Browsing by Subject "The other"
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De Ville, Jacques (University of Windsor, 2007)[more][less]
Abstract: Drucilla Cornell’s book The Philosophy of the Limit has for a long time been an important reference point in attempting to understand the relation between deconstruction and law. This article examines some of the themes discussed by Cornell in this influential book. The article specifically evaluates the translation of Derrida’s thinking into law as argued for by Cornell and concludes from this reading that Cornell to some extent misrepresents and also unnecessarily “tames” Derrida’s thinking. Instead of leading to the radical transformation of law and society, Cornell’s book gives support to an understanding of the relation between law and justice that is unlikely to have this effect. The article expounds a different reading of deconstruction based on a number of Derridean texts and argues that Derrida’s thinking poses a more radical challenge to law than that presented by Cornell. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10566/383 Files in this item: 1
DeVillleDerridaLevinasCornell2007.pdf (1.828Mb) -
De Ville, Jacques (Springer, 2009)[more][less]
Abstract: A book review of 'Derrida and Legal Philosophy' edited by Peter Goodrich, Florian Hoffmann, Michel Rosenfeld, Cornelia Vismann, published by Palgrave Macmillan (Basingstoke, Hampshire/New York), 2008, ISBN-13: 978-0-230-57361-1. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10566/289 Files in this item: 1
DeVilleDerridaLegalScholarship2009.pdf (506.1Kb) -
De Ville, Jacques (Griffith University, Griffith Law School, Socio-Legal Research Centre, 2007)[more][less]
Abstract: In this article, Desmond Manderson’s book, Proximity, Levinas, and the Soul of Law (2006) is analysed specifically with reference to the accuracy with which it translates Derrida’s thinking into law. Manderson, in a number of instances, invokes Derrida’s thinking as a ‘corrective’ to that of Levinas. The author shows that this invocation by Manderson of Derrida’s texts is selective and does not take account of Derrida’s broader ‘philosophical’ approach. The author points to the differences between, but also the correspondence in the thinking of Levinas and Derrida. He contends that being true to Derrida’s thinking requires that proximity be viewed not as simply making law responsive as proposed by Manderson, but as having a paradoxical structure. The latter would give expression to the distinction that Derrida draws between the conditional and the unconditional. Only if proximity is viewed in this manner will judges be faced with a true responsibility in deciding negligence cases; only then will justice stand a chance. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10566/381 Files in this item: 1
DeVilleMandersonDerridea2007.pdf (1.236Mb)
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