Now showing items 1-13 of 13

    • Am I my brother’s keeper? on personal identity and responsibility 

      Beck, Simon (Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2013)
      The psychological continuity theory of personal identity has recently been accused of not meeting what is claimed to be a fundamental requirement on theories of identity - to explain personal moral responsibility. Although ...
    • The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction: my two sense(s) 

      Lerm, Jessica (Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2013)
      The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is very well established and widely employed in the metaethical literature. However, I argue that there are actually two different senses of the distinction at large: the ...
    • The misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View 

      Beck, Simon (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013)
      Marya Schechtman has argued that contemporary attempts to save Locke’s account of personal identity suffer the same faults that are to be found in Locke, among which is an inability to capture the role our unconscious ...
    • Understanding ourselves better 

      Beck, Simon (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013)
      INTRODUCTION: Marya Schechtman and Grant Gillett acknowledge that my case in ‘The misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View’ (2013) has some merits, but neither is moved to change their position and accept that the ...
    • Transplant thought-experiments: Two costly mistakes in discounting them 

      Beck, Simon (Taylor & Francis, 2014)
      ‘Transplant’ thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some ...
    • This thing called communitarianism: A critical review of Matolino's Personhood in African Philosophy 

      Oyowe, O.A. (Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2015)
      The subject of personal identity has received substantial treatment in contemporary African philosophy. Importantly, the dominant approach to personal identity is communitarian. Bernard Matolino's new book Personhood in ...
    • The extreme claim, psychological continuity and the person life view 

      Beck, Simon (Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2015)
      Marya Schechtman has raised a series of worries for the Psychological Continuity Theory of personal identity (PCT) stemming from what Derek Parfit called the 'Extreme Claim'. This is roughly the claim that theories like ...
    • Reconsidering a transplant: A response to Wagner 

      Beck, Simon (Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, 2016)
      Nils-Frederic Wagner takes issue with my argument that influential critics of “transplant” thought experiments make two cardinal mistakes. He responds that the mistakes I identify are not mistakes at all. The mistakes are ...
    • Technological fictions and personal identity: on Ricoeur, Schechtman and analytic thought experiments 

      Beck, Simon (Taylor & Francis, 2016)
      It is notable when philosophers in one tradition take seriously the work in another and engage with it. This is certainly the case when Paul Ricoeur engages with the thought of Derek Parfit on personal identity. He sees ...
    • Philosophy of education in a new key: Cultivating a living philosophy of education to overcome coloniality and violence in African Universities 

      Waghid, Yusef; Davids, Nuraan; Mathebula, Thokozani; Terblanche, Judith; Higgs, Philip; Shawa, Lester; Manthalu, Chikumbutso Herbert; Waghid, Zayd; Ngwenya, Celiwe; Divala, Joseph; Waghid, Faiq; Peters, Michael A.; Tesar, Marek (Taylor & Francis, 2020)
      In this conversational article, we consider cultivating decoloniality in university education by drawing upon Jacques Ranci ere’s (2010) notion of a living philosophy. Ranci ere’s (2010) living philosophy holds the possibility ...
    • Naturalised modal epistemology and quasirealism 

      Omoge, Michael (South African Journal of Philosophy,, 2021)
      Given quasi-realism, the claim is that any attempt to naturalise modal epistemology would leave out absolute necessity. The reason, according to Simon Blackburn, is that we cannot offer an empirical psychological explanation ...
    • A social ontology of “maximal” persons 

      Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony (Wiley, 2021)
      In this paper, I address a range of arguments put forward by Kwame Gyekye (1992) and Bernard Matolino (2014) denying Menkiti’s twin propositions that persons differ ontologically from human beings and that human attitudes, ...
    • Thought experiments and personal identity in Africa 

      Beck, Simon; Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony (Cambridge University Press, 2021)
      African perspectives on personhood and personal identity and their relation to those of the West have become far more central in mainstream Western discussion than they once were. Not only are African traditional views with ...