	40.3%	32.1%
Limpopo	68.1%	50.8%	57.1%
Mpumalanga	54.8%	68.0%	61.6%
Northern Cape	82.3%	71.8%	77.1%
North West	66.5%	70.5%	60.2%
Western Cape	71.3%	77.3%	75.4%

Source: South African Citizens Survey (Total Sample for April, May and June: 3900)

The logical extension of these arguments is that voters will be less likely to pay attention to campaign messages coming from a party or leader they see as being incompetent or untrustworthy. Negative perceptions of parties and leaders can lead voters to question the content of campaign messages, rendering the most compelling campaign strategies ineffective. Thus, campaigning is of little worth if the recipients of the campaign see the messages as “tainted” by the characteristics of the source of the message. Messages from an untrustworthy source will either be interpreted through a negative mental schema or simply ignored. On the other hand, voters are more likely to engage with campaign messages if they trust the political party and/or leader issuing the message.

The ANC in the Western Cape

Even if the ANC in the Western Cape had well-functioning structures and ran an effective campaign, it would, in all likelihood, still have been overshadowed by national events and the negative perceptions emanating from those events. In any event, ANC structures in the Western Cape have also been beset with problems. The party’s leadership in the Western Cape seems to have been operating in crisis mode for several years now. Leading up to the 2016 local elections, the problems in the Western Cape were so severe that the party’s national structures had to intervene and place the provincial structures under administration (Mtyala, 2016).

In November 2015, the party’s provincial secretary, Faiz Jacobs, was accused of assaulting a staff researcher. The ANC’s provincial executive committee placed Jacobs on “precautionary leave” following the incident. The matter was also referred to the ANC’s

internal disciplinary committee, which found Jacobs guilty of assault. Jacobs received an 18-month suspension, which was suspended for three years on condition that he does not commit a similar offence (Meyer, 2016). The Western Cape chairperson of the ANC, Marius Fransman, has also been mired in controversy. He was re-elected, unopposed, as provincial chairperson after he threatened to pull out during nominations, because of internal power struggles (*Daily Maverick*, 2016). In January 2016, Fransman was accused of sexual harassment. Fransman denied the sexual harassment charge and claimed he was a victim of an “organised and engineered” campaign to discredit him by rival factions in the Western Cape ANC (*Daily Maverick*, 2016). Following the incident, Fransman was asked to step aside while the police and the ANC’s integrity committee investigate the sexual harassment allegations made against him. The ANC’s national executive committee was forced to intervene in the party’s Western Cape leadership by appointing caretakers to fill the breach left by provincial chairperson, Marius Fransman, and secretary, Faiz Jacobs.

While ANC heavyweights Jacob Zuma, Cyril Ramaphosa, Jessie Duarte and Gwede Mantashe did campaign in the Western Cape, most campaigning was done by Cape Town ANC mayoral candidate, Xolani Sotashe. In June 2016, Fransman made an unexpected appearance in Philippi, Khayelitsha and Delft (in Cape Town), for the ANC’s door-to-door campaign, alongside President Jacob Zuma and other ANC leaders (Gqirana, 2016). This caused confusion and tension within the party structures. It was reported that Nomvula Mokonyane, a member of the party’s national executive committee (NEC) who accompanied Zuma and Fransman on the campaign trail, told the media that Fransman had been reinstated. However, Jacobs informed the media that the provincial leadership of the party had received no formal news of Fransman’s reappointment as provincial leader (*Gerber*, 2016). ANC Secretary General, Gwede Mantashe, also insisted that Fransman had not been reinstated and that Mokonyane had been under pressure when she made the announcement. Fransman, on the other hand, maintained that he had a meeting with the provincial officials, before the campaign trail (in Cape Town), where they publically welcomed him back (*Mail & Guardian*, 2016).

