Now showing items 1-4 of 4
Naturalised modal epistemology and quasirealism
(South African Journal of Philosophy,, 2021)
Given quasi-realism, the claim is that any attempt to naturalise modal epistemology would leave out absolute necessity. The reason, according to Simon Blackburn, is that we cannot offer an empirical psychological explanation ...
A social ontology of “maximal” persons
In this paper, I address a range of arguments put forward by Kwame Gyekye (1992) and Bernard Matolino (2014) denying Menkiti’s twin propositions that persons differ ontologically from human beings and that human attitudes, ...
Thought experiments and personal identity in Africa
(Cambridge University Press, 2021)
African perspectives on personhood and personal identity and their relation to those of the West have become far more central in mainstream Western discussion than they once were. Not only are African traditional views with ...
On and beyond artifacts in moral relations: accounting for power and violence in Coeckelbergh’s social relationism
The ubiquity of technology in our lives and its culmination in artifcial intelligence raises questions about its role in our moral considerations. In this paper, we address a moral concern in relation to technological ...