Consequently, the internal battles led to the cancellation of the ANC’s Western Cape Manifesto launch at the last minute. ANC Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa, was meant to launch the manifesto in Khayelitsha, Cape Town in June. Jabu Mfusi, Western Cape’s provincial executive committee spokesperson, said that the cancellation was a result of “internal protesting from dissatisfied members within the party” (Pillay, 2016). Earlier this year, the ANC, in the province, also had to cancel its provincial 8 January celebrations in Grabouw, where Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa was due to share a microphone with leader Marius Fransman. The ANC also faced problems in Beaufort West with its mayor, Truman Prince, at the centre of a series of controversies including assault charges and allegations of influencing tender processes (Eyewitness News, 2016a). ANC Secretary General, Gwede Mantashe, called for an investigation. The ANC’s disciplinary committee of the Central Karoo region sentenced Prince to a R10 000 fine and a public apology for bringing the party’s name into disrepute (Gqirana, 2016a).

As in previous elections, the ANC in the Western Cape experienced challenges in its candidate selection process. In fact, the Western Cape ANC suspended a member for allegedly instigating violent protests following the change of councillor candidates without residents' consent (Evans, 2016b). The 2014 list process also presented significant challenges to the ANC in the Western Cape. The final list included Mbulelo Ncedana and Moegamat Majiet – both of whom left the ANC to join COPE when it was formed (Hartley, 2014). Dissatisfaction with the list process was already evident in 2011 when ANC offices in Cape Town were stormed as a result of anger with the list process (Independent Online, 2013). In fact, the former ANC Deputy President, Kgalema Motlanthe, admitted that internal upheavals in the ANC caused the party to lose 40 wards in the Western Cape (Mtyala, 2011). The fallout from the 2011 elections continued well after the elections were concluded. An internal ANC task team, investigating allegations of irregularities in the list process, looked at 10 wards in Cape Town and three in the Overberg, and found that the processes leading to the nominations of Mzwakhe Nqavashe from ward 40 and Coetzee Ntotoviyane from ward 42, both in Gugulethu, had been flawed, and recommended that the party begin the processes afresh (Coetzee, 2014).

In another incident, Western Cape ANC provincial chairperson Marius Fransman had to be rescued, by his bodyguards, from an attack in Oudtshoorn following a meeting to replace the town's mayor, Gordon April (Barnes, 2013).

The events outlined above did not spring from nowhere. Even before the formation of COPE in 2008, there were reports about the internal battles between factions aligned to former premier, Ebrahim Rasool, and the then provincial secretary, Mcebisi Skwatsha (*News24*, 2005). Months after former president Mbeki was recalled as president of the country, Rasool was told to resign as premier and was replaced by the then fi MEC, Lynne Brown (Makinana & Williams, 2008). It is worth remembering that in 1999 and 2004, the ANC ran largely positive campaigns. In 2004, it focused on celebrating ten years of democracy by emphasising its achievements, acknowledging its shortcomings and drawing attention to its strength, experience and commitment. The ANC won 45.3 percent of the vote in 2004 and took control of the provincial government in the Western Cape under the premiership of Ebrahim Rasool. After the DA seized control from the ANC in the 2009 elections, governance in the province assumed a highly conflictual nature. Relations between the DA and the ANC in the Western Cape reached new levels of dysfunctional competitiveness. Besides policy differences and the usual vigour with which incumbent and opposition parties engage each other, a toxic level of acrimony and hostility has permeated exchanges between the two parties. This has cast the ANC in the Western Cape into a non-flattering role. Once it was ousted from power, the party became far more confrontational in its approach.

Entrenchment of the Status Quo in the Western Cape

Given the events outlined above, the entrenchment of the status quo in the Western Cape and the consolidation of DA support in the province should not be seen as a surprise. In addition to the Western Cape ANC's own problems, any headway that it could make has been overshadowed by the whirlwind of events occurring at national level. Even if the

ANC in the Western Cape had well-functioning structures and ran an effective campaign, it would, in all likelihood, still have been overshadowed by national events and the negative perceptions emanating from those events. At the same time, the DA has consistently been able to register a disproportionately high number of new voters in its strong areas and the DA has benefitted from high turnout in areas where it is well-supported, while there has been a decline in turnout in former ANC strongholds. Of significance is the growing sense of loyalty to the DA among voters in the Western Cape. The DA's strengthened position is a combination of greater institutionalisation, astute campaigning and frustration with the ANC.

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